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123

JUS COGENS

AND THE QUESTION OF CRITERIA FOR ITS DETERMINATION

But it is much worse if the government of that entity incites the perpetration of

genocide or similar acts against its own inhabitants.

34

In this case the State itself is

commiting genocide, since its public incitement testifies to certain criminal intent.

Usually this is a continuing act which requires a countermeasure of self-help for its

cessation taken by the international community against the guilty State.

35

However,

using counter-genocide as a countermeasure to the genocide is not possible.

36

The

case of Serbia’s tragic adventure (1999) is proof of this.

After the failure of measures which did not involve the use of armed force, as

mainly decided by the Security Council in accordance with Article 41 of the UN

Charter (S/RES/1160, 31 March 1998),

37

self-help using force was used, as ethnic

cleansing against the Albanians in Kosovo continued (with the deaths of over 1,500

Kosovar Albanians and 400,000 people forced from their homes). The international

community became gravely concerned about the escalating conflict, its humanitarian

consequences, and the risk of it spreading to other countries, particularly to

neighboring Macedonia, where a population of 25% Albanians lives, in comparison

with 64.2% Macedonians for the whole population (2,022,547, census 2002).

NATO governments decided upon military action, carried out on 23 March 1999.

38

In the case of

Rwanda,

the genocide committed there can be described as the

most horrific massacre in history. The ending of that genocidal mass slaughter was

wholly in the hands of the holder of territorial sovereignty, which means the Rwanda

government, which even agreed to punish the perpetrators. The assassination of Tutsi

and moderate Hutu in Rwanda by members of the Hutu majority was mostly the

result of tribal differences; it was the culmination of longstanding ethnic competition

and tensions between the Hutu majority and the minority Tutsi. During the

approximate 100-day period from 7 April to mid-July 1994 an estimated 800,000–

1,000,000 Rwandans were killed, constituting as much as 20% of the country’s total

34

In this relation relevant passages of the Genocide convetion (see note 28 above) are cited: Article 2.

– “In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to

destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: • (a) Killing members

of the group; • (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; • (c) Deliberately

inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or

in part; • (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; • (e) Forcibly transferring

children of the group to another group.” Article 3. – “The following acts shall be punishable: • (a)

Genocide; • (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; • (c) Direct and public incitement to commit

genocide; • (d) Attempt to commit genocide; • (e) Complicity in genocide”.

35

ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), Article 30 –

“The State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation: (a) to cease that act,

if it is continuing; (…)”.

36

See Report of the International Law Commission (2001), Commentary to Article 26. Compliance with

peremptory norms, p. 85, para 4: “(…) countermeasures may not derogate from (…) (a peremptory

norm): for example, a genocide cannot justify a counter-genocide.”

37

Cf.

https://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/yugoslav/summary.htm.

38

For details see

http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm