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276

ONDŘEJ SVAČEK

CYIL 6 ȍ2015Ȏ

prosecution is not or has not been genuine,

i.e.

where the State is unwilling or unable

to genuinely carry out investigation or prosecution.

10

This particular aspect will be

analyzed in detail in the next chapter.

Complementarity may be assessed discretely (under Article 18 and Article 19 of

the ICC Statute) or in the context of other decisions (e.g. issuance of arrest warrant

under Article 58 of the ICC Statute).

11

Under Article 18 a State may seek a ruling on

admissibility at an early stage of proceedings, even before a ‘case’ has been identified,

i.e

. when the matter is still at the ‘situation’ stage.

12

This provision has not been

applied in practice – C. Stahn considers it to be a dead letter.

13

On the other hand,

challenges to admissibility of a

case

under Article 19 have been used widely by States

(Kenya, Libya and Côte d’Ivoire),

14

defendants (Katanga, Bemba, Gbagbo), and even

by the Court itself on the basis of Article 19(1) of the ICC Statute (Uganda).

Early case law of the ICC shed some light on basic concepts of complementarity;

nevertheless it did not escape some critics pointing to the fact that adopting a strict

interpretation of Article 17 (

e.g.

the same person and substantially the same conduct

test or understanding of unwillingness and inability) makes it difficult for States to

meet its requirements.

15

Some of the scholars even proposed an alternative approach

on how to assess the willingness of States to genuinely carry out investigation and

prosecution.

16

These ideas nevertheless extend beyond the scope of the present article

10

Unwillingness is defined in Article 17(2) of the ICC Statute, inability in Article 17(3) of the ICC

Statute. Unwillingness and inability are therefore exceptions to the inadmissibility principle. Compare

SAFFERLING, Christoph.

International Criminal Procedure

. Oxford: OUP, 2012, p. 102.

11

In the latter scenario the ACH ruled that the PTCH should exercise its discretion in consideration of

admissibility only when it is appropriate in the circumstances of the case, bearing in mind the interest

of the suspect. Such circumstances may include instances where a case is based on the established

jurisprudence of the Court, uncontested facts that render a case clearly inadmissible. To put it

differently, the PTCH should only consider admissibility on an exceptional basis when issuing an

arrest of warrant.

Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

. ICC-01/04-169. Judgment on the

Prosecutor’s Appeal Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled ‘Decision on the Prosecutor’s

Application for Warrant of Arrest, Article 58, ACH, 13 July 2006, para 52.

12

Schabas, W.: sub 8, p. 354. The dividing line between ‘situation’ and ‘case’ is not precise. The potential

case starts to become a case in the course of investigation; this process is completed by issuance of an arrest

of warrant or a summons to appear. Compare SCHABAS, William. Selecting Situations and Cases. In:

Stahn, Carsten (ed.)

The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court

. Oxford: OUP, 2015, p. 367.

13

Stahn, C.: sub 1, p. 240.

14

Challenges to admissibility by States were expected in situations where the ICC engaged without

consent of domestic authorities,

i.e.

in the context of the Security Council (SC) referral (Libya) and

proprio motu

action of the Prosecutor (Kenya). Strategy of Côte d’Ivoire is twofold: with respect

to Laurent Gbagbo it sided the ICC, with respect to his wife, Simon Gbagbo, it (unsuccessfully)

challenged admissibility and preferred exercise of domestic jurisdiction.

15

PITTS, Christopher. Being Able to Prosecute Saif Al-Isalam Gaddafi: Applying Article 17 (3) of the

Rome Statute to Libya.

Emory International Law Review

. 2013, vol. 27, p. 1339.

16

HELLER, Kevin Jon. A Sentence-Based Theory of Complementarity.

Harvard International Law

Journal.

2012, vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 86-133.