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POSTǧLISBON EXERCISE OF EU COMPETENCE IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT…
far-reaching argument as traditional investment international instruments, such as
BITs, typically deal with the post-establishment protection standards. To carve post-
establishment standards out from EU FDI competence would amount to leaving the
Member States’ extra-EU BITs almost untouched and the Union with not much to do.
The Commission argues that both market access and post-establishment protection of
investments are covered by the new competence and this view seems to be supported
by scholars arguing that the Union’s CCP competence does not limit itself to market
access and includes post-entry aspects too.
42
Finally, and once it is admitted that the Union can lay down post-establishment
protection standards, the discussion moves to a more detailed level as to whether the
Union can regulate all such standards and to what extent. In this context, the debate
has focused on the existence and nature of the EU’s competence over expropriation
given that Art. 345 TFEU provides that “[t]he Treaties shall in no way prejudice the
rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership”. In this aspect,
the debate seems to evolve, however, less around the possible exclusivity of the Union’s
competence, and more around the question of whether the expropriation falls
under shared competence or whether it is entirely under the Member States’ control.
43
Whereas the responses to these interrogations determine in principle the extent
of the EU-law illegality that the extra-EU BITs trigger and set the limits for the
review that the Commission can conduct, the Extra-EU BITs Regulation does not
make any distinction in this respect and qualifies the instruments falling under its
scope simply by the respective dates of their signature. Whether this absence of
further distinguishing can shed light on the intra-EU division of competence is,
however, doubtful given that this regulation states to be “[w]ithout prejudice to the
division of competences established by the TFEU”.
44
As to the second point, one should also consider the EU-law status of the extra-
EU BITs from the perspective of Art. 351 TFEU that was briefly invoked earlier.
Art. 351 TFEU is an intriguing provision of EU primary law which reflects on
the Union’s international legal context and on the legal “hardship” that EU-law
commitments may bring internationally for the Member States. Its first clause
guarantees that the agreements concluded by the Member States prior to establishing
or joining the Union shall not be affected by EU law. The second clause of the
same provision lays down an obligation of the Member States to eliminate any
incompatibilities between said agreements and EU law.
45
Unsurprisingly, striking the
42
See e.g. EECKHOUT, P.,
EU External Relations Law
,
op. cit.,
fn. No. 37, p. 64.
43
On this and other aspects of the competence under Art. 207 TFEU see BURGSTALLER, M., “The
Energy Charter Treaty as a Mixed Agreement: a Model for Future European Investment Treaties?”
in
COOP, G., Energy Dispute Resolution:…,”
op. cit
., fn. No. 37, pp. 125-153, p. 133.
44
Art. 1 of the Extra-EU BITs Regulation quoted above fn. No. 13.
45
For more on Art. 351 TFEU see FORTEAU, M., “La place des conventions internationales dans l’ordre
juridique de l’Union européenne”
in
BENLOLO-CARABOT, M., CANDAŞ, U., CUJO, E. (dir.),