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MAGDALENA LIČKOVÁ
CYIL 6 ȍ2015Ȏ
or whether it violates investors’ acquired rights seems to be subject to controversy
evolving around the nature of the rights granted by the given investment treaty and
a possible challenge before an investment tribunal cannot be excluded.
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This issue
will be of less relevance if, and to the extent that, the terminated extra-EU BIT is less
attractive to the eye of the concerned investors than the protection offered by the new
instrument concluded by the Union.
Independently of any indirect international-law ramifications that the Extra-
EU BITs Regulation may have, this instrument remains focused on intra-EU
management of the extra-EU BITs. Intra-EU focus is also what, overall, characterizes
EU regulation on intra-EU apportionment of financial responsibility that may arise in
investment arbitration, which is another piece of EU legislation adopted as a part
of the preparation for the future exercise of EU foreign investment competence.
Besides its mainly EU-domestic focus, this regime aims however, incidentally and
debatably, to induce some international legal effects.
B. Intra-EU Management of Investment-Related Financial Responsibility
A second major piece of EU legislation adopted in view of the future exercise by
the Union of its powers in the field of foreign investment protection is Regulation
No. 912/2014 establishing a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to
investor-to-state dispute settlement tribunals established by international agreements
to which the European Union is party
(“Financial Responsibility Regulation”).
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This regulation lays down rules apportioning at the intra-EU level the financial
obligations incurred in an investment arbitration.
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On the procedural side, it aims
at determining whether the Union or a Member State will act as respondent, and
it also gives guidance as to how payments under awards and settlement agreements
shall be processed. It connects with the above referred discussion on the scope of
EU competence over foreign investment in as much as it explicates that neither its
existence nor its application affects the intra-EU division of competences. Therefore
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For arguments that the law of treaties allows contracting parties to abrogate survival clauses through
mutual agreement extinguishing unexercised rights of investors (i.e. rights in which no claim was
launched prior to termination) see VOON, T., MITCHELL, A., MUNRO, J., “Parting Ways: The
Impact of Mutual Termination of Investment Treaties on Investor Rights”,
ICSID Review
, vol. 29,
No. 2 (2014), pp. 451-473. For a different view including more investor-friendly arguments see
HARRISON, J., “The Life and Death of BITs: Legal Issues Concerning Survival Clauses and the
Termination of Investment Treaties”,
J. World Investment & Trade
(2012), vol. 13, pp. 928-950.
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Regulation (EU) No. 912/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014
establishing a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-to-state dispute
settlement tribunals established by international agreements to which the European Union is party, OJ
L 257, 28. 8. 2014, p. 1210.
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See Art. 2 g) and b) of the Financial Responsibility Regulation quoted above, fn. No. 56.