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336
MAGDALENA LIČKOVÁ
CYIL 6 ȍ2015Ȏ
the one shaped in the CETA and EUSFTA in as much as its first rule provides the
Union with the possibility to project internationally its vision as to who the right
respondent should be, while the default rule imposes a ready-made solution (which,
however, differs in the UNCLOS case, on one part, and in the CETA/EUSFTA case,
on the other part).
The “internationalist” approach is challenged by the “Europeanist” one suggesting
that the attribution of international responsibility to the Union or to the Member
States should copy the intra-EU division of competences and that the international
responsibility should be borne by the actor who has “normative control”
91
over
the challenged measure. This approach points to the fact that under EU law there
are situations in which the Member States’ authorities act
as bras arm
é of the EU
institutions without the possibility to depart from the course of action defined at
the EU level. This is a specific aspect of the intra-EU constitutional arrangement,
referred to as executive federalism. Because the EU institutions and not the Member
States’ ones are entitled to adopt the relevant legal acts, it is also the former and
not the latter that can remedy possible international law violation. Therefore, the
attribution of international responsibility should follow the logic of EU “executive
federalism” and be associated with the appropriate regulatory level within the Union.
The international practice is divided and sides sometimes with one, sometimes
with the other approach. The internationalist reading corresponds to the first part
of the reasoning followed by the European Court of Human Rights (the “ECtHR”)
in the
Bosphorus
case where it held that while the ECHR parties are free to transfer
their sovereign power to an “international (including a supranational) organization”,
they remain “responsible under Article 1 of the [ECHR] for all acts and omissions
of [their] organs regardless of whether the act or omission in question was a
consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to comply with international legal
obligations.”
92
Although, as a second step, the ECtHR famously formulated its
rebuttable presumption of equivalent protection benefiting measures that the ECHR
contracting parties take when doing “no more than implement[ing] legal obligations
flowing from its membership of the [European Union]”,
93
the ECtHR did not engage
in any competence-related assessment at the level of the attribution of responsibility.
any specific matter. The organization and the member States concerned shall provide this information.
Failure to provide this information within a reasonable time or the provision of contradictory
information shall result in joint and several liability.”
91
Hoffmeister (F.), “Litigating Against the European Union and Its Member States – Who Responds
Under the ILC’s Draft Articles on International Responsibility of International Organizations?”,
EJIL
(2010) vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 723-747, p. 741. In favour of the competence-based approach also
KUIJPER, P.J., PASSIVIRTA, E., EU International Responsibility and its Attribution …”,
op. cit
., fn.
No. 69.
92
Judgment of the ECtHR (Grand Chamber), 30 Jun. 2005,
Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret
Anonim șirketi v. Ireland
, application No. 45036/98, par. 152-154.”
93
Par. 156, 159-165 of the judgment
Bosphorus
quoted above fn. No. 92.