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The Gazette otthe Incorporated Law Society of Ireland.

[FEBRUARY, 1914

(II.) " In all suits and proceedings under

any of the provisions of the County Officers

and Courts (Ireland) Act, 1877, Part II.,

other than those provided for above in the

' lower ' scale, there shall be paid the costs set

forth in the column headed ' higher scale.'

(V.) " The value of the subject-matter of

any suit for the taxation of stamp duties, and

the allowances of fees, costs, charges and

expenses shall, in case of dispute, be assessed

by the Judge.

X. "As to all fees and allowances which

are discretionary the officer on taxation shall

take into consideration the amount or value

of the subject of litigation."

Although part of the claim was for an

order that the defendant should pay, and

although a period was usually given for pay

ment before the sale of the lands was decreed,

the suit was not of the nature of a personal

action. The gist of the suit was that the debt

might be put on the lands by way of charge,

and the charge realised out of the lands.

When the lands were sold the court was

bound to distribute the purchase money

according to

law, and

to ascertain

the

priorities of the incumbrances

inter se

and

distribute the purchase money in accordance

with the rights of the various persons holding

interest in the lands. The subject of litiga

tion or the subject-matter of the suit must be

something having a money value or capable

of having a money value ;

it might be the

mortgage debt—the claim—or it might be the

lands or property—viz., the sale whereout the

claim was to be satisfied ;

it could not be

both in the aggregate, nor need it necessarily

be something the value of which was known

at the commencement of the proceedings,

because, as had been seen, in the case of a

bank giving an equitable mortgage

the

amount of the mortgage debt had to be a

subject of

inquiry.

The subject-matter

appeared to be some one thing the value of

which was to be the test as to the scale of

costs.

If the amount of the claim was the

subject-matter

in all representative suits

there would be more than one subject-matter.

He thought that the subject-matter meant the

material which was to be operated upon by

the decree of the Judge for the purpose of

satisfying the plaintiff's claim in the suit,

and that in this case could only mean the

lands.

In an administration suit it would be

absurd to say that the creditor's demand was

the subject-matter of the suit, or the subject

of litigation. That the assets constituted the

subject-matter of

the suit seemed plain.

The proof of.the plaintiff's claim was not

usually a matter of much trouble, but the

realization of the property out of which that

i

claim and the claims of other chargeants had

i

to be satisfied was, in the ordinary course, a

|

troublesome and expensive proceeding.

;

If the value of the subject-matter was not

I

known at the commencement of the suit it

i

could be assessed by the Judge at any time

I

under rule V. He reversed the order appealed

from and remitted the case to the Registrar

with a direction to tax the costs on the

" higher scale."

(Reported

Irish Law Times Reports,

Vol.

XLVIIL, p. 25.)

KING'S BENCH DIVISION (ENGLAND).

(Before RIDLEY and BANKES, JJ.)

HARPER

v.

EYJOLFSSON.

Jan. 15, 1914.—

Solicitors—Unqualified Clerk

—Remuneration—Business introduced

Proportion of profits—Determination of

engagement—Continuance of agreement—•

Solicitors Act,

1843 (6

6-

7

Vict., c.

73),

-

s. 32.

Though an agreement which provides that

a solicitor's clerk, who is not a qualified

solicitor, is to receive by way of remuneration

a proportion of

the profits on business

introduced by him to the solicitor is in itself

legitimate, yet where such an agreement also

provides that such payment is to continue

after the determination of the Clerk's engage

ment, the inference is that the business is the

business of the clerk and not of the solicitor,

and the agreement is therefore illegal undei

s. 32 of the Solicitors Acts, 1843.

This was an appeal by the defendant in an

action tried in the Mayor's Court, London,

before the Common Serjeant and a jury.

The action was brought by Mr. Harper, a

managing clerk in the employment of Messrs.

Nimmo and Co., solicitors, of 10 and 12

Copthall Avenue, against the defendant, the

managing director of a Cqmpany known as

the Finance Corporation (Limited), to recover

damages for malicious prosecution in the

following circumstances. The plaintiff and