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The Gazette otthe Incorporated Law Society of Ireland.
[FEBRUARY, 1914
(II.) " In all suits and proceedings under
any of the provisions of the County Officers
and Courts (Ireland) Act, 1877, Part II.,
other than those provided for above in the
' lower ' scale, there shall be paid the costs set
forth in the column headed ' higher scale.'
(V.) " The value of the subject-matter of
any suit for the taxation of stamp duties, and
the allowances of fees, costs, charges and
expenses shall, in case of dispute, be assessed
by the Judge.
X. "As to all fees and allowances which
are discretionary the officer on taxation shall
take into consideration the amount or value
of the subject of litigation."
Although part of the claim was for an
order that the defendant should pay, and
although a period was usually given for pay
ment before the sale of the lands was decreed,
the suit was not of the nature of a personal
action. The gist of the suit was that the debt
might be put on the lands by way of charge,
and the charge realised out of the lands.
When the lands were sold the court was
bound to distribute the purchase money
according to
law, and
to ascertain
the
priorities of the incumbrances
inter se
and
distribute the purchase money in accordance
with the rights of the various persons holding
interest in the lands. The subject of litiga
tion or the subject-matter of the suit must be
something having a money value or capable
of having a money value ;
it might be the
mortgage debt—the claim—or it might be the
lands or property—viz., the sale whereout the
claim was to be satisfied ;
it could not be
both in the aggregate, nor need it necessarily
be something the value of which was known
at the commencement of the proceedings,
because, as had been seen, in the case of a
bank giving an equitable mortgage
the
amount of the mortgage debt had to be a
subject of
inquiry.
The subject-matter
appeared to be some one thing the value of
which was to be the test as to the scale of
costs.
If the amount of the claim was the
subject-matter
in all representative suits
there would be more than one subject-matter.
He thought that the subject-matter meant the
material which was to be operated upon by
the decree of the Judge for the purpose of
satisfying the plaintiff's claim in the suit,
and that in this case could only mean the
lands.
In an administration suit it would be
absurd to say that the creditor's demand was
the subject-matter of the suit, or the subject
of litigation. That the assets constituted the
subject-matter of
the suit seemed plain.
The proof of.the plaintiff's claim was not
usually a matter of much trouble, but the
realization of the property out of which that
i
claim and the claims of other chargeants had
i
to be satisfied was, in the ordinary course, a
|
troublesome and expensive proceeding.
;
If the value of the subject-matter was not
I
known at the commencement of the suit it
i
could be assessed by the Judge at any time
I
under rule V. He reversed the order appealed
from and remitted the case to the Registrar
with a direction to tax the costs on the
" higher scale."
(Reported
Irish Law Times Reports,
Vol.
XLVIIL, p. 25.)
KING'S BENCH DIVISION (ENGLAND).
(Before RIDLEY and BANKES, JJ.)
HARPER
v.
EYJOLFSSON.
Jan. 15, 1914.—
Solicitors—Unqualified Clerk
—Remuneration—Business introduced
—
Proportion of profits—Determination of
engagement—Continuance of agreement—•
Solicitors Act,
1843 (6
6-
7
Vict., c.
73),
-
s. 32.
Though an agreement which provides that
a solicitor's clerk, who is not a qualified
solicitor, is to receive by way of remuneration
a proportion of
the profits on business
introduced by him to the solicitor is in itself
legitimate, yet where such an agreement also
provides that such payment is to continue
after the determination of the Clerk's engage
ment, the inference is that the business is the
business of the clerk and not of the solicitor,
and the agreement is therefore illegal undei
s. 32 of the Solicitors Acts, 1843.
This was an appeal by the defendant in an
action tried in the Mayor's Court, London,
before the Common Serjeant and a jury.
The action was brought by Mr. Harper, a
managing clerk in the employment of Messrs.
Nimmo and Co., solicitors, of 10 and 12
Copthall Avenue, against the defendant, the
managing director of a Cqmpany known as
the Finance Corporation (Limited), to recover
damages for malicious prosecution in the
following circumstances. The plaintiff and