Background Image
Previous Page  29 / 52 Next Page
Information
Show Menu
Previous Page 29 / 52 Next Page
Page Background

Special Issue

l

THE NEWYLS

CBA RECORD

29

beneficiaries of the estate, which was valued

at approximately $700,000.

Approximately six months after being

appointed the independent administrator,

Karavidas began withdrawing funds from the

estate’s assets for his own personal use, which

quickly became a pattern of Karavidas with-

drawing and repaying funds from the estate’s

assets. Karavidas ultimately made loans to him-

self in the total amount of nearly $450,000.

In 2006, Karavidas’s sister retained a

lawyer to represent her and her mother,

and sought to terminate the independent

administration and remove him as execu-

tor. The petition alleged that Karavidas

had failed to provide an inventory or an

accounting of his administration. The

probate court terminated the indepen-

dent administration of the estate, and

Karavidas’s sister succeeded him as execu-

tor. Following that, the ARDC initiated

proceedings, and charged Karavidas in

a one-count complaint, alleging that

he engaged in conversion, breached his

fiduciary duties, violated Illinois Rule of

Professional Conduct 8.4(a)(4) by engag-

ing in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,

deceit, or misrepresentation, violated IRPC

8.4(a)(5) by engaging in conduct prejudi-

cial to the administration of justice, and

violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 770

by engaging in conduct which tends to

defeat the administration of justice or to

bring the courts of the legal profession into

disrepute. The ARDC’s Hearing Board

found against Karavidas on all charges,

with the exception of finding that since

Karavidas took no affirmative steps to con-

ceal his dishonesty and because he repaid

the amounts that he borrowed, Karavidas

did not violate IRPC 8.4(a)(4). The Hear-

ing Board recommended that Karavidas

be suspended from the practice of law for

four months. Both parties appealed to the

Review Board, which reversed the Hearing

Board’s decision, and recommended that

the charges against Karavidas be dismissed

in their entirety, because the Administra-

tor did not prove by clear and convincing

evidence that Karavidas had violated the

Rules of Professional Conduct.

On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed

with the Review Board. The Supreme

Court found that while Karavidas did

breach his fiduciary duties to the estate in

a number of ways, “an attorney’s breach

of fiduciary duty or conversion does not,

standing alone, warrant the imposition of

professional discipline.”

Karavidas,

at ¶ 78.

The Supreme Court went on to say that

“discipline for conduct occurring outside

the attorney-client relationship should be

limited to situations where the attorney’s

conduct violates the Rules by demon-

strating a lack of professional or personal

honesty which renders him unworthy of

public confidence.” In sum, “professional

discipline may be imposed only upon a

showing by clear and convincing evidence

that the respondent attorney has violated

one or more of the Rules of Professional

Conduct. Mere bad behavior that does not

violate one of the Rules is insufficient.”

Karavidas,

at ¶ 79.

At the time

Karavidas

was issued, many

considered it to be a departure from the

Supreme Court’s earlier jurisprudence,

including Justice Robert Thomas. As Jus-

tice Thomas explained in his dissent, the

Supreme Court had previously held in

multiple cases that an attorney may be dis-

ciplined for conduct not specifically prohib-

ited by the Rules.

Karavidas,

at ¶ 107. The

Court itself noted as much in the majority

opinion, stating that “[t]o the extent that any

of our prior cases suggest that an attorney

may be subjected to professional discipline

for conduct that is not prohibited by the

Rules of Professional Conduct or defined as

misconduct therein, we hereby reject such a

suggestion.”

Karavidas,

at ¶ 103.

In the wake of the Supreme Court’s

shift, practitioners were left wondering

how further jurisprudence would develop.

Almost exactly one year later, on November

20, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its

decision in

Karavidas’s

companion case,

In

re Edmonds.

In re Edmonds

In 1998, John P. Edmonds was asked to

assist in rewriting a will and establishing a

charitable trust for the benefit of St. Mark’s

Roman Catholic Church and its associ-

ated school in Peoria, Illinois. Edmonds

agreed, and after the death of the testator

in 2000, Edmonds became the trustee of

the charitable trust. At that time, the trust

was valued at approximately $3.36 million.

Almost immediately, Edmonds began

investing the trust’s assets in a Canadian

energy company, and by February 2001

Edmonds had invested nearly all of the

trust’s assets in that one company. In

March 2003, the British Columbia Secu-

rities Commission suspended trading of

the company’s stock due to the company’s

failure to file required documents. A subse-

quent lawsuit, brought by another investor,

rendered a $14 million judgment for the

benefit of the trust. Thereafter, Edmonds

took steps on behalf of the trust to settle

the judgment for two $1 million payments.

Despite the significant deterioration

of the financial condition of the trust,

Edmonds continued to make sporadic

distributions to St. Mark’s, primarily by

depositing his own personal funds into

the trust account and then making distri-

butions from the trust account. In 2005,

St. Mark’s pastor and parish trustee met

with Edmonds to discuss the trust assets.

At that meeting, Edmonds explained that

he had shifted the trust’s assets to oil and

natural gas. Edmonds provided a report

on the trust’s assets (the “August 2005

Report”), which stated that the trust held

a 20% interest in the energy company and

“various additional equity holdings.” The

August 2005 Report also indicated that

the value of the trust was approximately

$3 million and that the health of the trust

had not changed significantly since Sep-

tember 2001. The August 2005 Report

did not disclose that the energy company

had failed to make payments pursuant to

the forbearance agreement.

Beginning in 2006, after the trust’s

payments to the church became sporadic,

the church began demanding more infor-

mation about the trust’s assets and hold-

ings, which Edmonds refused to provide.

In September 2008, St. Mark’s filed suit