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GAZETTE
MAY 1 9 89
i
"Certificate to be issued by the Medical
Bureau of Road Safety under Section 22
of the Road Traffic (Amendment) Act,
1978."
It was further contended in the District Court
that this heading did not form part of the
Certificate.
The Respondent was convicted in the
District Court and appealed to the High
Court by way of case stated. In the High
Court it was submitted on behalf of the
Respondent that because the "heading" did
not form part of the Certificate and because
it referred to a Certificate "to be issued" by
the Bureau under Section 22, this so called
heading was inadequate and the Certificate
should have contained a specific statement
to the effect that "This Certificate is issued
under Section 22 of the Act" or words to
that effect.
In both Courts the Certificate was
contrasted with the one provided for in the
Regulations made under the 1968 Road
Traffic Act which Certificate had a sentence
stating that the Certificate was issued under
Paragraph (a) Sub-section 3 of Section 43
of the Road Traffic Act, 1968. It was also
pointed out that the insertion of such
statement was restored by the draftsman
under the 1987 Regulations, the draftsman
apparently considering that the wording of
Section 23(2) required a statement that the
Certificate is issued under the Act.
The learned High Court Judge found in
favour of the Respondent and his decision
was appealed to the Supreme Court.
After reviewing the facts and the evidence
it was held in the Supreme Court that no
reasonable individual receiving the
Certificate and reading it could conclude
other than that it was issued and was on its
face shown to be issued by the Medical
Bureau of Road Safety under Section 22 of
the Act. The form of words used in the
Certificate was unimportant so long as it
was clear to the recipient that the Certificate
was issued under Section 22 of the Act. The
Supreme Court accordingly upheld the
Appeal answered question submitted in the
case stated in the following manner: -
"The document issued by the Medical
Bureau of Road Safety dated the 21st of
October, 1985 satisfied the requirements
of Section 22 and Section 23(2) of the
Road Traffic (Amendment) Act, 1978."
John Connolly -v- Liam Sweeney - Supreme
Court - per Griffin J. and McCarthy J.
(Finlay C.J. concurring) - 17 December,
1987.
[19881 ILRM 483.
GEORGE BRUEN
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY
Plaintiff employed in Defendant's dairy
injured in fall on broken milk bottle - no
protective gloves supplied - no evidence
of practice in other dairies or of any
common practice - case withdrawn
f r om Jury - Plaintiff successfully
appealed - injury was foreeeable and
there was a question for Jury to
determine.
The Plaintiff sustained injuries on his
forearm near his right wrist whilst working
at the Defendant's dairy premises at
Rathfarnham, Dublin. His duties involved
both getting out crates of bottled milk for
delivery and tidying up at the end of a
loading session; crates with broken bottles
would be rejected and the Plaintiff's job
included sorting out the broken bottles by
hand and stacking crates containing sound
^bottles. Whilst carrying a crate the Plaintiff
stood on the neck of a bottle and fell causing
the bottle to fall out of the crate thereby
breaking and causing injury to his forearm.
He sued his employers on the express basis
that he was not supplied with proper
protective clothing such as appropriate
gloves with gauntlets. The evidence for the
Plaintiff included that of an Engineer who
testified as to the need to wear appropriate
gloves in the glass manufacturing industry
but had been unable, due to refusal of
access, to learn what was established
practice in commercial dairies. At conclusion
of Plaintiff's case, Counsel for the Defendant
relying on a statement of law in the case of
Bradley -v- C.I.E.
[1976] I.R.217 successfully
applied to withdraw the case from the Jury
on the grounds that the Plaintiff had failed
to establish that employers in the same
business supplied gloves or if not that his
employers were obviously imprudent or
unreasonable in not providing the particular
gloves and gauntlets. The Plaintiff's Appeal
was upheld by majority decision (Hederman
J. and McCarthy J. - Finlay C.J. Diss).
HELD: There was adequate evidence upon
which the Jury might conclude that it was
unreasonable on the part of the employers
not to provide appropriate protective gloves
and gauntlets to employees involved in
carrying crates of empty bottles, some of
them broken and consequently jagged. The
essential question in all actions of negligence
is whether or not the party charged has
failed to take reasonable care whether by act
or omission and (Per McCarthy J):
"Bradley's
case is not to be construed as laying down
for all time two unchanging compartments
into one or both of which every Plaintiff
claim must be brought if it is to succeed"
Finlay C.J. in his minority judgment was
of opinion that the Plaintiff must prove in
accordance with the principles laid down in
Bradley -v- C.I.E.
and in this instance the
injury might just as easily have been inflicted
on the Plaintiff's side, his shoulder or his
chest as it was on his arm. It would clearly
not be reasonable or practicable for an
employer to seek to protect his workmen as
to the whole of his body or the upper part
of his body from cutting by broken glass
whilst carrying out the type of work which
the Plaintiff was doing on this occassion.
Richard Kennedy -v- Hughes Dairy Ltd. -
Supreme Court per McCarthy J. & Hederman
J. - (Finlay C. J diss.) 22nd July 1988 -
[1989] ILRM 117.
FRANKLIN O'SULLiyAN
PROCEDURE - CASE STATED
The Circuit Court has jurisdiction to
state a Cass to the Supreme Court at any
time in proceedings pursuant to Section
16 of the Courts Act 1947 although in
general all material facts ought to be
found first.
On the hearing of an application to the
Circuit Court for a licence under the
Intoxicating Liquor Acts objectors sought to
rely on a number of points. One such point
involved a contention that the Court was
precluded by the Intoxicating Liquor Acts
from granting the licence. Having heard
evidence on that point alone, and before
hearing evidence as to the other grounds of
objection, the Circuit Judge purported to
state a Case, pursuant to Section 16 of the
Courts Act 1947, for the opinion of the
Supreme Court on the point of statutory
interpretation under the Intoxicating Liquor
Acts. A preliminary point arose as to
whether the Supreme Court was prevented
from answering a Case Stated under Section
16 before all the evidence which might under
certain circumstances fall to be considered
by the Circuit Court had been heard. In
support of the contention that the Court was
so prevented reliance was placed on the
earlier Supreme Court decisions in
Corley -
v- Gill
[19751 IR 313 and
Dolan -v- Corn
Exchange
[1975] IR 315.
HELD by the Supreme Court (Finlay C. J.
and Walsh J., McCarthy J. concurring;
Henchy and Griffin J. J. dissenting).
1. (i) Section 16 did not unambiguously
prohibit the stating of a Case until all the
evidence had been heard and concluded;
(ii) the adjournment of pronouncement
of judgment or order by the Circuit Court
pending determination by the Supreme
Court of the Case Stated was
mandatory notwithstanding the use of
the word "may" in Section 16 but that
conclusion did not exclude the power of
the Circuit Court to adjourn any other
part of the proceedings pending before
it as well as the pronouncement of the
judgment or order;
(iii) every court had an inherent
jurisdiction in order to secure the due
administration of justice to adjourn any
part of the hearing of a case before it
and Section 16 did not clearly and un-
ambiguously remove that jurisdiction;
(iv) bearing in mind the purpose of
Section 16 and the procedure which the
Oireachtas intended to create, a court
must have ample powers of ensuring
that it does not pronounce or deliver a
judgment which is not justly in
accordance with the facts and the law
as found and that a Case could be stated
at any stage of the proceedings;
(v) it was generally desirable that all the
material facts should be found and the
evidence concerning them heard before
a Case was stated and, without deciding
it finally, it was difficult to conceive of
a Case stated without any evidence at all;
(vi) having regard to the Supreme Court
authorities on
Stare Decisis,
the
requirements to do justice in the instant
case and the fundamental importance
of relationships between the Circuit
Court and the Supreme Court, the
power of the Supreme Court to entertain
a Case stated was more flexible and
more expansive than decided in
Corley
-v- Gill
and
Dolan -v- Corn Exchange;
and
(vii) accordingly, it was proper for the
Supreme Court to hear and determine
the question raised in the Case stated.
2. (Per McCarthy J)
(i) the decision when to state a Case
was best left to the discretion of the
Circuit Court; and
ii