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Before he could entertain any application for a

declaration which would bind the Registrar of Political

Parties, the Registrar would have to be represented

before him and would have to be entitled to put for-

ward submissions as to what matters in his view should

influence him in deciding whether or not a party was

genuine or organised as set out in the Section.

In the absence of the Registrar as a party in these

proceedings it seemed to him he could make no declara-

tion which in some way bound him and he did not

propose to do so.

The President said he thought that that consideration

prevented him making any of the first three declarations

claimed in paragraph two of the statement of claim—

that the Registrar's decision was wrong; that the party

was at all material times a genuine political party within

the meaning of Section 13 (2) of the Act; and that the

party was organised to contest a Dáil or local elections.

On the question of the claim for a declaration that

the appeal board was wrongly constituted the President

said that here they were faced with questions of some

difficulty.

Having referred to the constitution of the appeal

board the President said that having applied for regis-

tration of the party and been refused by the Registrar

of Political Parties, they then asked for the constitution

of the appeal board. The appeal board apparently was

constituted and met and, one gathered from a letter of

16th March 1965 that on that day it decided to hold a

public sitting on March 19th at which the question

would be considered. Unfortunately, on March 18th

Dáil Eireann was dissolved and the question had been

argued as to what was the position arising from the

dissolution of Dáil Eireann on March 18th, the appeal

board having taken place on March 19th.

The President said that the plaintiffs were repre-

sented before this appeal board on March 19th at a

time when it must have been obvious to them that the

Dáil had been dissolved; the Ceann Comhairle was no

longer chairman of Dáil Eireann, if the contention now

put forward was correct. It might be that they did not

advert to that at the time and it might be that the

members of the appeal board did not advert to it.

Whatever the reason, the plaintiffs proceeded with their

application to the appeal board as if the appeal board

was properly constituted.

Afterthought

The appeal board upheld the decision of the Registrar

and it was not for quite some time after that that the

plaintiffs decided to complain as to the lack of juris-

diction of the board.

They first brought proceedings claiming a declaration

that the Statute was unconstitutional and it was only as

an afterthought that they claimed in relation to the

constitution of the board. This was perhaps not sur-

prising when one considered what the practical merits

of their claim in relation to the board were. If they had

succeeded in their appeal they would hardly have com-

plained as to the lack of jurisdiction of the board.

Having lost their appeal they now complained of the

lack of jurisdiction. They submitted that because there

was no person who could be described as the chairman

of Dáil Eireann the board could not function at all

during the period of the dissolution.

It became necessary to determine whether the board

was or was not properly constituted. It was hardly

intended that the framers of the legislation intended

that there should be no properly constituted board

during a period of dissolution of Dáil Eireann. In addi-

tion to that there was the point that the Standing

Orders of Dáil Eireann provided that the Ceann

Comhairle, who had been a member of the board on

March 16th, was not the chairman of Dáil Eireann on

March 19th and that the board on which he sat was not

properly constituted. The President said he thought that

the board could have functioned on March 19th with

Mr. Justice Kenny and the chairman of Seanad Eireann

constituting a majority and could have carried on.

That did not arise, however, because it had been

conceded on behalf of the board that if it should be

held that the Ceann Comhairle was not in fact the

Ceann Comhairle on March 19th, that the fact that he

sat with the other members was to be regarded as

invalidating the decision.

No Jurisdiction

In the result, in his view, he should make the declara-

tion that the board was not properly constituted on

March 19th and that the decision was accordingly made

without jurisdiction. The President said he had been

asked to express a view on the merits of the decision

but he felt he should not do so. In the result, he could

not deal with the claim for a declaration that the

board's decision was wrong in law.

In an

obiter dictum,

the President said that in his

view the Registrar had adopted far too high a standard

in his requirements of genuineness of organisations.

That was not to say that if the matter came before the

Registrar again he was bound by what was now being

said, or that the evidence of what was the situation in

1965 was the same as the evidence as to the situation

today or at some future date whenever the matter came

up again. But for himself—and it was entirely

obiter

dictum

—it seemed to him that the standard required by

the Registrar was very much too high.

On the application of Mr. Niall McCarthy, S.C., for

the Attorney General, the President awarded the Attor-

ney General his costs against the plaintiffs.

On an application by Mr. Donal Barrington, S.C.

(for the plaintiffs), for costs, the President said that

they had failed to secure registration for an election

held in the year 1965. They could, any time after

the meeting of Dáil Eireann subsequent to the election,

have raised the point they now made and applied to

an appeal board properly constituted and perhaps got

themselves on the register.

"But the litigation as to the constitution of the board

in the year 1965, when the litigation comes for hearing

in May 1971 is to my mind a complete waste of the

Court's time and I don't think I ought to award to the

plaintiffs the costs of wasting public time in that

fashion."

On the application of Mr. Barrington, the President

allowed a stay on the order for costs.

The Irish Times

(15th May 1971)

SUPREME COURT FINDS THAT COMMITTEE

OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS ACT 1970 IS DEFECTIVE

In a reserved judgment delivered yesterday, the Supreme

Court allowed the appeal by Mr. Paraic Haughey, of

Raheny, Co. Dublin, against a six-month sentence im-

posed on him by the High Court for failing to answer

questions put to him in last February by the Committee

of Public Accounts of Dail Eireann investigating the

disposal of the £100,000 grant-in-aid for the relief of

distress in Northern Ireland. Mr. Haughey was awarded

his costs.

The judgment, which was delivered by the Chief

Justice, Mr. Justice O Dalaigh, declared sub-section 4

of section 4 of the Committee of Public Accounts of Dail

Eireann (Privilege and Procedure) Act, 1970, to be

unconstitutionalf or being in violation of the constitu-

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