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310

PAVEL CABAN

CYIL 7 ȍ2016Ȏ

in pursuance of a certain state policy and by using the apparatus of the state. Thus,

immunity

ratione materiae

is a mechanism for diverting responsibility (liability) from

the individual official to the state.

7

Despite this very close connection of immunity

ratione materiae

to a state, it

should be noted that immunity

ratione materiae

of state officials and immunity

of the state itself are different legal concepts with their own, different function

and objective, adressees and scope (including different exceptions to immunity).

It means that,

i.a.

, immunity

ratione materiae

of state officials is not coextensive,

but broader than the immunity of the state – the official is immune in respect of

all acts performed in the exercise of official functions, whether these official acts,

performed on behalf of the state, are sovereign (

acta iure imperii

) or non-sovereign

(

acta iure gestionis

), while the home state of the official is, according to the restrictive

theory of state immunity, protected by state immunity in general only in respect of

its sovereign acts (

acta iure imperii

).

8

Immunity

ratione materiae

has the same characteristics whether it protects low-

ranking official or a head of state; its scope is determined only by the scope of the exercise

of official functions of the state official in question, without regard to the position of

the official within the state hierarchy.

9

In addition, on the basis of its characteristics,

this type of immunity is effective

erga omnes

, which means that it protects state officials

in relation to jurisdictions of all other foreign states. (It can be added that customary

7

D. AKANDE, S. SHAH,

op. cit.

sub 4, p. 825; H. FOX,

The Law of State Immunity

, 2nd edition,

Oxford Unversity Press, 2008, pp. 94-97; A. CASSESE,

op. cit

. sub 4, pp. 863-4.

8

D. AKANDE, S. SHAH,

op. cit.

sub 4, p. 827; Second Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roman

Anatolevich Kolodkin, 63rd session, 2011, doc. A/CN.4/631, p. 16; ILC, Memorandum by the

Secretariat, Sixtieth session, 2008, doc. A/CN.4/596, pp. 106-107. As stated by the ILC already within

the context of the immunities of states from foreign civil jurisdiction, the civil actions directed against

foreign officials in respect of their acts performed in the exercise of official functions are to be regarded

as the actions directed against the state, on whose behalf the officials acted; Report of the ILC, forty-

third sesssion, 1991, UN doc. A/46/10, pp. 24-25.

9

See

i.a.

D. AKANDE, S. SHAH,

op. cit.

sub 4, p. 825; J. FOAKES,

The Position of Heads of State

and Senior Officials in International Law

, Oxford International Law Library, 2014, pp. 136-137. As

pointed out by J. Foakes, despite this clear theoretical concept, the treatment received by former high

ranking officials may be different based upon perceptions of their continuing importance and the

potential impact on relations with their home state if any action is taken against them. According

to some other opinions, immunity

ratione materiae

protecting the heads of state and possibly other

high-ranking officials (the troika) could or should be somehow distinguished from immunity

ratione

materiae

enjoyed by “ordinary” state officials (see for example H. FOX, The Pinochet Case No. 3,

The

International and Comparative Law Quarterly

, Vol. 48, 1999, No. 3, pp. 694-5). However, from the

theoretical point of view, such an approach, according to which there might exist a special category

of immunity

ratione materiae

accorded to former heads of state, heads of government and ministers

of foreign affairs, is very problematic and theoretically not justified. The head of state and other high-

ranking officials may, in fact, enjoy wider immunity

ratione materiae

, but this would be based simply

on the fact that the range of their activities performed in the exercise of their official functions is wider

than in the case of lower ranking state officials.