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JOSEF MRÁZEK CYIL 7 ȍ2016Ȏ
doctrine” for military intervention on the basis of “broad” interpretations of UNSC
resolutions.
The NATO members originally justified the threat and use of force against the
FRY on the basis of UNSC res. 1199 which declared that the UNSC was “alarmed
at the impending humanitarian catastrophe…”20 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry stated
in its “Introduction” that for the first time since the Second World War, the United
Kingdom took part in an “opposed invasion and full-scale occupation of a -sovereign
State- Iraq.” The decision for “use of force” provoked a profound controversy, especially
when chemical, biological and nuclear weapon had not been found. The British
government suggested a “strategy for regime change” in Iraq (point 57). The Inquiry
report confirmed that the “invasion was not prompted by the aggression” or an
“unfolding humanitarian disaster” (point 826). The invasion was taken without clear
indication that military action would be lawful” (point 810). In relation to the UN
Charter the Report claimed: “The Charter of the United Nations vests responsibility for
the maintenance of peace and security in the Security Council.” The UK Government
was claiming to act on behalf of the international community to “uphold the authority
of the Security Council,” knowing that it did not have a majority in the Security
Council in support of its actions (point 439).21 In those circumstances, according
to the Report, the U.K.’s actions undermined the authority of the Security Council.
The NATO countries insisted that one of the purposes of NATO’s action
taken without authorization in Kosovo was enforcement of the UNSC resolutions.
Probably the main official argument for NATO military action was to “prevent
a humanitarian catastrophe.”22 It has been repeatedly argued that the UNSC
resolution had endorsed ex post facto a non-authorized unilateral NATO action. There
is no reference in the UN Charter to ex-post-facto legalization or legitimization of
military actions, however. It has been also argued, that by the lack of condemnation
of NATO’s actions in the UNSC a precedent was created. The UNSC rejected a draft
resolution, with a majority of 12 states against 3 states, which ought to affirm that
the unilateral use of force against the FRY without UNSC authorization “constitutes
flagrant violations of the UN Charter, in particular Art. 2 (4) and 53” and to
determine that this NATO action “constitutes a threat to international peace and
security.”23 Before the ICJ NATO member countries insisted that failure to act would
have been to the irreparable prejudice of the people of Kosovo and that the human
tragedy in Kosovo left no other choice…
In the mentioned case the states were hesitating to acknowledge that the “justified”
armed action in Kosovo was to set a “precedent”. This was e.g. the position of Germany.
20 See UNSC, res. 1160 (1999).
21 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary Report of a Committee of Privy Counselors.
House of Commons, 6 July 2016; available at:
22 UN Doc. S/1999/328, 26 March 1999.
23 Ibid.