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GAZETTE

SEPTEMBER 1984

BCL

BUSINESS COMPUTING AND LAW LIMITED

Authorised Wang Dealer.

Welcomes your firm to our stand at

The Law Society's Computer Exhibition

BCL will be demonstrating:—

* Wang Legal Word Processing

* Conveyancing Systems for:—

Domestic

Commercial

Building Society

* Debt Collection

* Probate

* Litigation

* Legal Accounting Matter / Nominal

* Time Recording

The above systems are available on the

Wang Professional Micro Computer

and

Wang OIS Mini Computer range.

Business Computing and Law Limited,

55 Lansdowne Road,

Ballsbridge,

Dublin 4. Phone (01) 604545 604518

which contains chattels,

or

documents of title to chattels

(cf

Re Mulory

[1924] 1 IR 98). He also cites examples of

what,

inter alia,

has been held capable of being the subject

matter of a

Donatio Mortis Causa:

a Post Office savings

book (cf

Re Thompson

[1928] IR 606 and

Hearty

-v-

Colman

[1953-54] Ir. Jur. Reg. 73), a policy of insurance

effected on the donor's life (cf

Nelson

-v-

Prudential

Assurance Company Limited

[1929] N.I. 113.)

According to the English Court of Appeal in

Birch

-v-

Treasury Solicitor

[1950] All ER 1198,

"where the subject matter of an alleged

Donatio

Mortis Causa

consisted of a chose in action,

incapable itself of physical delivery, the real test of

the validity of the gift is whether the instrument, of

which there had been a physical delivery, was the

essential

indicia

or evidence of title, possession or

production of which entitles the possessor to the

money or property purported to be given and it was

not essential that every term of the contract out of

which the chose in action arose should be stated in

the document of title."

There was no real dispute in relation to the capability

of the bank books and insurance policy in the case of

Tuite

-v-

Malone

constituting a

Donatio Mortis Causa per

se,

in the light of decided and tested authorities.

However, the defendant's case rested on the assumption

that the delivery of the gift to the donee before the

donor's death had been a delivery of the goods for safe-

keeping only and not a gift in the real sense of the word.

In

Re Mulroy

[1924] 1 IR 98 it was decided that the

donee permitting the retention by the donor after initial

delivery may be sufficient, provided it is clear that the

donor's possession remains that of custodian only and no

longer that of owner.

However, in

Tuite

-v-

Malone

the defendant claimed

that the deceased's intention from his action suggested

that he wanted the plaintiff to look after his possessions

whilst he was in hospital. The defendant refused to accept

that the wording of the deceased "you know what I want"

could be construed in* the manner suggested by the

plaintiff.

Witnesses appearing on behalf of the defence gave

evidence to the effect that the plaintiff had attempted to

return the keys of the house to the deceased's relatives

when she found out about their existence. The defence

also attempted to introduce evidence to the effect that the

bank books were with the keys when the plaintiff tried to

return them, but this evidence was not supported by the

witnesses in course of examination.

In cross-examination the plaintiff admitted that she

attempted to return the keys of the house, but only

because the deceased had a dog living in the house and

she was anxious that somebody would look after it. She

lived a considerable distance away from the deceased's

house and his relatives lived literally around the corner.

After formal submissions, Neylon J. decided in favour

of the plaintiff on the basis that the only reliable evidence

came from the plaintiff. It had already been decided in

McGonnell

-v-

Murray

[1869] IR3EQ 460 that a

Donatio

Mortis Causa

might be proved by the evidence of the

donee alone, provided such evidence is clear and

satisfactory.

Neylon J. considered from the evidence that the

deceased had made the plaintiff his confidante and that it

was evident that, had he made a Will, he would have left

everything to the plaintiff. This had not been done, but he

had let her know his intentions in this respect and it was

clear that he was seriously ill when he made the gift. The

Judge considered that the deceased had been very specific

about the gift. He handed the plaintiff the books and

made a very specific statement in relation to what he

wanted her to do with them. He had handed them over to

her, according to the Judge, relying on her as a friend to

carry out his wishes. They were not handed over for safe-

keeping, but rather the

Donatio Mortis Causa

given in the

belief that he could rely on her.

Accordingly judgment was given in favour of the

plaintiff in the terms of the endorsement of claim on the

Equity Civil Bill. The plaintiff was asked to pay the

deceased's funeral expenses as this appeared from the

evidence to have been the deceased's intention. Each

party was also asked to bear their own costs.

As a consequence of this case, the law in relation to

Donatio Mortis Causa

has once more come before the

Courts for review. The case confirms the older and

accepted Irish authorities. It confirms that a plaintiff

should not be precluded from obtaining relief simply

because the plaintiff did not know that he or she was

entitled to a

Donatio Mortis Causa

until legal advice was

taken.

The case also underlines the more important aspect in

any case such as this, where a discretionary remedy is

available, that the Judge has to approach each case on its

facts and, at the end of the day, it is the Court in

exercising its discretion, that concludes whether a valid

Donatio

Mortis

Causa

has or has not been

established.

!190