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CASES OF THE MONTH
Road Traffic Negligence
The defendants were approaching each other on
an unlit wet shiny road. The first defendant was
dazzled by the second defendant's headlights and
failed to see the plaintiff who was standing on
the roadway with a bicycle. The first defendant
alleged that the second defendant had switched
his lights on to full beam and this was denied.
The Judge found that the second defendant had
switched his headlights onto main beam :
that as a
result the first defendant had been dazzled. He
apportioned liability two-thirds to the second de
fendant and one-third to the first defendant.
On appeal the second defendant contended that
a motorist becoming aware of an undefined object
on the road has a duty to switch on the main
beam of his headlights even
if this should in
convenience an oncoming driver. It was held that
a driver would not be negligent in switching on
his lights to full beam in such circumstances but
that it was his duty to show some reason :
no
reason had been known in this case. Appeal dis
missed.
[Saville v. Bache & anor. 113 S.J. 228].
Road Traffic Negligence
The Plaintiff was crossing the road near to a
pedestrian crossing and weaved his way through
lines of traffic to the centre of the roadway. A
motor scooter approaching over the white line in
the centre of the roadway struck him. It was held
in the first instance that the defendant, the motor
scooter driver, was solely to blame for the acci
dent. On appeal it was held that the defendant
was not negligent in not using the pedestrian
crossing. However
in not electing
to use
the
crossing he took on himself a higher standard of
care and was negligent in leaving himself maroo
ned in the centre of the road at the mercy of
oncoming traffic instead of crossing where there
was a central refuge. As he had placed himself
in an unnecessarily hazardous position he was
25% responsible for the accident.
[Snow v. Giddins, 113 S.J. 229].
Road Traffic, Negligence
A heavy lorry descending a hill intended to stop
behind a parked post-office van to enable an on
coming vehicle to pass but as a result of a brake
failure it crashed into the rear of the van and
ran over and killed the postman. The brake failure
was found to be due to a fracture in the brake
fluid pipe which had coroded. The pipe was
approximately ten feet long and about sixty per
cent, of it could be examined without dismantl
ing the lorry. The remaining forty per cent, in
which
the corosion and fracture had occured
could not be examined without removing the pipe.
Evidence was given
that it was
the standard
practice as regards such vehicles to rely upon a
visual examination of that part of the pipe which
could be seen and that the pipe would not be
removed to examine the remainder unless
the
visible portion showed signs of deterioration. It
was held in the first instance that there had been
no negligence.
On appeal the Court of Appeal indicated that
the onus on the defendant in these cases is to
establish that the sole cause of the accident was a
latent defect and that the accident had occured
despite their proper maintenance of the lorry. A
defendant is not absolved simply because he has
followed the common practice but it was not
possible to say that the decision in the first instance
was wrong. Appeal dismissed.
[Henderson v. Henry E. Jenkins & Sons and
another 1969, 2 WLR 147].
Solicitor, Negligence
In 1960 the plaintiffs took a ten year lease on
premises and subsequently entered into another
lease for more accommodation at the same ad
dress for ten years, and they carried on their
business as architects and surveyors at that ad
dress. In 1965 there was a recession in building
and in order to reduce overheads they instructed
estate agents to find under-lessees for the addi
tional accommodation. Lessees were found but
the landlords refused to grant a licence for the
"change of use". After the commencement of the
present proceedings the Landlord permitted the
Plaintiffs to sublet premises to a public relations
firm.
The Leases contained a clause whereby the
Lessees undertook "not to use the demised pre
mises otherwise than as offices in connection with
the lessees business of architects and surveyors or
as offices and showrooms in connection with any
other business for which the permission in writing
of the lessor and the superior lessor had first
been obtained, such permission by the lessor not
to be unreasonably withheld".
Another clause provided that the lessees would
not "part with possession parmanently or tem
porarily of the demised premises or any part
thereof without first obtaining the written consent
of the lessors".
The first clause contained a trap in that the
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