510 / 736
shipowners (Compagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A.; a
French company), from the decision of the Court of
/appeal (the Master of the Rolls, Lord Justice Salmon
and Lord Justice Karminski)
(1969)
1
W.L.R. 1338
,-oldinK, on a preliminary issue, in favour of claimants,
(Compagnie
d'Armement
Maritime,
S-A.
v.
company, that on the true construction of a contract for
the carriage of goods made with the French shipowners
the proper law to be applied in a London arbitration
was English law.
(Compagnie
D'Armement
Maritime,
S.A.
v.
Compagnie Tunistinne de Navigation, S.A.—The Times
15th July 1970^
INJUNCTION
Injunction granted restraining Landlords from letting
Food Displacement Area exceeding 1,300 square feet.
Plaintiffs, proprietors of supermarkets, issued proceedings
claiming an injunction restraining the first defendants,
L.S.D., owners of Rathfarnham Shopping Centre, from
permitting the second defendants, Quinnsworth (Rath
farnham) Limited, as the tenant or lessee of the first
named defendants to have an area for the sale of food
there in excess of 1,300 square feet.
L.S.D. have developed the former Rathfarnham golf
club into a shopping centre. L.S.D. made an agreement
with plaintiffs that they would erect a specified building
to be used as a supermarket to be leased to plaintiffs;
amongst the covenants entered into by L.S.D. was one
"not to permit any premises in the shopping centre to
have an area for the sale of food exceeding 1,300 square
feet". The lease was eventually executed between L.S.D.
and plaintiffs, incorporating ail the terms, including the
aforementioned one, in March 1969. In fact the revised
restrictive
term was more
stringent,
inasmuch as
it
confined the sale of intoxicating liquor to the plaintiffs.
An agreement to build specified buildings for a super
market was made between L.S.D. and Quinnsowrth Ltd.
on 30th April 1970; the premises comprised a total
area of 20,600 square feet and were to be demised for
35 years at a rent of £10,815 rising to £12,875. There
was a restrictive covenant against the sale of intoxicat
ing liquor, and a provision that the total area for the
sale of food was not to exceed 1,300 feet. There was an
indemnity by the tenant to keep the landlords indemnified
against all claims.
Though no lease was executed, Quinnsworth entered
into posession of the premises and opened for business
on 13 th May 1970. The area occupied by foodstuffs on
display had not more than 1,300 feet (food displacement
area).
Held—the restrictive covenant as to the letting or user
of property must be construed strictly—therefore food
items
could
not
be
distributed
at
various
points
throughout an unrestricted area in Quinnsworth, in view
of the fact that Quinnsworth did not devote the area
of 1,300 square feet solely to the sale of food, they had
committed
a
breach of
covenant with L.S.D. The
plaintiffs contended that L.S.D. had been guilty of
a.
breach of covenant with them, by allowing Quinnsworth
to have an area of more than 1,300 square feet, and that
this covenant was a continuous one which had to be
discharged from day to day. This contention is correct,
and the plaintiffs were entitled to an Injunction re
straining L.S.D. from permitting Quinnsworth from hav
ing in the Rathfarnham Shopping Centre an area for the
sale of food exceeding 1,300 square feet.
As regards the plaintiff's claim against Quinnsworth,
there
is no privity of contract between them. It was
contended that, on the principle of
Tulk v. Moxhay,
a
covenant against a particular use of land retained on
sale, may be enforced by any person entitled in equity
to that bargain against any person bound in equity by
notice of it. Although Quinnsworth had notice of the
restrictive covenant, it was really a restriction on L.S.D.,
and this contention fails. The contention that this le-
strictive covenant ran with the land, and therefore bound
a tenant of L.S.D. by privity to supply, is inapplicable.
Therefore
the plaintiff's action against Quinnsworth
must be dismissed.
(Williams & Co. v. L.S.D. and Quinnsworth Ltd.)
Unreported—Pringle, J.—19th June 1970.
EVIDENCE
Proof of Convictions in Defamation Actions Conclusive.
The Court of Appeal (Lord Justices Salmon, Phillimore
and Megaw) held that section 13 of the Civil Evidence
Act, 1968, which provides that proof that a person has
committed a criminal offence is conclusive evidence in
defamation proceedings
that he has
committed
the
offence in question, and consequently enabled a court to
strike out the whole or a part of a statement of claim
where the defamatory matter consists of allegations that
a person had been convicted of criminal offences.
In dismissing an appeal from a refusal by a judge in
chambers to strike out the statement of claim in a libel
action, their Lordships found that although it would be
acceptable in many cases to separate matters which might
be struck out under section 13 from other matters com
plained of, it was impossible to separate them in the
present case.
(Levene v. Roxhan and others,
The Times,
10th July
1970.)
Plea for Report of Inquiry is Refused — Compulsory
Purchase case.
In a reserved judgment delivered in the High Court,
Mr. Justice Kenny refused an application to compel the
Minister for Local Government to produce a report made
to him by an inspector who held a public inquiry.
The application had been made on behalf of Joseph
Murphy, a building contractor, of Fitzwilliam place,
Dublin, as part of proceedings in his action against
Dublin Corporation.
Mr. Murphy has claimed that an inquiry had been
held in connection with a proposed compulsory purchase
order in respect of lands at the Popintree-Balbutcher-
Santry area and that subsequently the Minister had con
firmed the order. He claims that the confirmation was
ultra vires.
At an earlier hearing it was stated that the Minister
had objected to the production of the inspector's report
and had claimed privilege.
In the course of his judgment, Mr. Justice Kenny said
that in
this case the Minister had certified that the
production of the report would be contrary to public
interest concerned and there was no evidence on which
he could conclude that this view was wrong or that it
was not taken in good faith, or that the Minister had
misconceived the issues in the action.
"I hope that the Minister's opinion that a document
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