513 / 736
action for wrongful dismissal, damages are intended to
compensate the plaintiff, because he has been allowed
to earn it.
It follows that, as the damages in this case consist of
a sum calculated by reference to salary, commission.
and director's fees that are only taxable in Mr. Glover's'
hands to the extent of £3,OOO, under Sections 8 and
9 of the Finance Act 1964.
Although the Gourley case had only been applied to
damages awarded for loss of remuneration in accident
cases, the contention that it did not apply to damages
given for wrongful dismissal was rejected. Held that
the decision in Gourley accords with reason and should
be applied to the first £3,000 of the damages for loss
as previously stated. The amount of income tax payable
in
this respect has been agreed at £1,050. Judgment
was accordingly given for plaintiff for £9,694.
Glover v. B.L.N. Ltd. and others—Kenny J. — 31st
July 1968 and 25th November 1968.
COPYRIGHT
Damages for
Infringement of Copyright
Publishing Contract made out on Typed Sheet with
blanks filled in in black ink by plaintiff and red ink by
defendant. The
plaintiff
published
10
books
for
defendant before this contract. It was agreed that it
would be unnecessary
to enter into a further specific
agreement in respect of the publishing of future books,
unless different terms were subsequently agreed upon.
This
left it open
to
the defendant
to publish books
elsewhere prior to this contract. It was held that the
terms of this contract would apply to defendant's Irish
History and European History for
the
Intermediate
Examination and the royalties provided were paid. In
1966
the defendant wrote a new Intermediate First
Year Course which was not submitted for publication
to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff's claim is for infringement of copyright
on the ground that a substantial material contained in
the former history books was incorporated in the New
Intermediate First Year Course, which was held to be
proved. The question of fair dealing was next considered.
In view of a change in the history course by the Depart
ment of Education, undoubtedly
the books
formerly
published by the plaintiff were going to become dated
—therefore there was not much competition with the
new book. But it was held that the infringement was
flagrant, as the defendant, instead of re-writing the work
had copied verbatim more
than 30 ^ages
from
the
previous book. Effective relief was not available to the
plaintiff because damages cannot adequately be pre-
estimated; nevertheless an injunction would not be suit
able.
In view of
the copying which
the defendant
perpetrated, damages were assessed at £250.
(Folens v. O'Dubhaghail—Unreported—Murnaghan
J—22nd October 1969)'.
PRACTICE
Bar Council Order Halts Trial
The Ruling of the Bar Council forbidding any counsel
to appear in a criminal case in which
?
certificate of
legal aid has been granted to an accused person, except
where the accused person is
in custody awaiting trial,
was referred to in the Supreme Court yesterday.
The court was told that seven counsel on the legal aid
panel had declined, because of the Bar Council ruling,
to appear for two men whose trial had been fixed by
the President of the High Court, Mr. Justice O'Keeffe,
to begin in the Central Criminal Court. The men are
Jeremiah O'Leary of Upper Drumcondra. Dublin, and
Patrick O'Brien, manager
of Blanchardstown, Co.
Dublin.
O'Leary is charged that on last December 28th, being
armed with a gun he robbed Marie O'Loughlin of
£33/10s. in cash and cheques to the value of £911.
O'Brien is charged with aiding and abetting. Both are
also charged with having a pistol and machine gun in
their possession on the same day with intent to endanger
life. They are also charged with conspiring to rob Marie
O'Loughlin of cash and cheques
in Wynn's Hotel,
Lower Abbey Street, Dublin.
Mr. T. J. Conollv. S.C., who, with Mr. Donal
Barrington S.C., appeared for the men, told the court
that the President of
the High Court had made on
order on June 24th refusing an application by Mr.
Patrick F- O'Donnell, solicitor, on behalf of the men,
for an adjournment of their trial which the President
had fixed for Monday, June 29. The motion now before
the court was for an order adjourning the trial until
such date as might appear proper to the court.
The Supreme Court directed that the trial fixed be
adjourned, pending the determination of the question as
to the right of the two accused men to have the trial
adjourned in view of the fact that counsel on the legal
aid panel had declined to act because they felt bound
by the Bar Counsel ruling.
The motion was adjourned pending the service of
notice on the Attorney-General of an application for a
further adjournment of the trial.
Mr. Conoolly explained
that
the men had been
returned for trial on the charges mentioned and the
motion now before the court was on the ground that
the President, in refusing an application for an adjourn
ment of the trial, had done so in the wrongful exercise
of his discretion.
He read an affidavit by Mr. O'Donnell in which he
stated that he had been informed on June 24th that he
had been assigned as solicitor of the accused men, who
had been granted a certificate of legal aid on May 14th.
Each accused had been assigned a solicitor and one
counsel. The men had been admitted to bail on Mav
14th. On the following day he was told bv a counsel
whom he had approached that he could not apnear for
either accused because of the Bar Council ruling. He
subsequently
approached
the
secretary
of
the Bar
Council, who confirmed that the ruling applied to all
members of the Bar.
Mr. O'Donnell said he had been instructed bv both
men that they required counsel to conduct their defence
and that they themselves felt that counsel was necessary
in order to have their defence proper!" conducted.
"I say and believe, from the attempts I have made
to
instruct counsel,
that it will not be possible
to
retain counsel on behalf of either of the accused, or in
the immediately foreseeable future."
Mr. O'Donnell said that on June 24th he applied to
the President of the Hieh Court in the Central Criminal
Court for an adjournment on the grounds that counsel
could not be retained for the defence and pointed out
that both accused men wished
to be represented by
counsel in order that full justice might be done in their
case. The President refused
the application _
on
the
grounds that he considered it his duty to dispose of
59