560 / 736
being a trespass. His Lordship so found when
awarding the husband, Mr. Ernest Joliffe, tailor,
of Slough, £400 damages and costs against the
inquiry agent, Mr. Cyril Hearne, of Manderville
Court, Egham, for trespass and assault. Mr. Jolliffe
also sued his wife's solicitors, Willmett & Co., of
Carey Street, W.C., but that claim was dismissed
with costs against Mr. Jolliffe.
[Jolliffe v Willmett & Co. and another; Geoffrey
Lane J.;
The Times,
21 July 1970.]
TRESPASS BY ANIMALS
The right to have the fences of neighbouring
farmers kept up in order to keep out straying
sheep is a right of the nature of an easement
known to the law which can come within the
words "easements, rights and advantages" in Sec
tion 62 of the Law of Property Act, 1925, and
so within the general words implied in convey
ances.
[Crow v Wood; Court of Appeal; 15 June
1970.]
WARDSHIP
Where a fit person order has been made in
respect of an infant by a juvenile court in favour
of a local authority and the local authority pro
poses a course pursuant to the powers and duties
conferred by statute in the event of such an order,
the Chancery judge in wardship proceedings can
not substitute his own views as to the best course
to be adopted in relation to the care and control
of the infant for the views of the local authority,
[in re T (AJJ) (an infant); Court of Appeal;
22 June 1970.]
WORDS AND PHRASES
The registration of a building certified as a
place of meeting for religious worship under the
Places of Worship Registration Act, 1855, requires
the Registrar General to be satisfied after due
inquiry that it is such a place. "Religious worship"
connotes, among other things, reverence and ven
eration for a Supreme Being, humility, praise,
thanksgiving and intercession to and for such a
Being, so
that where a building was used for
instruction in the tenets of Scientology which laid
stress on man the Registrar General's decision that
it was not registrable under the Act was correct.
[Regina v Registrar General, ex parte Segerdal
and another; Court of Appeal;
The Times,
7 July
1970.]
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
by Hon. Mr. Justi ce Henchy (Part II)
However, the American Supreme Court, not
being bound by any rigid doctrine of precedent,
did a
volte-face
in
Williams v Florida
(22 June
1970). By a majority decision, it over-ruled the
previous decisions and held that a conviction by
a six-man jury was not in breach of the Sixth
Amendment. The rationale of the decision derives
primarily from the parliamentary history of the
Sixth Amendment. As originally introduced in
Congress, it provided that: "the trial of all crimes
.
.
. shall be by an impartial jury of freeholders of
the vicinage, with the requisite of unanimity for
conviction, of the right of challenge, and other
'
accustomed
requisites
. .." The version
that
finally emerged
from Congress
as
the Sixth
Vmendment ensured an accused "the right to n
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed .. ." The court held that
the omission from the final version of the require
ments of "unanimity" and "the accustomed re
quisites" was no accident and that, accordingly,
the Sixth Amendment, having omitted "the accus
tomed requisites" of the common-law jury, there
by omitted the requirement that the jury should
consist of twelve. While the decision extends only
to deciding
that a six-rnan
jury satisfies
the
requirement of the Sixth Amendment, its reason
ing casts
serious doubt on
the constitutional
necessity of the unanimity rule.
The historical argument
that
induced
the
American Supreme Court to deem the twelve-
man jury not to be constitutionally jnecessary, and
to cast doubt on the necessity of the unanimity
rule, would, of course, find no place in the inter
pretation of the Irish Constitution, which derives
its existence from a vote of the people and not
from any parliamentary process. As the law stands
104