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Upon to do so.

This is not something which a

registrar, who is necessarily an expert in county

court work, could reasonably be asked to do.

Complaints and disciplinary bodies

Editor:

5 Would you favour the participation

of laymen in

(a)

determining complaints from the

public about lawyers;

(b)

the proceedings of law

yers' own disciplinary bodies?

Lord Chancellor:

This seems to me to be a

question for the public relations of the professions

on which, as Lord Chancellor, I ought not to

express a view.

My experience of the legal professions is that

their handling of complaints against their mem

bers is both meticulous and fair.

However, I

recognise — and I think the professions recognise

— that some dissatisfied clients are apt to ignore

or underrate the professions' genuine interest in

maintaining public confidence by promoting and

enforcing high standards. The handling of com

plaints should not only be, but be seen to be,

efficient and fair, and the professions should be

expected, and will no doubt desire, to satisfy

the public that these conditions are fulfilled.

Supreme Court

Editor: 6

(«) Have you any comment to make

on Lord Goodman's utterance at last month's

Law Society's Conference at Bristol to the effect

that it did not help the administration of justice

to have judges sitting in

an elevated position

dressed in Jacobean robes?

Lord Chancellor:

The particular formalities

and robes which judges observe and wear vary

from country to country in accordance with nati

onal tradition. There is virtually no country in

which there is no formality and few in which there

are no robes. Whether it helps to have the judges

sitting on a rostrum and wearing robes depends,

I think, on the nature of the court in which they

are adjudicating. For the legal argument which is

the concern of the House of Lords (where apart

from the Lord Chancellor the Law Lords do not

in fact wear robes), no change in

the present

arrangements would be either necessary or helpful.

I dare say that it would be useful to consider this

question in relation to certain tribunals, but I

personally think -that it is important to keep a

degree of formality, especially in the criminal

courts, and to make people realise that the judge

has full control over the proceedings and is a

person to be respected. It is easy enough to ridicule

the fact that most judges and, indeed, counsel

wear wigs and gowns and that solicitors when

appearing in county courts as advocates wear

gowns. But ours is by no means the only country

in which it is customary for them to do the like

and I think that we should consider the matter

very carefully before throwing aside something

which is not simply of superficial significance.

Editor: (b)

Would you like to see frequent use

of the new power, given by pt II of the Adminis

tration of Justice Act 1969, enabling an appellant

to leapfrog the Court of Appeal and go directly

to the House of Lords on appeal from the High

Court?

Lord Chancellor:

This is a question for the

parties themselves if the statutory conditions are

satisfied. If they are, there is a saving of time and

money to be effected. I would, however, be sur

prised if frequent use could be made of the power,

as I do not suppose that there would be many

cases which would satisfy the conditions, which

were only designed for exceptional cases.

Editor:

(c)

Should

there be state-supported

legal actions to clarify the law whereby the higher

courts would be asked to give rulings wider than

an appellant's own particular circumstances?

Lord Chancellor:

No, not in the terms stated.

As was pointed out by the United States Supreme

Court to President George Washington in the

very early days of its history, the law develops

more flexibly by the consideration of actual cases

than by an attempt to legislate for new ones

which is the function of Parliament.

To ask

appellate courts to go wider than the case before

them would be a fundamental and undesirable

departure from the doctrine of precedent and,

indeed, inconsistent with the judicial function as

hitherto understood in this country. There are, of

course, a number of schemes which have been

put forward over the years for subsidising appeals

in various ways and for various purposes, includ

ing the clarification of the law. The latest, and

perhaps most far-reaching, scheme was advanced

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