Upon to do so.
This is not something which a
registrar, who is necessarily an expert in county
court work, could reasonably be asked to do.
Complaints and disciplinary bodies
Editor:
5 Would you favour the participation
of laymen in
(a)
determining complaints from the
public about lawyers;
(b)
the proceedings of law
yers' own disciplinary bodies?
Lord Chancellor:
This seems to me to be a
question for the public relations of the professions
on which, as Lord Chancellor, I ought not to
express a view.
My experience of the legal professions is that
their handling of complaints against their mem
bers is both meticulous and fair.
However, I
recognise — and I think the professions recognise
— that some dissatisfied clients are apt to ignore
or underrate the professions' genuine interest in
maintaining public confidence by promoting and
enforcing high standards. The handling of com
plaints should not only be, but be seen to be,
efficient and fair, and the professions should be
expected, and will no doubt desire, to satisfy
the public that these conditions are fulfilled.
Supreme Court
Editor: 6
(«) Have you any comment to make
on Lord Goodman's utterance at last month's
Law Society's Conference at Bristol to the effect
that it did not help the administration of justice
to have judges sitting in
an elevated position
dressed in Jacobean robes?
Lord Chancellor:
The particular formalities
and robes which judges observe and wear vary
from country to country in accordance with nati
onal tradition. There is virtually no country in
which there is no formality and few in which there
are no robes. Whether it helps to have the judges
sitting on a rostrum and wearing robes depends,
I think, on the nature of the court in which they
are adjudicating. For the legal argument which is
the concern of the House of Lords (where apart
from the Lord Chancellor the Law Lords do not
in fact wear robes), no change in
the present
arrangements would be either necessary or helpful.
I dare say that it would be useful to consider this
question in relation to certain tribunals, but I
personally think -that it is important to keep a
degree of formality, especially in the criminal
courts, and to make people realise that the judge
has full control over the proceedings and is a
person to be respected. It is easy enough to ridicule
the fact that most judges and, indeed, counsel
wear wigs and gowns and that solicitors when
appearing in county courts as advocates wear
gowns. But ours is by no means the only country
in which it is customary for them to do the like
and I think that we should consider the matter
very carefully before throwing aside something
which is not simply of superficial significance.
Editor: (b)
Would you like to see frequent use
of the new power, given by pt II of the Adminis
tration of Justice Act 1969, enabling an appellant
to leapfrog the Court of Appeal and go directly
to the House of Lords on appeal from the High
Court?
Lord Chancellor:
This is a question for the
parties themselves if the statutory conditions are
satisfied. If they are, there is a saving of time and
money to be effected. I would, however, be sur
prised if frequent use could be made of the power,
as I do not suppose that there would be many
cases which would satisfy the conditions, which
were only designed for exceptional cases.
Editor:
(c)
Should
there be state-supported
legal actions to clarify the law whereby the higher
courts would be asked to give rulings wider than
an appellant's own particular circumstances?
Lord Chancellor:
No, not in the terms stated.
As was pointed out by the United States Supreme
Court to President George Washington in the
very early days of its history, the law develops
more flexibly by the consideration of actual cases
than by an attempt to legislate for new ones
which is the function of Parliament.
To ask
appellate courts to go wider than the case before
them would be a fundamental and undesirable
departure from the doctrine of precedent and,
indeed, inconsistent with the judicial function as
hitherto understood in this country. There are, of
course, a number of schemes which have been
put forward over the years for subsidising appeals
in various ways and for various purposes, includ
ing the clarification of the law. The latest, and
perhaps most far-reaching, scheme was advanced
193