CYIL 2014

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THE BRUSSELS CONVENTION ON THE LIABILITY OF OPERATORS OF NUCLEAR SHIPS

merchant ships. Basically, it was not expected to be commercially competitive. NS

Savannah was designed as a visually impressive luxury yacht, carrying thirty air-

conditioned staterooms, a dining facility for 100 passengers, a lounge, a swimming

pool and a library. By many measures, the ship was a success. From 1965 to 1971,

the US Maritime Administration leased NS Savannah to

American Export Isbrandtsen

Lines

for revenue cargo service. However, many of their competitors could accommodate

several times the cargo of the NS Savannah. The crew was a third larger than comparable

oil-fired ships and had to receive additional training after completing all requirements

for conventional maritime licenses. The operating budget had to include maintenance

of a separate shore organization to negotiate port visits. Consequently, the US Maritime

Administration decommissioned the NS Savannah in order to save costs in 1972.

Similarly, the NS Otto Hahn was decommissioned in 1979. Her nuclear reactor and

propulsion plant were removed and replaced by a conventional diesel engineroom. The

NS Mutsu was decommissioned in 1992.

These have been the only two areas where nuclear energy showed itself to be

an appropriate means of marine propulsion: First, there is the example of nuclear-

powered military submarines, which continued to be constructed both by the United

States and the Soviet Union. Second, the Soviet Union proceeded to build nuclear-

powered icebreakers, construed to be used for both ocean as well as river transport.

However, in the years following the Conference, contemporary comments revealed

that the failure of the Soviet Union to sign the Convention will not greatly affect the

movements of the Soviet nuclear fleet unless they expect to enter Western harbors

or territorial waters.

Nevertheless, Soviet nuclear-powered icebreakers have been

operated exclusively in international and Soviet waters and, consequently, the Soviet

Union has never felt any urgent need to facilitate liability matters in relation to these

vessels at a multilateral level.

Necessity to negotiate bilateral agreements in order to enter foreign harbors

As pointed out above, the Convention itself does not imply the right of nuclear-

powered ships of one contracting party to enter the harbors and territorial waters of

another contracting party to the Convention. Furthermore, once being the contracting

party to the Convention implies

inter alia

, that all claims should be channeled towards

the operator or the operating state in cases of state-owned ships and no claims will be

available towards suppliers, even if these will be from a non-contracting state.

Consequently, it might appear that those states not willing to join the NS

Convention, because of the inclusion of the nuclear warships, will prefer to negotiate

a series of bilateral agreements with harbor states. This was obviously the case of the

United States. Some of the authors already pointed out in the early 1960s that the US

nuclear navy could in this way possibly obtain the same benefits as granted through

the Convention.

Op. cit.

sub note 11, at p. 110.

Op. cit.

sub note 11, at p. 110.