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JAKUB HANDRLICA
CYIL 5 ȍ2014Ȏ
However, it is a matter of fact that, after the failure of the Convention, international
regulation of nuclear shipping has been governed exclusively through means of bilateral
agreements. As a result, such agreements
de facto
supersede the role of the multilateral
treaty.
4. Key messages
Where do we stand now with the use of nuclear energy for marine propulsion?
Today six states deploy some form of nuclear-powered submarines: the United States,
Russia, France, the United Kingdom, the People’s Republic of China and India. In
the last few years projects to build nuclear-powered submarines have been announced
in several other states, including Brazil.
Furthermore, the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation announced it would
expand its fleet of nuclear icebreakers with new-generation nuclear vessels capable of
running in both deep rivers and at sea. These new vessels are intended to become the
core of the future Russian nuclear fleet.
In relation to these actual developments, several messages can be addressed
concerning future development of the liability regime for nuclear propelled vessels:
First, experience from the developments following the adoption of the Convention
showed that the states operating nuclear-powered military fleets have been in opposition
to including these vessels under the treaty. Consequently, the general principles of
international public law are to be applied. In general, the use of nuclear energy is
included in the general obligations resulting from customary international law, which
entail State responsibility to ensure that activities within their [a state’s] jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States, or of areas beyond the
limits of their national jurisdiction. Consequently, the risks arising from the operation
of nuclear-powered military vessels are primarily covered by the rules of international
responsibility of the states, as there is in principle no international framework for civil
nuclear liability in force.
Second, states willing to further develop the use of nuclear energy as a means of
marine propulsion may prefer bilateral or regional treaties rather than multilateral
conventions. If so, the project to create interstate subsidiary compensation funds,
already discussed in the early 1960s, would be worth reconsidering. Nevertheless,
taking into account the existing geo-political constellation of states using nuclear
energy for marine propulsion (or planning to do so), we must face the fact that only
their commitment to create a legal framework for nuclear liability in this area can
lead to a successful result.