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embargo) or a particular country (country-specific trade embargo), the latter meaning
that no CITES export permit issued by the targeted country is recognized as a valid
documentation by any CITES Party. This sanction is particularly harmful for the
Party concerned because it means its exclusion from access to the lucrative market of
almost 35 000 Appendix II species that may be exported for commercial purposes.32
The recommendations to suspend trade are monitored by the CITES Secretariat and
regularly reviewed by the Standing Committee. They are withdrawn “as soon as the
compliance matter has been resolved or sufficient progress has been made”.33
Considered a measure of last resort, CITES trade sanctions are nevertheless
applied rather regularly. As of 9 September 2013, 31 countries were subject to
50 recommendations to suspend trade, seven of them being country-specific. 34 Since
the first trade embargo of this type against Bolivia in 1985, 43 countries have
been subject to recommendations to suspend all trade or all commercial trade.35
As mentioned above, the CITES trade sanctions rank amongst the most successful
enforcement tools within all international environmental law regimes.36 It is therefore
interesting to briefly examine their legality and fairness.
2.2 Legality and fairness of CITES trade sanctions: are some Parties
more equal than others? 37
Similar to the vast majority of other multilateral environmental treaties, the
text of the CITES does not provide expressis verbis for any coercive measure to be
applied in case of a State’s failure to comply with its obligations. The collective trade
sanctions are formally based on the combination of two CITES articles: article XIII,
providing for the basis of the non-compliance procedure, and article XIV para. 1
(a), dealing with domestic legislation. While the former authorizes the Conference
of the Parties to review information on compliance matters and to “make whatever
recommendations it deems appropriate”,38 the latter guarantees the right of Parties to
32 SAND, P.H., op. cit. supra note 19, p. 254.
33 Guide to CITES compliance procedures, supra note 21, art. 34. The Secretariat is required to notify
Parties of any such withdrawal as soon as possible.
34 CITES. Countries currently subject to a recommendation to suspend trade [online]. 2014. Available at:
[accessed 20-06-2014]. There can be more than
one trade suspension in place for the same country resulting from different compliance procedures.
35 See the table of suspension(s) of all commercial trade in CITES-listed species (1985-2013) in
SAND, P.H., op. cit. supra note 19, p. 256.
36 As noted by the doctrine “in view of the economic stakes involved … the mere threat of denial of market
access often tends to produce near-instant compliance” ( ibid., p. 254).
37 A paraphrase of the famous commandment from George Orwell’s Animal farm: “All animals are equal,
but some animals are more equal than others.”
38 CITES, art. XIII para. 3 in fine. The basis of the compliance procedure that appears in article XIII
(entitled International measures) includes the following: obligation for the Secretariat to communicate to
the management authority of the Party concerned information indicating that this Party is not effectively
implementing the convention (para. 1), obligation for the Party concerned to inform, as soon as possible,
the Secretariat of any relevant facts and, where appropriate, propose remedial action (para. 2), review of
the information provided by the Party concerned by the next Conference of the Parties (para. 3).