167 / 532
151
CITES AT THE BEGINNING OF ITS FIFTH DECADE…
The proposal met with mixed reactions. It was supported by a number of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), including the WWF and IUCN, and by
several States, such as the United States of America and Norway (both members
of ICCAT). Concerning the European Union, Spain submitted a document on its
behalf supporting the proposal in principle but suggesting numerous amendments
at the same time (including a one year postponement of the listing) which
“made
its support little credible”.
56
Many States opposed the proposal, arguing that ICCAT
was the appropriate forum to manage the Bluefin tuna in the Atlantic.
57
Concerning
ICCAT itself, it assured the Parties to CITES, through a statement presented to the
Conference of the Parties, of its determination to further improve and make more
effective the relevant conservation measures.
58
The secret ballot, used at the request of Iceland, showed the supremacy of opponents
of the proposal: it was rejected by 68 votes against, 20 in favour and 30 abstentions.
According to the representatives of ICCAT the rejection reaffirmed the responsibility
of ICCAT to properly manage the Atlantic Bluefin tuna.
59
The rejection has been widely criticised by NGOs and a part of the legal doctrine;
60
it must be said, however, that the benefits of potential acceptance of the proposal are
rather disputable. In fact, it is not the relevant RFMO – ICCAT – who has failed in
its mandate to manage the Atlantic Bluefin tuna but its members who
“have failed in
their responsibilities to ICCAT and to the international community”.
61
It seems highly
improbable that the same States that do not respect ICCAT recommendations would
respect the total ban on trade imposed by the listing of Atlantic Bluefin tuna in
CITES Appendix I; the possibility to make a reservation
62
would certainly be used
by a number of States. The listing without agreement and cooperation with ICCAT
and its members would create a situation of coexistence of two normative systems
56
BESLIER, S.
Pêche et environnement : complémentarité ou concurrence au sein de l’ordre juridique
international ? Le cas du thon rouge
. A.D.M. Tome XV. Pedone, 2010, p. 170.
57
Including, for example, Japan, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Canada, Tunisia, Chile, Indonesia and Turkey.
See CITES.
Compte rendu résumé de la huitième séance du Comité I
. Document CoP15 Com. I Rec. 8
(Rev. 1) [online], p. 2-4.
Available at
:
http://www.cites.org/fra/cop/15/sum/index.shtml[
accessed
20-
06-2014].
58
ICCAT Statement Bluefin Tuna in CITES CoP 15. Doha 18 March 2010
[online]. Included in Annex
of document CoP 15 Inf. 63.
Available at:
http://www.cites.org/fra/cop/15/inf/index.shtml[
accessed
20-06-2014].
59
CITES.
Compte rendu résumé de la sixième séance plénière
. Document CoP15 Plen. 6 (Rev. 1) [online],
p. 3.
Available at:
http://www.cites.org/fra/cop/15/sum/index.shtml[
accessed
20-06-2014].
60
Cf.
par example ROS, N.
CICTA 2010: la dialectique de la compétence et de l’irresponsabilité
. A.D.M.
Tome XV. Pedone, 2010, p. 131-164
61
ICCAT,
op. cit. supra
note 55
,
p. 2.
62
“During the period of 90 days provided for by sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 1 or sub-paragraph (l) of
paragraph 2 of this Article any Party may by notification in writing to the Depositary Government make
a reservation with respect to the amendment. Until such reservation is withdrawn the Party shall be treated as
a State not a Party to the present Convention with respect to trade in the species concerned.”
(CITES, art. XV
para. 3).