Table of Contents Table of Contents
Previous Page  226 / 532 Next Page
Information
Show Menu
Previous Page 226 / 532 Next Page
Page Background

210

EMIL RUFFER

CYIL 5 ȍ2014Ȏ

had the power to conclude between themselves an agreement for the establishment of a

stability mechanism such as the ESMTreaty provided that the commitments undertaken

by the Member States who were parties to such an agreement were consistent with EU

law. The ESM is not concerned with the coordination of the economic policies of the

Member States but rather constitutes a financing mechanism.

32

Furthermore, the

strict conditionality to which all support is subject and which can take the form of a

macro-economic adjustment programme does not constitute an instrument for the

coordination of the economic policies of the Member States but is intended to ensure

that the activities of the ESM are compatible with,

inter alia

, the ‘no bail-out’ clause

in Art. 125 TFEU and the coordination measures taken by the EU. In addition, the

ESM Treaty does not affect the competence of the Council to issue recommendations

to a Member State in which an excessive deficit exists, in accordance with Art. 126(7)

and (8) TFEU.

33

The Court then elaborated on the relationship with Art. 122(2) TFEU, which

contains the competence

34

of the Council to grant EU financial assistance to a Member

State which is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused

by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control. This provision, in

the CJEU’s view, did not preclude the Member States from establishing a stability

mechanism such as the ESM, provided that, in its operation, such mechanism

complied with EU law and, in particular, with measures adopted by the EU in the

area of coordination of the Member States’ economic policies. The ESM Treaty

contains provisions [Art. 13(3) and (4) ESM Treaty] which are intended precisely

to ensure that any financial assistance granted by the ESM would be consistent with

such coordinating measures.

35

Another issue which needed to be addressed was the prohibition on the ECB and

the central banks of the Member States from granting overdraft facilities or any other

type of credit facility to public authorities and bodies of the EU and of Member States

and from purchasing directly from them their debt instruments (Art. 123 TFEU).

That prohibition is also safeguarded, since it is addressed specifically and exclusively

to the ECB and the central banks of the Member States. The grant of financial

assistance by one Member State or a group of Member States to another Member

State, directly or through the ESM, is therefore not subject to that prohibition and

does not constitute an infringement of Art. 123 TFEU.

36

One of the central and most difficult elements of the challenge was the ‘no bail-

out’ clause under Art. 125 TFEU, which provides that neither the EU nor a Member

State are to be liable for the commitments of another Member State or assume those

32

Ibid.

, paras. 109-110.

33

Ibid.

, paras. 111 and 113.

34

Not an exclusive competence, though:

“Further, nothing in Article 122 TFEU indicates that the Union

has exclusive competence to grant financial assistance to a Member State.”

(C-370/12

Pringle

, para. 120).

35

Ibid

., para. 121.

36

Ibid

., paras. 125-126.