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THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVENUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION…
The TSCG signatories also agreed under Art. 5, in cases of excessive deficit
procedure under the TFEU, to put in place budgetary and economic partnership
programmes, subject to endorsement by the Council of the EU and the European
Commission (hereinafter as the “Council” and the “Commission”). Further, Art. 6
TSCG stipulates ex-ante coordination of plans to issue new debt (reporting to the
Council and the Commission) and Art. 7 TSCG commits Contracting Parties to
support
“the proposals or recommendations submitted by the European Commission
where it considers that a Member State of the European Union whose currency is the euro
is in breach of the deficit criterion in the framework of an excessive deficit procedure
”,
unless a qualified majority is opposed to the decision proposed or recommended.
Art. 9 TSCG then foresees strengthened coordination of economic policy and
Art. 11 TSCG provides for discussion of all plans for major economic policy reforms.
It is worth mentioning that the Fiscal Treaty also established the jurisdiction of
the CJEU, albeit a limited one and based on Art. 273 TFEU (so called ‘arbitration
clause’).
16
The CJEU thus has jurisdiction, under Art. 8(1) TSCG, to assess compliance
of the Contracting Parties with the obligation to transpose the ‘balanced budget
rule’ under Art. 3(2) TSCG into their national legal systems. The action can be
brought only by a Contracting Party, based either on its own finding or the report
by the Commission. In case of failure of a Contracting Party to comply with the
Court’s judgement stating deficiencies in implementation, a second action can follow
and the CJEU is entitled, under Art. 8(2) TSCG, to “
impose on it a lump sum or a
penalty payment appropriate in the circumstances and that shall not exceed 0,1% of its
gross domestic product.
”
17
However, if the implementation of a ‘balanced budget rule’
is correct and the Contracting Party concerned does not follow it in its domestic
budgetary procedure, the CJEU has no jurisdiction to review such breach, and other
mechanisms (under the TFEU excessive deficit procedure) must be used.
Furthermore, as far as the quasi-institutional arrangements are concerned, the
signatories agreed in Title V, Art. 12 TSCG to hold at least twice a year informal
Euro Summit meetings,
which bring together Heads of State or Government of
the Eurozone, along with the President of the Commission and the President of
the European Central Bank. According to Art. 12(1) TSCG, the President of these
summits
“shall be appointed by the Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties
whose currency is the euro by simple majority at the same time as the European Council
elects its President and for the same term of office.”
The Euro group is responsible for
the preparation and follow up of these meetings. As to the agenda of the summits,
they should deal with questions relating
“to the single currency, other issues concerning
the governance of the euro area and the rules that apply to it, and strategic orientations for
the conduct of economic policies to increase convergence in the euro area.”
It is important
16
Art. 273 TFEU stipulates: “
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction in any dispute between Member
States which relates to the subject matter of the Treaties if the dispute is submitted to it under a special
agreement between the parties
.”
17
The lump sum or penalty imposed is payable to the ESM in the case of euro area Member States.