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ARE INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS BOUND BY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS…

international legal doctrine.

It concerns the question of whether international

organisations are generally bound by customary international law.

It is mostly accepted that in their external relations international organisations

are bound by international customary rules which are related to their activities and

which the international organisation is able to apply. But what is still debated is the

basis allowing for such a conclusion. Without going into depth of the variety of

scholarly opinion, I may mention three options provided by

Schermers

: the binding

force of customary rules may result from international organisations being subjects

of international law; it may be based on the presumption that Member States have

bound the organisation to customary rules; or it is a given because customary rules are

part of general international law, which also applies to international organisations.

I will rely on this and add two arguments put forward by

Bleckmann

which I consider

convincing.

Bleckmann

argues with equality before the law as a general principle enshrined

in every legal order. Indeed, for me it is not obvious why international organisations

should not be treated equally to States with respect to the application of customary

rules, which together with general principles of law amount to the basic normative

framework of the life and functioning of the international community. An international

organisation with an international legal personality

does not exist in a legal vacuum

but exists in the international legal order by virtue of this legal order

– despite the

fact that its creation depends on the will of its Member States.

The second argument of

Bleckmann

relates to continuity and gap-filling tasks

which general international law, including custom, fulfils.

In fact, international

law and its coherency as a legal system would be endangered if international

organisations, as entities participating in international relations in such an extensive

manner, would not be bound by general international law, filling gaps left by the

Against the applicability of customary rules, see for example ČEPELKA, Čestmír, ŠTURMA, Pavel.

Mezinárodní právo veřejné

Supra

note 41, p. 79. Pleading in favour of applicability, see JÍLEK,

Dalibor. Mezinárodní organizace: partikulární subjektivita. Vyvratitelnost předchozí hypotézy. In:

ŠTURMA, Pavel (ed.).

Právní následky mezinárodně protiprávního chování: Pocta Čestímru Čepelkovi k

80. narozeninám

. Praha: Univerzita Karlova v Praze, Právnická fakulta, 2007, p. 119.

In this regard many questions remain, such as the possibility of participation of international

organisations in the creation of international custom.

SCHERMERS, Henry G. The Legal Basis of International Organization Action.

Supra

note 74, p. 402.

BLECKMANN, Albert. Zur Verbindlichkeit des allgemeinen Völkerrechts für Internationale

Organisationen.

ZaöRV

. 1977, vol. 37, no. 1, p. 113 – 120.

Available online at:

http://www.zaoerv

de/37_1977/37_1977_1_t_107_121.pdf (

last accessed

26 June 2014).

Also international organisations not possessing international legal personality may exist. Such

organisations, however, are not bound to any

own

rights and obligations under international law; hence

the discussion whether they are bound by customary rules would be superfluous.

ZWANENBURG, Marten.

Accountability of peace support operations

. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff

Publishers, 2005, p. 151; NAERT, Frederik.

International Law Aspects of the EU’s Security and Defence

Policy

Supra

note 37, p. 394.

BLECKMANN, Albert. Zur Verbindlichkeit des allgemeinen Völkerrechts für Internationale

Organisationen.

Supra

note 82, pp. 113-120.