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GAZETTE
SEPTEMBER 1976
A MEETING OF A LOCAL AUTHORITY
PART II
by T. C. Smyth, B.L., former Assistant Secretary
(Part I
was published
in
the August Gazette)
THE PUBLIC: What then of the conduct of the
public at a meeting of a local authority. Two points
may be immediately noted:—
(i) The Local Authority have the right to admit
members of the public to meetings — that is
to admit them as an audience or to make
representations, and
(ii) That, except where there is permission under
Statute or Bye-Laws, to the contrary, such right
of the authority is discretionary.
Though the case law may seem ancient on the topic,
the principles enunciated are still relevant.
(1) Purcell v. Sowler & Ors. (1877) 2 C.P.D. 215.
This was a libel action arising out of words spoken
at a meeting of a Board of Poor Law Guardians, Cock-
burn C.J. stated:—
"It is quite clear that the meetings of Poor Law
Guardians are not necessarily public. They have
full right to close their doors and although the
public are generally admitted yet when changes
are to be made affecting private character the
proper course would be to close the doors and
hold the discussion in Camera. This is one of
the cases in whihc the Board of Guardians are not
called upon to make their proceedings public.
They are clearly not bound to do so and they
ought to use proper discretion as to closing their
doors".
Again Mellish LJ. says: "A Board of Guardians have
a discretion whether or not they will admit the public
to their meetings and whether they choose to admit,
the public have no right to complain".
(2) Tenby Corporation v. Mason (1908) 1 Ch. 457.
In this case the Defendant claimed a right to attend
meetings of the Borough Council of Tenby in any one
of these capacities:—
(a) as a Burgess of the Borough,
(b) as a representative of the Press, and
(c) as a member of the public.
As the first claim was not pursued, and the second
has since been covered by legislation — S.15 of the
Local Government (Ireland) Act, 1902 — the third
depended upon the English Municipal Corporations
Act, 1882. It was held in the first instance that as
there was no expression of any public right in the
Act, he could not reasonably infer any such right
from a provision that the notice of the time and place
of intended meetings being fixed on the town hall or
that notice of any meeting called by members of the
Council should state the business proposed to be
transacted. On appeal Cozens Hardy, M.R., concurred
at page 467: "I am clearly of opinion that there is no
such right as that claimed and that no member of
the public be he burgess or not has a right to attend
meetings of the Council unless by the express or
implied permission of the Council itself".
Buckley LJ. concurring says: "It seems to
me that this meeting of the Council of the borough
was not a public meeting such that any member of
the public had a right to go there . . . No person had
simply as a member of the public the right to say
'open that door I will come in'."
The public has no right to attend the meeting, but it
may in the discretion of the local authority.
The recent case of Regina v. Liverpool City Council,
Ex Parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators Association
(1975) I All E.R. 379 dealt with the public's "right" to
attend a meeting of a local authority. There 40 mem-
bers of the public wished to attend a meeting of a
Committee of a Local Authority. There were only 14
seats available for the Press, the public and those mak-
ing representations to the Committee. The Chairman
suggested to the Committee that it was not practic-
able with the limited seating available to open the
meeting to the public and that it was desirable that
those making representations should be heard in the
absence of those making conflicting representations.
The Committee passed a resolution, giving effect to
the Chairman's suggestion, which complied with the
requirements of S.l(l) of the Public Bodies (Admission
to Meetings) Act, 1960. An application by the
Association for,
inter alia,
an Order of Certiorari to
quash the Council's resolution on the ground that
the Committee's resolution excluding the public was
contrary to the provisions of the Statute failed.
The supposed entitlement of the public to attend
at a local authority meeting was the subject of a
decision by District Justice Delap at Dun Laoghaire
District Court in January, 1973 (reported in the
Vol. 67, No. 7, p. 163 — July/August, 1973).
The case —
Att.-Gen.
v.
Eugene Keogh and Aidan
Griffin
was one in which the Defendants were charged
with: —
(a) Forcible Entry, and
(b) Forcible occupation of the Town Hall, Dun
Laoghaire, on 4th September, 1972.
Both Defendants were members of a group calling
itself The Dun Laoghaire Housing Action Group' and
they entered the Town Hall when a meeting of the
Corporation was in progress and they interrupted
the deliberations of the Councillors, distributed leaflets
in the Council Chamber and refused to leave when
requested to do so by the Chairman and later by a
Garda Sergeant, the Gardai having been called to the
meeting.
The contention of one of the Defendants on the
hearing was that he felt that as a citizen of Dun
Laoghaire he was entitled to attend any meeting of
the Corporation. He also contended that the system of
obtaining admission by way of invitation from a Coun-
cillor (which was provided for in the Standing Orders
of the Corporation) was not democratic or in order.
The case is of importance because a statutory defence
to the offence of forcible entry of land or a vehicle
is provided in the Forcible Entry and Occupation Act
1971 which provides that a person who enters in
pursuance of a bona fide claim of right does not
commit an offence.
Justice Delap in the course of judgment referred to
the White Paper on Local Government Re-Organisa-
tion
and
S.15
of
the
Local
Government
(Ireland) Act, 1902, the provisions of the Procedure
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