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GAZETTE
SEPTEMBER 1976
of Councils Order, 1899, and S.187 of the Grand Jury
Act. The Justice applied Tenby's case and stated:—
"In view of the complexity of the law on the sub-
ject the Defendants may have genuinely but mis-
takenly believed that they had a right as citizens
to enter the meeting and although the actual
method of entry revealed a certain amount of
clever planning I am disposed to give them the
benefit of the doubt on the "forcible entry"
charge and hold that they entered in pursuance of
a bona fide belief."
On another aspect of the case the Justice bound the
Defendants to the peace on very stringent and special
terms.
Regarding the jurisdiction of the Gardai, I do not
think that people interrupting a Council meeting,
whether members of the Council or of the public,
could
ipso facto
be prosecuted, nor could they be
bound over without some strong justification, stem-
ming probably from anticipated offences or anticipated
breach of the peace. Whether or not a Garda who, at
a Council meeting, reasonably apprehended the
occurrence of a breach of the peace if a certain person
or persons did not leave the meeting, could require
them to do so (or at least to be silent) without
recourse to the authority of the Council or of the
Chairman may be debatable. It may well be that
the principle of
Duncan
v.
Jones
(1936) 1 K.B. 218
would apply and a person failing to comply would be
guilty of wilfully obstructing a Garda in the execution
of his duty. At any rate it was held in
Thomas
v.
Sawkins
(1935) 2 K.B. 249 that the Gardai had a right
at common law to be present at a public meeting held
on private premises, if they reasonably apprehended
that, if they were not present, seditious speeches
would be made, or a breach of the peace would take
place. Assuming that the Irish Courts are prepared
to take a similar view I see no reason why they should
be reluctant to enter the Council Chamber, and every
reason why they should do so (and deal with the
breach of order).
What has been stated in relation to defamatory
motions on the Agenda may be reiterated in relation
to defamatory statements generally made at a meet-
ing. So long as a person believes in the truth of what
he says and is not reckless, malice cannot be inferred
from the fact that his belief is unreasonable, pre-
judiced or unfair.
Of the two particular facets of defamatory state-
ments I referred to I understand that that dealing
with the "governing" reputation with a local authority
is entitled to protect in the case of
Bogrtor Regis Urban
District Council
v.
Campion
(1972) 2 Q.B. 169 has been
fully discussed at an earlier Seminar. Hence I will con-
fine my remarks to the case of
Horrocks
v.
Low
(1972)
1 W.L.R. 1625; (1972) 3 All E.R. 1098 C.A. There: —
Councillor Horrocks issued a writ against Alder-
man Lowe, each of them being members of Bolton
Council, claiming damages for slander. At a meet-
ing of the authority the Alderman claimed justifi-
cation and fair comment on a privileged occasion.
By his reply the Councillor pleaded that the
Alderman was actuated by express malice. Stirling
J. held that the occasion was privileged, that the
Alderman had honestly believed that what he had
said was true but that he had shown such gross
and unreasoning prejudice as to constitute malice
in law sufficient to destroy the privilege. On
appeal by the Alderman, to the Court of
Appeal it was held, allowing the appeal
that as the Alderman had been found to have
honestly believed what he said was true and
believed that it needed to be said in the public
interest, the qualified privilege attaching to the
occasion could only be destroyed if he were
proved to have been actuated by express malice
in a sense of
spite or ill will. Lord Denning
said:—
Defamatory Statements
"It is of the first importance that the members of
a local authority should be able to speak their
minds freely on a .matter of interest in the
locality. So long as they honestly believe what
they say to be true, they are not to be made
liable for defamation. They may be prejudiced
and unreasonable. They may not get their facts
right. They may give much offence to others. But
so long as they are honest they go clear. No
councillor should be hampered in his criticisms
by fear of an action for slander. He is not to be
forever looking over his shoulder to see if what
he says is defamatory. He must be allowed to
give his point of view, even if it is hotly dis-
puted by others. This is essential to free dis-
cussion".
The attitude of the
Aldermann
had
been
described as one of brinkmanship, megalomania or
childish petulance).
This recent and authoritatively reported case on
the topic casts the net very wide.
AFTER THE MEETING
Minutes
The obligation to keep minutes of meetings is re-
ferred to in several enactments, S.92 of the Municipal
Corporations Act, 1840, expresses it thus:—
"Minutes of the Proceedings of all such Meetings
shall be drawn up, and fairly entered into a Book
to be kept for that purpose and shall be signed
by the Mayor, Alderman or Councillor or Com-
missioner presiding at such meeting; and the said
Minutes shall be open to the inspection of any
Burgess or Voter at all reasonable times, on pay-
ment of a fee of One Shilling, and any Burgess
shall be at liberty at all reasonable times to make
any copy or take any extract from such Book".
The obligation is reiterated in S.55 of the Commis-
sioners Clauses Act, 1847, and again in the Public
Bodies Orders of later years. The minutes of Statutory
Committees where the relevant Act so provides may
be open to inspection, with a right to take copies. The
right of inspection and to take copies or extracts is
not confined to the individual person entitled by
statute; the right may be exercised through an agent
(R.
v.
Gloucestershire County Council
(1936) 2 All E.R.
168). Further it is a right available to electors, as such,
not to persons who desire to inspect for other motives
(R.
v.
Wimpledin Urban District Council
(1897) 62 J.P.
84). The minutes of a committee exercising referred
powers, if submitted to the council for approval, are
148