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GAZETTE
J
UNE
/J
U
LY
1976
RECENT IRISH CASES
COMPULSORY PURCHASE
High Court says property firm
should be paid lower compensation
for compulsory purchase.
In a reserved judgement in the
High Court Mr. Justice McMahon
held
that
the
compensation
to be paid to a Dublin firm of
developers in respect of lands in the
Bray road area acquired by Dublin
County Council should be deter-
mined in relation to an order served
on the developers on April 14th,
1975—not in relation to an earlier
compulsory purchase order served on
December 14th, 1972.
The effect of the judgment is that
the company, Green Dale Building
Company Ltd., of Burlington Road,
Dublin, is to be paid £60,000 com-
pensation instead of £90,000 com-
pensation as would have been the
case under the earlier order.
The matter came before the Court
by way of a case stated by Mr.
Owen McCarthy, BE, who had
acted as arbitrator, and who asked
the Court to determine which com-
pulsory purchase order he should
act upon. The lands are situated at
Galloping Green South.
Mr. Justice McMahon said that
the value of the land which was sub-
ject to a compulsory purchase order
had been falling since the order was
confirmed in 1972, thereby giving
rise to a dispute as to the proper
time for assessing compensation. The
order, under the 1966 Housing Act,
had been made by the County
Council on November 11th, 1968,
and was confirmed, with amend-
ments, on August 25th, 1972.
Within the statutory three weeks,
Mr. William Fuller and The Holi-
day Motor Inns Ltd., owners of part
of the property affected, instituted
High Court proceedings, claiming
that the order was invalid in its en-
tirety or, alternatively, insofar as
affected their property.
The Green Dale Building Co.
Ltd. did not question the validity
of the order and, on December 14th,
1972, the County Council served
what purported to be a notice to
treat on the company. The com-
pany's case was that the compensa-
tion payable was to be based on the
value of the land at the time when
this notice was served.
Mr. Justice McMahon said that
the County Council contended that
it was not a valid notice because by
reason of the pending proceedings
in the High Court by Mr. Fuller
and The Holiday Motor Inns Ltd.,
the order had not become operative.
In the latter proceedings, the High
Court, on February 19th, 1975,
suspended the operation of the
order, on the application of the
Council, insofar as it affected the
property belonging to Mr. Fuller
and The Holiday Motor Inns. These
proceedings were later dismissed, by
consent.
Arbitrator sought
Mr. Justice McMahon said that
on April 14th, 1975, the Council
served a second notice to treat on
Green Dale Building Co. Ltd. who,
in the meantime, asked to have an
Arbitrator appointed.
At the subsequent inquiry, Green
Dale Building Go. Ltd. made the
case that the value of the lands for
the purpose of determining com-
pensation should be taken at the
time when the first notice to treat
was served.
Mr. Justice McMahon held that
the services of the first notice to
treat was not merely irregular but
ultra vires
the powers of the County
Council which could not, by serving
such notice before the order had be-
come operative, make itself liable to
pay compensation based on the
value of the land at that time. As a
statutory body with limited powers,
the Council could not be bound by
estoppel to do what was
ultra vires
its powers, or to refrain from doing
what it was its duty to do, and
therefore it could not be estopped
from relying on the invalidity of
the first notice to treat. Accordingly,
he held that the relevant time was
April 14th, 1951.
The Court made no order as to
costs.
Fuller and Holiday Inns Ltd. v. Green
Dale Building Go. Ltd. — McMahon J.
— unreported — June 1976.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER
Sale of registered land subject to
registered judgment mortgages—
Conditions under which order for
specific performance will be granted.
The complicated facts of this case
were stated in the December Gazette,
1975, at page 297. It will be re-
called that the plaintiff Tempany,
was the receiver of two debentures,
the first one of September, 1949
between Tractasales (Longford) and
United Dominions Trust which re-
lated solely to a loan of £25,000 in
respect of the lands contained on
Folio 9792 only. Although there
were 3 Folios involved in the lands
belonging to Tractasales the plain-
tiff, in putting up these lands for
sale by auction, only mentioned two
of them, and forgot to mention Folio
12386, Co. Longford. The auction
was held on 26th February, 1974,
and the defendant bought the lands
for £30,500, and paid a deposit of
£7,625. Two further Judgment
Mortgages against the lands com-
prised in the three Folios were regis-
tered by Peter Doggett and Henry
Smith before the contract for sale
had been signed. After the contract
was signed, further Judgment Mort-
gages were registered in respect of
the lands by Foster Finance Ltd.
and the Longford Arms Motor
Works Ltd.
In buying the premises, the de-
fendant thought he could get finance
to develop it, but he was unable to
do so. As a result of searches in the
Land Registry, in January, 1975, he
discovered the existence of the mis-
sing Folio 12386 relating, to the
lands. There was a meeting at the
Four Courts on 18th March, 1975
when the defendant refused to close
the sale unless £4,500 was paid to
him immediately. The plaintiff re-
fused to comply, and proceeded with
his action for specific performance to
carry out the terms of his contract.
Finlay P. duly dismissed this action,
mainly because he thought that the
title shown by the plaintiff would
involve the defendant in litigation
with the post-contract judgment
mortgages.
It was contended on behalf of the
plaintiff that, when the contract for
sale was signed, that Tractasales be-
came a Trustee for the defendant,
who became the owner of the whole
beneficial interest in the lands. Con-
sequently Tractasales could not own
any estate or interest on which the
two judgment mortgages of Foster
Finance and of Longford Motor
Works could operate. The position
is that a vendor who signs a contract
with a purchaser for the sale of land
becomes a trustee to the extent that
he is bound to take reasonable care
of the property until the sale is com-
pleted. However the vendor becomes
a trustee of the beneficial interest
merely because he signs a contract.
Consequently, until the whole pur-
chase money is paid, the vendor has
a beneficial interest in the land which
may be charged by a Judgment
Mortgage. Furthermore, when a
contract for sale has been signed,
the vendor becomes a trustee of the
beneficial interest only to the extent
that the purchase money has been
paid. This contention is therefore
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