GAZETTE
J
UNE
/J
U
LY
1976
In this contract however, seemingly
time was not expressed to be of the
essence ol the contract; in fact there
was a clause that if the purchase
was not completed before closing
day, 22nd April, the purchaser was
to pay to the vendor interest of 15%
per annum on the unpaid balance of
the purchase money until the date
of actual completion. This is incon-
sistent with the notion that time
should be of the essence of the
contract.
2. Was the purchaser, between
22nd April and 26th July, in such
default of his obligations under the
contract as to entitle the vendor in
law to fix a reasonable time for com-
pletion? It was within the clear
knowledge of the purchaser, when he
entered the contract, that it involved
the taking over by him as a going
concern of a licensed business. The
title to the property did not present
much difficulty, and the solicitor for
the purchasers, having acted pre-
viously, was in full possession of
knowledge about the title. The pur-
chaser was deliberately in conscious
default of his obligations, for he
made no early attempt to obtain a
bridging loan. The vendor was there-
fore entitled to call upon him to
complete.
3. It was contended that the
letter of 26th July, was invalid in
fixing a time for completion, by not
indicating precisely what steps were
to be taken by the purchaser. This
contention cannot be sustained, as
it was well known to the solicitors
concerned what was to be done for
completion.
4. It was contended that the
letter of 26th July, was invalid to
require completion, because the two
weeks allowed was not a reasonable
time. Mainly in view of the time that
had elapsed since the original date
of completion, 22nd April, this letter
was in the particular circumstances
reasonable.
The decision of Circuit Judge
Neylon will be affirmed, and tla.
appeal dismissed. Specific perfor-
mance of the contract by the pur-
chasers will be refused.
O'Brien v. Seaview Enterprises Ltd
— Finlay P. — unreported — 31A
May, 1976.
LICENSING
The character of suitability of an
applicant should not be taken into
account in considering the granting
of
interim
licence, but the character
of the company concerned should be
considered.
By an agreement of January, 1975,
Mr. Woolton agreed to purchase a
public house known as the Chariot
Inn, Ranelagh, Dublin with licence
attached. Mr. and Mrs. Woolton
registered in May, 1975 as the direc-
tors of Chariot Inns Ltd. The Com-
pany passed a resolution appointing
Mr. Woolton to apply for an
ad
interim
transfer of the licence. The
application came before the District
Court on 28th May, 1975. The de-
fendant Superintendent objected on
the ground that Mr. Woolton had
sustained several convictions for
breaches of the licensing laws, at a
time when Mr. Woolton had no
interest in Chariot Inns Ltd. The
application was withdrawn, and sub-
sequently the Company appointed a
first plaintiff, Mr. Henessy to make
the application. On 4th June, 1975,
District Justice Donnelly heard the
application, and the Guards indic-
ated that they had no objection to
Mr. Hennessy. The Justice, having
inspected the District Court books
learned that 7 convictions had been
recorded against Mr. Woolton in
respect of the Revolution Club in
Rutland Place. The District Justice
then refused the
ad interim
transfer
on the ground that the Company
had not got a suitable character.
Having considered in detail the
law on the subject, and in particular
Henchy J.'s decision, as a High Court
Judge, in The State (Doyle) v.
District Justices Carr and Delap —
(1970) I.R. 87 — Finlay P. held that
the applicant is entitled notwith-
standing cause shown by the Super-
intendent, to an absolute order of
Certiorari quashing the District
Justice's order, and to an order of
Mandamus directing the District
Justice to make an order to carry
on the trade in the licensed premises
until the next Annual Licensing
Session.
It is contended that Finlay P.
wrongly held that the District Justice
had power or discretion to refuse the
interim transfer of the licence to the
nominee of Chariot Inns Ltd., when
it had been established that a direc-
tor and part owner of that company
was a disqualified person. But Finlay
P. was correct in holding that the
character or personal suitability of
the applicant is not a factor to be
taken into account in deciding
whether an
ad interim
transfer
should be granted.
Per Henchy J. I am not persuaded
that in a licensing case, where char-
acter or personal suitability is
íd
issue, and the applicant is the nom-
inee of an incorporated company,
the inquiry is to be limited to the
character or personal suitability of
the nominee or of the incorporated
company.
Per Griffin J.: Two questions, not
decided in the High Court, were
raised on appeal, i.e. whether a com-
pany can hold a licence and whether
the character or suitability of a
director or shareholder of a company
can be considered when the Certifi-
cate of Transfer of the Licence is
applied for at the Annual Licensing
District Court. This Court sitting is
a Court of appellate jurisdiction,
should not normally decide or enter-
tain questions not decided or con-
sidered by the High Court. Opinions
on such questions would in any event
be merely
obiter dicta,
and should be
reserved until the questions arise in
an appeal, and are fully argued
therein.
Per Kenny J. — There is a widely
held myth that a company incor-
porated under the Companies Acts
cannot be granted a licence to sell
intoxicating drink, and that when it
is so licensed, the licensee must be
granted to the nominee. The case of
D. (Cottingham) v. Cork Co.
Justices (1906) 2 I.R 415, duly held
that a company could be granted a
licence. The illusion that a company
cannot be licensed springs from the
belief that a company cannot have
a character, and hence is not a per-
son. A modern company is a person
in the sense that it can sue and be
sued; it can be prosecuted in the
District Court and can be indicted;
injunctions can be granted against
it, and its property may be sequest-
rated. Good or bad character is a
matter of local or public reputation,
and the widest discretion is given to
Justices in respect of their Certificate.
A Licensing House is conducted in
a disorderly way if convictions are
had for breaches of the Licensing
Acts, or if improper characters are
allowed to resort there for improper
purposes. In such a case a Company
would, through their manager, whom
they put in charge, have an evil rep-
utation and a bad character. The
conduct of the authorised agents of
a company is
its
character.
In an application for in Interim
Transfer under the Public House
(Ireland) Act 1855, the District
Justice cannot of course transfer the
licence to an unqualified person.
He must however grant the transfer,
if the evidence establishes :- (1) That
either (a) the licensee has died, oi
(b) that he has removed himself
from the premises, or (c) that there
has been a sale or assignment of his
interest in the premises; (2) That
notice of this application has been
given to the Gardai and (3) That
the applicant, in this case the com'
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