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GAZETTE
J
UN
E/J
U
LY
1976
October, 1975. The settlement pro-
vided as follows,—(1) For the sale
by the plaintiff to the defendant of
the premises for £16,000. (2) That a
sum of £4,000 be paid by the de-
fendant as a deposit on the exchange
of contracts before 20th October,
1975, (3) That the defendant agreed
to pay £1,600 towards the costs of
the action, (4) That £2,005 lodged
in Court be paid out to the plain-
tiff. This was done, but the defen-
dant did not perform any other
part of the settlement agreement.
Shortly afterwards, the plaintiff
found an alternative house available
at £16,000, and entered into a ten-
tative agreement to purchase it. As
the defendant had not performed
the terms of the settlement agree-
ment, the plaintiff was unable to
make a binding agreement.
The plaintiff claims damages in
respect of:—(1) loss of the bargain
to purchase the new house, and (2)
discomfort, inconvenience and dis-
tress at having to remain over the
winter in an uninhabitable house.
The plaintiff cited
Capital & Sub-
urban Properties
v.
Swycher,
(1976)
2W. L. R. 822 in support. The Cap-
ital Properties caes was one in
which a vendor, having obtained a
decree for Specific Performance,
which the purchaser did not carry
out, claimed Recission of the con-
tract and Damages for breach of the
decree. The Court of Appeal (Buck-
ley and Orr
L.JJ. and Sir John
Pennycuick) unanimously held that
the purchaser's failure to complete,
when time had been made of the
essence of the contract was neither
waived by the claim for specific per-
formance nor superseded by the
decree made by die claim. Never-
theless the vendor was not entitled
to Damages as well as Recission; as
he was obliged to elect at the trial
whether to repudiate the contract
and claim damages, or to affirm the
contract and recover the remedies
due. The appeal from Foster J.
would be allowed. It was held that
the principle stated in the Capital
Properties case did not apply in this
case, as the damages claimed there
were Common Law Damages and
not Equitable Damages.
In a proper case, Lord Cairn's
Act provides that a vendor is en-
titled to damages as well as specific
performance.
The following damages were ac-
cordingly awarded: —
(1) £2,000 for losses due to in-
crease in price.
(2) £750 for distress and incon-
venience in having to remain over
the winter in an uninhabitable
house.
Murphy v. Quality Homes —
McWilliam J. —unreported —22
June, 1976.
GUARDIANSHIP OF
INFANTS
Mother awarded custody of
daughter of 6, and son of 3, in
view of their age.
Application by husband for cus-
tody of his daughter Hanna, aged 6,
and his son, Michael, aged 3. The
husband plaintiff and wife defendant
were married in August, 1968, and
both reside in the same house in
Blackrock, Co. Dublin, despite the
fact that the marriage has irretriev-
ably broken down. The paramount
consideration, as defined in S. 3 of
the Guardianship of Infants Act, is
the religious and moral intellectual,
physical and social welfare of the
infants. The defendant's suggestion
that there was any impropriety be-
tween the plaintiff and named
women is rejected. It was held that
both plaintiff and defendant were
equally suitable to look after the
children but, in view of their ten-
der years, custody should be award-
ed to the defendant mother. Sub-
missions will be heard in regard to
the plaintiff's access to his children.
CD v. CD —Hamilton J. —un-
reported — 17th June, *976.
HABEAS CORPUS
Habeas Corpus refused on
ground that jury convicting ac-
cused consisted of ratepayers
and did not contain women.
The prosecutor was charged in
Dublin Circuit Criminal Court with
larceny and receiving. The trial last-
ed three days, and on 17th Decem-
ber, 1975, the accused was found
guilty of receiving stolen property,
and was sentenced to seven years
penal servitude. An appeal to the
Court of Criminal Appeal was dis-
missed.
The accused then applied for a
conditional order of
Habeas Cor-
pus,
on the ground that the jury
that convicted him was composed of
ratepayers and did not contain any
women, and was thus contrary to
the Supreme Court decision in
De
Burca and Anderson
v.
the Attor-
ney General,
12th December, 1975.
During the empanelling of the jury
at the trial, the accused did not ob-
ject to its composition.
It is said that the right to trial
by jury conferred by Art. 38 of the
Constitution is an inalienable right
conferred not only on an accused
person for his protection when he
faces an indictable charge, which he
cannot apparently waive, but that
this right is conferred also on soc-
iety at large. This contention is re-
jected as the right to trial by jury
conferred by Art. 38 is manifestly
a privilege accorded to a person
charged with an offence. It is not
derived from any concept of the
human personality, nor from any
principle antecedent to or superior
to positive law. This does not ap-
pear to be a right vested in the com-
munity generally.
As the prosecutor was capable of
waiving any objection to the jury
selected in his case, which he ap-
parently did, there was no duty laid
upon the trial Judge in the course
of the trial to discharge the jury,
upon the ground that a decision de-
livered by the Supreme Court be-
tween the accused's arraignment and
the time of the verdict of the jury
had declared the provisions of the
Juries Act 1927 to be inconsistent
with the Constitution.
Although the question of the re-
troactive effect of decisions with re-
gard to the constitutionality of the
laws were argued at length by coun-
sel, no decision was taken on this
matter by the Court.
The cause shown will consequent-
ly be allowed, and the conditional
Order of
Habeas Corpus
will be dis-
allowed.
The People (Michael Byrne) v.
Governor of Monntjoy Prison —
High Court —Divisional Court —
(Finlay P., Murnaghan and Mc-
Mahon JJ.) per Finlay P. —Unre-
ported — 17th July, 1976.
LICENSING
Refusal to grant license In shop-
ping centre, on the ground that
there are too many licensed pre-
mises In the neighbourhood.
The applicant, is a nominee of
North-East Development Ltd., who
30