The Gazette 1976

GAZETTE

NE/J

1976

Professor Diamond, from his vast experience as a Law

Commissioner, gives examples of "Repeal and Desue-

tude of Statutes". In "Roots of Title Today", Professor

Pritchard of Nottingham has shown how gradually the

equitable doctrine of constructive notice has disappeared

from modern English conveyancing. Mr. Austin, a

Lecturer in University College, London, in considering

"Judicial Review of Subjective Discretion", deals in

detail with

ultra vires

; he favours the reasoning that,

as in

Coleen Propert'es v. Minister of Housing

and

Local Government

(1971) I W.L.R. 433, the Minister

was held to have acted without jurisdiction because the

statutory reason for his confirmation of a local requisi-

tion, was unsupported by evidence. Mrs. Freeman, in

considering "References To the Court of Justice under

Article 177", considers at length Lord Denning's judg-

ment in

Bulmer v. Bollinger

(1974) 2 All E.R. The

following guide-lines for a Reference were laid down :

(1) The point in the judgment must be conclusive;

(2) A previous ruling by the Court of Justice on

substantially the same point can be followed by the

English Court; (3) the doctrine of the "acte clair"—

the English Court may consider the point is reasonably

clear and free from doubt; and (4) the facts must be

decided first, therefore it is not open to refer a prelimin-

ary po nt to the Court. But essentially the mechanism

of Article 177 depends on judicial co-operation. Pro-

fessor Brown writes learnedly on a contemporary prob-

lem that is causing much concern, namely the compe-

tence to establish and enforce standards in the preven-

tion of marine pollution by oil from ships, particularly

the International Convention of 1973

Mr. Butler, in considering "The Sources of Soviet

Law", emphasies that all Soviet legislation receives un-

ammous endorsement in the Soviet Parliament. In

practice the legal acts of the Presidia are superior to all

others. Acts of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers are

issued on the basis of laws in force, and are binding

throughout the Soviet Union. Judgment of Courts are

not deemed to be precedents. Soviet Courts are for-

bidden to cite decrees or rulings of higher Courts in

their judgments; nor are the teachings of Soviet jurists

regarded as a source of law.

It will thus be seen that the work "Current Legal

Problems 1975" does not belie its title, and many legal

experts have given us the benefit of their views in

relation to their particular field

Cole, J. S. R. — Cases on Criminal Law. Dublin :

Golden Eagle Books, 1975. xi, 240p. 22cms £5.50.

£5.50.

This book, as its title suggests, deals essentially with

Irish Cases on Criminal Law; it is a pity that the word

"Irish" has been omitted, and practitioners of Criminal

Law will be well aware of most of the cases decided

from 1924 to 1951 by the Irish Court of Criminal

Appeal which had already been adequately dealt with

by Sandes. Mr. Cole has wisely concentrated on the

more recent cases, particularly as some of them are un-

reported and thus unavailable. It need hardly be

stressed that, in order to confine the book within reason-

able limits, many of the judgments were not quoted in

full, but extracts from the more important points in

judgments are included. There is a useful short sum-

mary as to the effect of each decision at the beginning

of each judgment, and if the matter has been con-

sidered subsequently in a later judgment, there is a note

to that effect. Under the heading of "Inchoate Crimes"

four cases of attempt are dealt with, including an un-

successful plea of innocence in a charge of attempting

to drive a car while d r unk—

The State v. Coelman

Porter

(1961) Ir. Jur. The important principles relat-

ing to manslaughter by a driver as a result of Davitt

P.'s decision in

Attorney General v. Dunleavy

(1948)

I.R. is fully considered. In the

People v. Gallagher

(1972) I.R. Kenny J. established that it was hence-

forth not necessary in order to establish a dangerous

driving charge, that the accused's dangerous driving

was the sole cause of the accident. In the

People v.

Messitt—{\91%)

I R. 406—the Supreme Court gave full

consideration to the terms "wounding" and "grievous

bodily harm". In dealing with contempt of court, the

case of

Re (T Kelly—

Supreme

Court, 30 July, 1973—is

duly noted. In the chápter on Public Mischief, the

author fails to point out that Gavan Duffy, P. did not

consider this a crime as it was the duty of the police

to pursue investigations no matter how involved. The

important case of

People v. Dwyer

—(1972)

I.R.—in

which the Supreme Court directed a new trial on self-

defence is fully given, but the equally important

Northern Ireland case decided by the House of Lords—

Lynch v. Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern

Ireland

—(1975)

1 All E.R. 913—appears to be omitted.

The vital decision of the Supreme Court in

People v

()'Ca!laghan—(

1966) I.R. relating to bail is fully re-

ported but the vital principle in

Bourke v.

Attorney

General

(1972) I.R. that henceforth

travaux

prepara-

toires

are admissible as evidence, is not stressed.

It is hoped that the author's painstaking work, which

entailed much research, will be amply rewarded.

LODGEMENT OF INFANTS' MONEY IN

COURT

LODGMENT OF INFANTS' MONEY IN COURT

Solicitors are reminded of their duty to ensure that no

loss will accrue to an infant through any unreasonable

delay in dealing with Orders of the Court as to lodg-

ment of infants' moneys in Court.

As soon as the relevant Court Order is perfected the

Solicitor concerned should immediately bespeak same

and attend the Accountant with an attested copy of

the Schedule of the Order so that no undue delay

will occur in complying with the directions of the Court.

It is to be understood that in the absence of a satis-

foctory explanation for such delay the Court may have

to consider the question of recoupment of the infant's

loss by the person responsible. Normally a delay of more

than seven weeks from the perfection of the Order

would be regarded as unreasonable

J. K. Waldron,

Registrar.

9th June 1976.