The appellant sent two letters to the Secretary of
the Bar Council alleging professional misconduct
against the respondent, who was a Queen's Counsel.
When sued for libel the appellant pleaded that the
letters were protected by absolute privilege. Held,
by the Court of Appeal that the plea failed: Lincoln
v.
Daniels (1961)
3 W.L.R. 8
66;105 S.J. 647,
(Sellers, Devlin and Danckwerts
L.JJ.)
Master and servant—occupational disease.
The duty of an employer towards a servant who
is susceptible to an industrial disease does not extend
to refusing to employ him in work which involves
a risk.
If the servant knows there is a slight risk
and decides to take it, that is a matter for him.
A company hired a young woman whom it had
previously employed in jobs involving contact with
grease and, later, greasy water and who had on
each occasion contracted dermatitis as a result.
The present job was similar, but she did not protest;
however, when she contracted dermatitis again she
sued the company for damages for personal injuries.
Held, that the company had not failed to take
reasonable care for the employee : Withers
v.
Perry
Chain Co. (1961) i W.L.R. 1314 ;
105 S.J. 648, C.A.
bankruptcy—share certificates held as security—reputed
ownership.
(Irish Bankrupt and Insolvent Act, 1857 (20 &
2.1
Vie. c. 60), s. 313).
In Re McClement (1960)
I.R. 141, where share certificates which did not
contain any note on them requiring their production
on a transfer were pledged by the registered owner,
who later became bankrupt, and the pledgee allowed
the pledger's name to remain on the register of
shareholders, Budd J. held that the shares were, for
the purposes of s. 313 of the Irish Bankrupt and
Insolvent Act, 1857, in the order and disposition of
the bankrupt as reputed owner by the consent of
the pledgee, as were also shares similarly pledged
which were transferred to the bankrupt upon trust
to enable him to vote at company meetings. Shares
issued by way of bonus on the shares held by the
bankrupt as trustee and received by him without the
transferor's knowledge were, however, not in the
order and disposition of the bankrupt as reputed
owner by the consent of the pledgee.
Practice—third-party procedure.
In Andrews
v.
Dunn & Co. : Belfast Ropework
Co. (Third Party) (1960 N.I. 181) the plaintiff, whose
eye was injured by a needle while stitching mattresses
for his employers, the defendants, alleged that the
injury was caused by the snapping of twine supplied
to him by the defendants. On an application for
third-party directions under Ord. 16 r. 52, by the
defendants who had issued a third party notice on the
manufacturers of the twine, the defendants claimed
that they had purchased the twine from the third
party and that they could not reasonably have
examined it before use. Lord MacDermott C.J. held
that the defendants had made a sufficient prima facie
case against the third party to entitle them to the
order sought.
Administrative
law — tribunals — proceedings
before
Domestic Tribunal of Defendant Institute.
In Lloyd
v.
Institute of Chartered Accountants in
England and Wales (October n, 1961) the plaintiff,
a member of the defendant Institute, was employed
by George S. May International Co. G.B. In August,
1961, a complaint was preferred against the plaintiff
in respect of his professional activities. The com
plaint alleged that the plaintiff was guilty of acts or
defaults discreditable to a member of the Institute
in that he was employed by an organisation which in
its business as consultants or advisers in manage
ment, costing and methods of business offered its
services by advertising, so as to render himself
liable to exclusion from the Institute. On a motion
by the plaintiff to restrain the defendants from
hearing or otherwise determining
the question
whether he had acted discreditably under the
provisions of r. 21 (3) of the Institute's supplemental
Royal Charter dated December 21, 1948, Wilberforce
J., dismissing the motion, held, that since there was
no evidence of any particular bias against the
plaintiff himself but only evidence of an attitude of
hostility against his employer, it would be wrong to
say that an employee could not be given a fair trial
in respect of his individual professional conduct.
Accordingly, the issue should be left to the tribunal
which
the parties had contractually accepted.
(The Times,
October 12, 1961.)
Contract—performance—remuneration at discretion of
defendants.
In Mann
v.
Shell Petroleum (October n, 1961)
M. brought an action against S. for an alleged breach
of a contract under which S. promised to pay M.
remuneration commensurate with the degree of
success achieved by him in a mission to Cuba which
M. was to undertake for S. M. alleged that he
negotiated the lifting of a boycott imposed on
British goods by the Castro regime, and that he
was accordingly entitled to £100,000 under contract.
S. denied that the boycott was lifted as the result of
M.'s negotiations. Salmon J., dismissing the claim
on the facts, held, that the contract fell into that
class in which the principal reserved the right to