129 / 328
to the accountant and solicitor respectively for their
charges or costs as professional trustees.
The
beneficiaries entitled in remainder after the death
of the widow took an action against the trustees
and they alleged in their statement of claim that
these sums exceeded what was reasonable remunera
tion and also they sought an inquiry as to what was
the excess and asked that any excess so found might
be replaced. The defendants applied to the plaintiffs
for particulars
specifying what would be
the
reasonable remuneration for their work and it was
held by the court on this point that the beneficiaries
had an absolute right (at their own risk as to costs)
to have the amount of the charges investigated and
that the claim for particulars was misconceived,
because the defendants were thereby endeavouring to
convert what in substance was an action for an
account into an action for a specific sum. Cross J.
in his judgment said that the defendants claimed
that they wished to have the issue defined, that is
to say, they wanted to have the claim for a general
inquiry or account converted into a claim for a
specified sum which is said to have been the excessive
charge. This would have great advantages from the
point of view of the defendants because they would
then know the maximum which could possibly be
recovered from them. The plaintiffs, being obliged
to tie themselves down to a specified sum in advance,
could not claim more than that, even if the tribunal
thought the excess was larger. Where there was
a question of an account to which the plaintiff was
entitled and the defendant was an accounting party
there could be no question of the plaintiff having to
deliver particulars at this stage of an action. This was
essentially an action for an account and could not be
converted into an action for a specified sum. He
held, therefore, that the defendants were not entitled
to the particulars for which they asked. The matter
had come before the court on a procedure summons
(Re Wells deceased, Wells & ors.
v
Wells & ors.
1962 I.
All England Law Reports,
page 812.)
NOTE
This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal
(Denning M. R. Harman and Russell L. J. J.) on
the 8th May, 1962. Lord Denning giving judgment
said that where reasonable charges were in question
—whether of a builder, an architect, or an accountant
charging for his services—the ordinary way was to
give particularised accounts and for the other side
to take objections set out in a schedule. This was
how the matter should be dealt with. This was in
substance an action for an account: the averment
that too much had been charged was merely intro
ductory and the particulars which the beneficiaries
had given in their pleadings were as full as could
be expected from them at this stage and were all
that the trustees were entitled to. The appeal was
accordingly dismissed. (Solicitors Journal May i8th,
1962 vol. 106 no. 20 page 410).
IMPORTANT ESTATE DUTY
DECISION
Investments of Channel Island's resident not taxable in
Ireland
A
recent
judgment by
the Supreme Court,
delivered on 2ist December, 1961, will have an
important bearing on the question whether, in
certain circumstances, investments held abroad are
liable to estate duty in this country. The decision
related to investments held subject only to an
outstanding jointure by trustees for a man who died
in the Channel Islands, where no estate duty is
payable.
In a reserved judgment, the Supreme Court,
consisting of Mr. Justice Lavery, Mr. Justice
Kingsmill-Moore, and Mr. Justice Haugh, affirmed
a High Court decision allowing a petition of Barclays
Bank Executor and Trustee Co. (Channel Islands),
Ltd., which asked for a declaration that no estate
duty was payable by the late Henry Howe Cuffe
Knox, Jersey, Channel Islands, on funds set out in
the petition. The case went to the Supreme Court
on an appeal by the Revenue Commissioners against
Mr. Justice Teevan's decision.
The appeal was
dismissed with costs. Mr. Justice Kingsmill-Moore
delivered the judgment to which the other judges
subscribed.
Mr. Justice Teevan in his judgment had stated
that Mr. Knox died on February
i6th, 1954,
domiciled in Jersey.
At the time of his death
investments (and two comparatively small sums in
cash) to the value of £68,788, stood in the names of
two trustees to pay to Violet Lleena Cassandra
Knox an annuity of £1,500 for her life, and there
after for Mr. Knox absolutely.
The Revenue
Commissioners contended that the testator had no
proprietary interest in the property making up the
trust fund, but only a personal right against the
trustees to call on them to execute the trusts,
enforceable by action if necessary, i.e., a chose in
action. As the dispositions constituting the trust
fund were made by Irish settlements and by the will
of a Testator domiciled in Ireland, the Revenue
said that the " proper law " is Irish, and they valued
the testator's right as equivalent to the full value of
stocks and bonds which would be liable to estate
duty. Equitable interests and estates, they contended,
invoke only rights in personam, and not rights
in rem.
The view that equitable interests convey no right
ii