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all cases coming to notice where land is acquired by
non-nationals.
The section, except that part of it which relates to
pre-1947 companies, will have effect from the ist
August, 1961.
Section
30. Existing legislation provides for the
application of the 25 per cent. Stamp Duty to certain
leases of land in the same way as it applies to con–
veyances and transfers on sale. This section carries
out in relation to such leases amendments of the law
similar to those contained in Section 29 in relation
to conveyances and transfers.
PART V.
MISCELLANEOUS AND GENERAL.
Section
32 removes the restriction which at present
prevents the Bank of Ireland from making advances
or loans to the Minister for Finance without the
consent of the Oireachtas. The restriction does not
apply to any bank other than the Bank of Ireland.
DECISIONS OF PROFESSIONAL
INTEREST
Delegated powers invalid sub-delegation (N.Z.).
In Hawke's Bay Raw Milk Producers Co-operative
Co.
v.
New Zealand Milk Board (1961) N.Z.L.R.
218, the New Zealand Court of Appeal held that a
purported sub-delegation by the Governor-General
of the Minister of Agriculture of a power to fix milk
prices was invalid. The court also held that in making
regulations under statutory authority the Governor-
General was exercising a delegated power of legisla–
tion.
Evidence admissibility highly
prejudicial
evidence. At the trial of a man charged with wound–
ing his wife with intent to cause her grievous bodily
harm a neighbour gave evidence that the wife had
said to a neighbour "He shot me, he said he would."
The judge gave a strong direction to the jury to
ignore those words and the jury convicted. Held
on appeal that the conviction should be quashed
because the neighbour's evidence was so likely to
influence the jury that even after the judge's direction
there was a distinct danger that the jury had been
influenced by that evidence. R.
v.
Parker (1960)
45 Cr. App. R. i, C.C.A.
Evidence identification.
Evidence of similar
offences is admissible in questions of identification.
The appellant was convicted of obtaining a car by
false pretences in that he went with another man to
the seller of the car and posed as a fitter advising the
other man who finally bought the car for a cheque
which was dishonoured. The appellant denied that
16
he was the man in question but he was identified by
three witnesses as having posed as a fitter when
committing other similar offences. On appeal it was
argued that the evidence of the other offences was
inadmissible and that the conviction should accord–
ingly be quashed.
Held that the evidence was
admissible on the question of identity and the appeal
failed. R.
v.
Giovannone (1960) 45 Cr. App. R. 31,
C.C.A.
Evidence corroboration accomplice.
In R.
v.
Heaps (1961) Crim. L. R. 254, the appellant had been
convicted of receiving furs which had been found in
possession of C. who, being indicted with the appel–
lant, gave evidence against him.
The jury were
given no warning as to how they should approach
C.'s evidence.
The Court of Criminal Appeal,
allowing the appeal, held that warning that C.'s
evidence should be looked upon with suspicion
should have been given and corroborative evidence
looked for.
Murder diminished responsibility "abnormality
of mind". The "abnormality of mind" referred to in
the Bahamas Islands (Special Defences) Act, 1959
(which is similar to the Homicide Act, 1957), should
not be judged by seeing whether it is on the border–
line of insanity as defined in the M'Naghten Rules.
It means something which a jury would consider as
partial insanity or on the border-line of insanity in
the popular, not the M'Naghten, sense.
The appellant was convicted of murder in the
Bahamas in spite of a plea of diminished responsibility
under the above Act.
The judge had read the
M'Naghten Rules to the jury and left it to them
whether the appellant was on the border-line of
insanity as defined by those Rules. Held that that
was a misdirection and the conviction should be
quashed. Rose
v.
R. (1961) 2 W.L.R. 506 ; 105 S.J.
253 ;
(1961) i All E.R. 859 P.C.
Res judicata —
by
implication question not
directly raised in former proceedings. (Law Reform
(Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935 (25 &
26 Geo. 5, c. 30), s. 6 (i)
(c),
(2).) The point at issue
in later proceedings is not
res judicata
and there is
no estoppel by record unless the question in the
earlier proceedings was precisely the same as that
in the later.
In a collision between two motor-cars T., the
driver of one, and the plaintiff, his passenger, were
injured. T. sued S. in the county court for damages,
but judgment was given for S., the court holding
that T. was wholly to blame for the accident. Later,
the plaintiff sued T. and S. in the High Court for
damages, each denied liability and S. served a third