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submitted by the plaintiffs subject to a reduction in
price. On March 8th, 1953, the plaintiffs submitted
a revised tender which specified that the works
would be completed within 18 months from the
date of instructions to proceed.
The date for
completion of the works in fact inserted in the
contract, on the instructions of an official of the
defendants, was September 3oth, 1956, giving a
period for completion of 30 months. If the tender
had been made on the basis of a 30 month period for
completion the price would have been higher. The
plaintiffs brought an action claiming,
inter alia,
rectification of the contract. Pennycuick J. held that
the plaintiffs in the circumstances were entitled to
the relief claimed on the ground that if one party
to a transaction knew that the instrument contained
a mistake in his favour but did nothing to correct it,
he was precluded from resisting rectification because
the mistake was merely unilateral and not common
(J.A.G.) See also 105 S.J. 425.
Criminal Law—sentence—conspiracy to contravene
Official Secrets Act,
1911.
In R.
v.
Kroger ; R.
v.
Kroger ; R.
v.
Houghton ;
R.
v.
Gee ; R.
v.
Lonsdale (May 8, 1961) the Court
of Criminal Appeal (Hilbery, Pilcher and Paull JJ.)
held,
dismissing appeals against sentences imposed
on a conviction of a common law conspiracy to
communicate
information,
in
contravention of
s. I of the Official Secrets Act, 1911, that
the
appropriate sentence for a common law conspiracy
was any sentence in the discretion of the court,
provided that the sentence was not inordinately long.
(D.C.)
The Times.
Extradition—-fugitive offenders—discharge—discretion.
In R.
v.
Governor of Brixton Prison ex p. Maranjan
Singh
(May
5,
1961)
the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate had committed S. to Brixton Prison to
await his return to India on charges under Art. 420
of the Indian Penal Code. The offences were alleged
to have been committed in about October, 1951.
S. applied for a writ of
habeas corpus,
applying
alternatively under s. 10 of the Fugitive Offenders
Act, 1881, principally on the ground of the long
delay on the part of the Indian authorities in bringing
proceedings. The Divisional Court (Lord Parker
C.J., Salmon and Edmund Davies JJ.)
held,
allowing
the application, that that court had a wide discretion
under s. 10 of the Act. (D.C.)
The Times,
May 6,1961.
Malicious Prosecution and False Imprisonment—action
against police constables.
In Selby
v.
Maclennan (May 8, 1961) plaintiffs
claimed damages for alleged assault, false imprison–
ment, malicious prosecution and conspiracy against
two police constables. Havers J. on the verdict of
a jury, entered judgment for the plaintiffs for £5,200.
The Times,
May 9, 1961. This is known as " The
Kiss in the Car Case ".
Road Traffic—dangerous driving and careless driving—
circumstances in which mechanical defect a defence.
In R.
v.
Spurge (May 18, 1961) the Court of
Criminal Appeal
(Lord Parker C.J., Hilbery,
Gorman, Salmon and Stevenson JJ.)
held
that if,
on a prosecution for dangerous driving, the motor–
car endangered the public solely by reason of some
sudden overwhelming misfortune suffered by the
man at the wheel for which he was in no way to
blame, then he was not guilty of dangerous driving.
The Times,
May i9th, 1961.
Solicitors—authority
to
sign memorandum—acting for
both parties to sale.
In Gavaghan
v.
Edwards (April 28, 1961) the
Court
of Appeal (Ormerod, Willmer and Danc-
dwerts
L.JJ.) held, dismissing an appeal from a
county court judge, that the issue whether a solicitor
who acted for both parties to a sale could have
authority to sign a memorandum on their behalf
for the purposes of s. 2 of the Irish Statute of Frauds,
1695, depended on the facts of each particular
case :
the mere fact of solicitor and client relation–
ship did not give the solicitor by implication any
authority to sign a memorandum.
Trade Unions—trade dispute
inducement to breach of
contract—boundaries of law of tort.
In Rooks
v.
Barnard (May 19, 1961) Sachs J.
held
(i) that the making of threats to induce a man
to break a contract where he had no right to do so
was tortious; (2) That where individual threats
had the cumulative effect of causing damage it was
not possible for each individual to say that no one
of them had actually caused the damage and con–
sequently that no tort had been committed at all;
(3) that since the policy of the Trade Disputes Act,
1906, was to ensure that employees were as a general
rule free to pursue by lawful means the furtherance
of trade disputes, it followed that s. 3
should be
construed as to avoid giving employees freedom to
use in furtherance of a trade dispute means which
were of themselves unlawful or in impairment of
their obligations. Accordingly, by (i) and (2) a
defence based on s. i of the Trade Disputes Act
failed, and by (3) a defence based on s. 3 also failed.
The Times,
May 20, 1961.
29