63 / 244
that the justices’ decision that the charge made to
the mortgagors was
ultra vires
was clearly wrong,
and Mr. Pauli, for the prosecutor, had not sought
to support it. It was argued for the council and
their clerk that they had not acted for fee, gain or
reward because what the mortgagors paid went
into the general rate fund.
The Court could not accept that contention.
The council were “ a person ” within the meaning
of section 47 (1) o f the Act o f 1932, and could
only act by their officer. They had acted for a
fee because they had made a charge which the
mortgagors had had to pay.
The only real point in the case was whether or
not the clerk was a “ public officer.” Different
meanings could be given to those words according
to the statutes in which they occurred. The question
was whether “ public officer ” in section 47 (3)
of the Act o f 1932 referred to any clerk of a local
authority or must be interpreted more narrowly
as referring to an officer in a public department.
The object o f the Act o f 1932 was to ensure that
conveyancing matters were carried out by qualified
persons, and the Court ought accordingly not to
give the words “ public officer ” a very wide
interpretation since that would open the door to
preparation o f mortgage instruments and so forth
by a large number o f unqualified persons. The
officers meant by the words “ public officer ” in
the Act o f 1932 were officers in a department of
State or a public department set up by statute,
officers whose salary was chargeable to national
as distinct from local funds. The justices had been
wrong on both points, though they had arrived
at the right results.
The appeal would be dismissed.
Mr. Justice Humphreys and Mr. Justice Finnemore
agreed.
(65
T .L .R .
134)
V
P
acey
v.
A
tkinson
D
ebt
collecting
. U
nqualified
person
acting
IN EXPECTATION OF FEE OR REWARD
Before the Lord Chief Justice, Mr. Justice
Lynskey and Mr. Justice Sellers.
The Court allowed the appeal, by case stated,
of Mr. Frederick William Beston Pacey, acting
on behalf o f the Law Society, from the decision
of Darlington justices dismissing six informations
preferred against the respondent. Mr. Victor Cecil
Atkinson, charging him with offences under section
47 (1) of the Solicitors Act, 1932, as amended by
the Solicitors Act, 1941.
The information preferred against the respondent
charged that contrary to the section, he,
“ not being a barrister or a duly certificated
solicitor, solicitor in Scotland, writer to the
signet, notary public, conveyancer, special
pleader, or draftsman in equity, drew, or,
alternatively, prepared, an instrument in relation
to a legal proceeding for or in expectation
o f a fee, gain or reward.”
The respondent, who was not qualified under the
section, was a rent and debt collector. He carried
on business in Darlington, and was employed
by creditors and landlords to collect sums due to
them, and had authority from his principals to
institute and carry through proceedings in the
Darlington County Court for the recovery o f sums
due. He was remunerated by a payment o f
i\%
on the sums which he collected.
In the case referred to in the informations he had
drafted particulars o f claim in county court
proceedings, and received or expected to receive
z\
per cent, o f the sums recovered whether the
proceedings were heard in Court or not. Apart
from his agreed remuneration he neither received
nor expected to receive any reward for drawing
or preparing particulars of claim, or for any work
in connection with the proceedings or for attendance
in Court. No objection had ever been taken to the
procedure which he followed.
The justices were o f opinion that the respondent
had drawn the instruments relating to a legal
proceeding specified in the informations, but a
majority were satisfied that he did not do it directly
or indirectly for or in expectation o f any fee, gain
or reward.
They accordingly dismissed all the
informations.
The Lord Chief Justice, in delivering the judgment
o f the Court, said that the evidence to the effect
that no objection had been taken by the county
court judge or the registrar to the practice followed
by the respondent was quite irrelevant. Whatever
practice might have existed the only question was
whatever the respondent’s action was prohibited
by the statute. A t the same time it was well known
that the practice had existed in all parts of the country
and the question was one, therefore, o f considerable
importance, not only to rent and debt collectors,
but to the owners o f property who employed them
and who, if the statute prohibited collectors from
taking proceedings in the county court on behalf
o f their principals, would have either to do the
57