g a z e t t e
april 1982
(2) Where a constable arrests a person, he shall tell that
person, at the time of the arrest or as soon thereafter as is
possible, the act for which he is arrested and the
circumstances as specified in section 1 above whichjustify
the arrest.
3. (a) Where a person has been arrested under paragraphs
(b) (c) or (d) of section 1 above, that person shall be
released from custody:
(i) In the case of a person arrested under paragraph (b),
when his name and address have been disclosed to
the constable;
(ii) In the case of a person arrested under paragraph (c),
when the constable no longer has reasonable cause to
believe that the arrested person will persist in
repeating or continuing the commission of the
offence;
(iii) In the case of a person arrested under paragraph (d),
when the constable no longer has reasonable cause to
believe that the arrested person will abscond or evade
the service of process.
(b) In section 3 (a) the term "constable" shall mean the
constable having custody of the arrested person for the
time being.
Arrest at Common Law — "on Reasonable Suspicion"
But now we should examine the powers of arrest at
common law as they exist apart from statute. The first
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great power of the constable at common law arises on
"reasonable suspicion of a felony having been committed
and of the person being guilty of it."
46
Thus, except in
conspiracy or common design cases or in a case where, for
example, a policeman finds two persons standing over a
recent murder victim, only one person may be arrested.
Suspicion attaching to several persons does not justify
arresting them all. In carrying out the arrest, the policeman
need not himself believe in the arrestee's guilt nor need he
fear the arrestee's escape in the event of a failure to arrest;
it is enough if suspicion sufficient to justify arrest exists.
The question of what constitutes reasonable and sufficient
suspicion is a question of law and in a civil action for false
imprisonment would be a question for the judge.
47
However, in criminal cases it is a question for the jury.
48
The police need not be certain, nor have enough
evidence to convict before arrest, nor enough grounds to
make out a 'prima facie' case. However, their suspicion
must be reasonable and not based merely on instinct or
guesswork
49
but must be founded on some grounds which
if subsequently challenged will at least show that at the
moment of arrest they acted reasonably. Thus, in the
United States at least, the correctness of a 'hunch' leading
to arrest will be no defence to subsequent civil proceedings
for false imprisonment; and in this jurisdiction, presum-
ably, just because the Gardai have the right hunch and
arrest a person does not thereby render that person's
detention lawful; and, consequently, any confession made
by that person would not be admissible in evidence. So
what do the police need in order to show that they acted
reasonably?
Firstly, the question of the reasonable suspicion of the
police has nothing to do with the technical law of evidence.
At the trial within a trial the judge orjury will be entitled to
consider matters which the law would not allow a jury to
hear on the substantive issue of guilt. Thus in
Hussein v.
Chong Fook Kam
i0
the arrestee's lorry had discarded a
piece of timber which had killed a passing motorist. The
lorry did not stop but the police got its number. The next
day the police found the driver who offered them an alibi.
They arrested the driver and upon investigation the alibi
proved false. Lord Devlin said that the mere circumstance
of driving could not furnish grounds for reasonable
suspicion as to reckless driving but on the discovery of the
false nature of the alibi such suspicion sufficient to justify
the arrest was created and cured its bad character from
that moment.
Lord Devlin said:
"Suspicion can take into account matters which
could not be put in evidence at a l l . . . Suspicion can
take into account also matters which, though
admissable, could not form part of a 'prima facie'
case. Thus the fact that the accused has given a false
alibi does not obviate the need for 'prima facie' proof
of his presence at the scene of the crime; it will
become of considerable importance when such proof
as there is, is being weighed perhaps against a second
alibi; it would undoubtedly be a very suspicious
circumstances."
In founding a reasonable suspicion a policeman may
also rely on hearsay. But normally mere hearsay will
probably not be enough, but this depends on the source of
that information. According to Hatherly L.C. in
Lister
v.
Perryman.
iX
80