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GAZETTE
JULY-AUGUST
1980
meetings and telephone conversa-
tions.
At that time in 1970 a claim was
pending before the Labour Court for
an award of Marriage and Children's
allowances to the professional
employees of the Defendants. This
claim was discussed in the
Defendant's negotiations with the
officers of the Plaintiff's Union when
it was indicated that if that claim of
the professional staff was allowed by
the Labour Court the Plaintiff and
other members of his Union who
were "technicians" employed by the
Defendant would receive the same
allowances. The position was left as
stated in a letter dated 16 November,
1970 from the Defendant to the
Union:
"Should the question of Marriage
and Children's allowances be
resolved satisfactorily and should
payment of this be made to pro-
fessional staff, I can assure you
that similar allowances will be
made to all staff of the Institute
(i.e. the Defendant) including the
technicians."
In February 1971, the Labour Court
declined to make a recommendation
that such Marriage and Children's
allowances
be paid to
the
professional
staff.
However,
subsequently, on the laying of new
facts before the Labour Court, this
decision was reversed in favour of the
professional staff when these allow-
ances were recommended with effect
from 2 April 1970 and the allow-
ances were duly paid by the
Defendant to the professional staff.
A similar application by the
technicians was refused by the
Labour Court in 1974 and 1975.
The Plaintiff then issued proceed-
ings in the High Court for a declara-
tion that the assurance given by the
Defendant to the Plaintiff's Union in
the letter of 16 November, 1970, that
were the Marriage and Children's
allowances recommended by the
Labour Court to be paid to the pro-
fessional staff that similar allow-
ances would be paid to the
technicians, formed a term of a bind-
ing Contract between the Plaintiff
and the Defendant.
Held
(per McWilliam J.) that the
Plaintiff's claim of a binding
Contract between him and the
Defendant included the term in
respect of the Marriage and
Children's allowances in so far as it
was intended to be part of a
"package" settlement for the two
year period ending 1 April 1971, and
was a term relied upon by the
Plaintiff's Union in its acceptance of
the offer made by the Defendant
upon which the claims then being
negotiated were settled; that the fact
that the Labour Court at that time
decided against the claim of the pro-
fessional staff did not end the matter
as the Labour Court reversed its
decision at a later date on having
further information before it; that this
reversal indicated that the Labour
Court was satisfied that it had been
incorrect initially in refusing the
professional staff's claim; and that
accordingly, the Plaintiff was held
entitled to damages equal to what
would have been the appropriate
yearly Marriage allowance and the
appropriate yearly Children's allow-
ances (on proof that he was married
and had children) for the two year
period ending 1 April, 1972.
Harold P. Pattison v. Institute
for Industrial Research and
Standards
— High
Court,
McWilliam
J. - 31 May 1979 -
Unreported.
WILL-CONSTRUCTION
Meaning of a bequest of "an average
of fifteen hundred pounds per year"
to a testator's widow — nature of a
residuary bequest to "the Parish of
Bray" and whether or not a charit-
able gift.
The testator, who died on 13 April
1976, had made a short will as
follows:
"I
give divise and bequeath unto
L.D. my niece . . . the sum of
£2,000. Also £500 for Masses to
the Parish of Bray.
I
bequest an
average of £1,500 per year to my
wife M.D. and after her death to
the Parish of Bray, County
Wicklow the residue of my
property."
The Plaintiff was the exécutor and
sought the assistance of the Court,
first,
as to the meaning of the
expression "an average of £ 1500 per
year", and,
second,
as to the nature
of the residuary bequest, whether it
was a valid charitable bequest, what
entity was designated by the
expression "the Parish of Bray",
whether the residuary bequest was
void for uncertainty or not, and, if
the gift was a valid gift, how it was to
be administered.
On the
first
question, it was argued
on behalf of the testator's widow (the
first defendant) that the gift of "an
average of £1,500 per year" being
for an unlimited time was an absolute
gift of sufficient capital to produce an
average of £1,500 per year.
Reference was made to
Theobald on
Wills
(13th ed., paragraph 1326)
which stated that a gift of the income
of property to a person without
limitation as to time, is a gift of
capital.
On the
second
question, with
regard to the residuary gift, it was
uncertain under the terms of the will
what beneficiary or beneficiaries the
testator intended to include in the
description "the Parish of Bray"
although, having regard to the use of
the same expression to designate the
beneficiary of the gift for Masses, it
could be assumed that he had in mind
either the Roman Catholic Church in
that parish or the memnbers of that
church in the parish.
There was no indication as to how
the residuary legacy was to be
applied and unless the gift was a
charitable gift, it would have failed
for uncertainty and would have
passed as on intestacy to the
testator's widow.
Reference was made to a number
of cases in which gifts for the benefit
of the inhabitants of a parish or town
or to a parish as such were held to be
charitable, including,
In re Smith,
Public Trustee v. Smith [1932] 1 ch.
153, in which a gift "unto my
country England" was held to be a
good charitable gift.
Held
(per McWilliam J.):
(1) That the testator's estate was to
be held during the life of the widow
on trust to provide her with an
income of £1,500 per year; that
capital might be applied for that
purpose; and that, if there was a
surplus of income in any year, that
that surplus was to be retained with
the capital and would, if required, be
applicable with the capital to make
up the sum of £1,500 in any
subsequent year. The principle
referred to in
Theobald
by the first
named defendant was a well estab-
lished principle but the proposition