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GAZETTE

JULY-AUGUST 1980

RECENT IRISH CASES

CONTRACT — RESERVATION

OF TITLE

The effect of reservation of title

clauses in contracts for the sale of

goods must be considered in the light

of the intentions of the parties as

shown by the provisions of the whole

agreement and each case rests on its

own facts and the nature of the

transaction.

The Plaintiffs sold a refrigerating

machine to the first Defendant for a

price which was to be paid by four

instalments

during

the

period

commencing with the placing of the

order and ending shortly after the

machine was

in situ

and ready for

operation. The contract contained

(inter alia)

the following clauses:—

(1) "Until all sums due to the Seller

have been fully paid to it, the

plant, machinery and materials

supplied by the Seller herein shall

remain the Seller's personal

property and retain its character

as such no matter in what

manner affixed or attached to

any structure. If the Buyer fails

fully to perform this contract, the

unpaid portion of the purchase

price shall, at the option of the

Seller, become immediately due

and payable without notice,

together with all reasonable legal

or collection agency fees incurred

in the collection thereof'.

(3) "In case of default, the Seller

reserves the right to enter upon

the premises where the materials

are located and take possession

of and remove the same, if so

elects. In the event of such

removal the Seller may retain all

payments made therefor as

compensation for the use of the

materials."

The facts, which were not in

dispute, were that the machine was

installed and operational but that

approximately 25% of the purchase

monies remained outstanding when

the second Defendant was appointed

Receiver over the property of the first

Defendant.

The Plaintiff claimed that the

machine was still its property and

demanded its return or payment in

full of the monies outstanding. The

Defendants argued that the property

in the goods passed either on delivery

or once user commenced and that the

reservation of title clause (above

quoted) was only effective to create a

charge or some other kind of security

on the machine for the purchase

price, and as such ought to have been

registered under Section 99 of the

Companies Act, 1963. As it was not

so registered, the Defendants claimed

that the clause was void as against

the Receiver and creditors of the first

Defendant.

The High Court (McWilliam J.)

had considered the effect of a number

of such clauses in the previous case

of

Stokes

McKiernan

Limited

(December 1978 unreported) where

the Court had been referred to and

relied on the earlier decision in the

case of

Aluminium Industries B.V.

v.

Rompala Ltd.

[ 1976] 1 WLR 676 but

that unfortunately at that time

(December 1978) the full judgement

of Slade J. in re

Bond Worth Limited

[1979] 3 All ER 919 had not then

been delivered. The High Court

considered that in the

Bond Worth

case, the wording of the clause in

question (in fact similar to the

wording of one of the clauses in the

Stokes McKiernan

case) and the

nature of the transaction as a whole

did appear to create only an equitable

charge over the goods in question for

the purchase price. The clause in the

Bond Worth

case was as follows:—

"The risk in the goods passes to

the buyer upon delivery, but

equitable and beneficial ownership

shall remain with us until full

payment has been received (each

order being considered as a whole)

or until prior resale, in which case

our beneficial entitlement shall

attach to the proceeds of resale or

to the claim for such proceeds."

The clause in the Romalpa case was

similar to that in the present case in

that the entire property in the goods

was expressed, although in a different

form, to be retained by the vendor

until all that was owing had been

paid. The clause was as follows:—

"The ownership of the material to

be delivered to A.I.V. will only be

transferred to purchaser when he

has met all that is owing to A.I.V.,

no matter on what grounds."

McWilliam J. had held in the

Stokes

McKiernan

case (December 1978)

adopting the view expressed in the

Romalpa

case that a clause such as

condition (1) in the present case was

effective to retain the property in the

goods in the vendor even though the

goods were in the possession of the

purchaser.

Held:

(per McWilliam J.) that

in the present case, the clause and

nature of the transaction appeared

to be more similar to that in the

Romalpa

case, but that the

wording of the clauses and the

construction of the intentions of

the

contracting

parties

as

evidenced by the contract as a

whole must be considered and

each case must stand on its own

facts. The parties to a contract

could agree to any terms they

wished and the Court would have

to decide what

was their

intentions. The clause in the

present case was clear, in that

there was only one article sold, the

resale of which was most unlikely

to have been contemplated by

either the vendor or purchaser,

and accordingly the Plaintiff had

retained the property in the

refrigerating

machine

until

payment was made in full.

Frigoscandia (Contracting) Limited

v. Continental Irish Meat Limited

and Lawrence Crowley

— High

Court (McWilliam J.) — 25 April

1979 — Unreported.

CONTRACT

Specialist roofing contractors liable

for damages arising from their failure

to provide an effective waterproofing

of a roof within a reasonable time.

The specialist roof contractors had a

duty to provide for and insist on any

special precautions in the design of

the basic roof structure that they

required for their specialist form of

roofing insulation.

In 1974 the Plaintiffs were in the

course of constructing a shopping

centre in Dundalk. The Defendants,

who

described

themselves

as

specialists and licencees in the Shell

Monoform system of roofing and re-

roofing quoted for roofing in the

shopping centre. The quotation was

accepted on behalf of the Plaintiffs by

their Architect on 2 April 1974

subject to the fact that the

Defendants commenced work on 24

September, 1974, at which time the