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GAZETTE
JULY-AUGUST 1980
estimate for completion of the work
was just under four weeks. The
Defendants continued to work from
that time, though not continuously,
until the 13 November 1974, when the
Plaintiffs purported to repudiate the
contract
and engaged
another
contractor who laid an alternative
type of roof, namely an asphalt roof.
The
initial
period
of
the
Defendants' work, commencing on
September 24, 1974 had ceased on 2
October 1974, when the Defendants
left the site, as the Defendants were
awaiting the completion of work by
other contractors to permit them to
continue the further insulation of the
roof. The Defendants complained
that during that initial period of work
and during the period of their absence
from the site extensive damage had
been caused to the roof and that
when they returned to the site on
October 18, 1974 they were faced
with an extremely difficult problem.
The Defendants further complained
that between that time and the 13
November 1974 (when the purported
repudiation by the Plaintiffs took
place) damage continued almost
uninterrupted despite protests and
complaints on their part.
On 9 November 1974 a major leak
through the roof in various places
occurred during, admittedly, very wet
weather. As a result the Plaintiffs'
Architect was called to the shopping
centre and a series of meetings were
held with the Defendants when
proposals were made by the
Defendants for repair. The Plaintiffs'
Architect expressed the point of view
that the Defendants had completely
failed to carry out the system as an
effective and efficient system and that
their explanations for the failure were
unacceptable; he accordingly advised
the Plaintiffs to engage another
contractor. The advice was accepted
and the Plaintiffs purported to
repudiate their contract with the
Defendants on 13 November 1974.
Changes in the design of the basic
roof structure had been made by the
Plaintiffs resulting in a change in the
fall of the roof, and the case was
made by the Defendants that this was
a major contributing factor to the
failure of their roof insulating
operation.
It was undisputed at the hearing
that a water-tight or weather-tight
roof was not achieved as at 13
November 1974, and the dispute
between the P'aintiffs and the
Defendants on liability turned on two
contentions of the Defendants',
namely.
(i) The Defendants contention that
they were at the commencement
of the work supplied with an
architect's
drawing
which
indicated that the fall on the roof
would be one in one hundred and
that without their knowledge or
approval this was altered to a fall
of one in three hundred only with
the consequence that there was a
marked lack of drainage on the
roof causing the lodging of water
which destroyed the process
which they were applying.
(ii) The
Defendants'
further
contention that during the entire
process of the work being carried
out by them the roof was
subjected to damage due to the
negligence
of
the
Plaintiff
Contractors, their servants or
agents and of the servants or
agents of other sub-contractors.
Held
(per Finlay, P.):
(a) That on the evidence the
alteration and design of the roof
by the Plaintiffs was not the
cause of the failure nor was the
change in the fall of the roof
unknown to the Defendants
before
their
operations
commenced.
(b) That
the
Defendants
held
themselves out as specialists in a
specialist
form
of
roofing
insulation and that under the
term undoubtedly implied into
the contract, the Defendants
would use reasonable skill and
care in the carrying out of their
work and that the Defendants
had a duty to provide for and
insist upon any special precautions
that they required. In the
circumstances the repudiation of
the contract by the Plaintiffs on
13 November 1974 was justified
as the Defendants had failed in
the fundamental term of the
contract namely to provide an
effective waterproofing of the
roof within a reasonable time.
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs claim
for damages was successful.
Dundalk Shopping Centre Limited
v. Roofspray Limited,
High Court,
(Finlay P. 21 March 1979 —
unreported.
EXTRADITION
Robbery with violence contrary to
Section 8 of the English Theft Act,
1968,
does correspond to robbery
with violence under the Larceny Act
1916,
in this State, provided the
recital of the offence in the warrant
identifies the offence by reference to
the factual components relied on and
not merely because the offences have
the same name. Sections 47(2) and
5<X2Xc)
of Extradition Act,
1965,
considered.
Extradition was sought on a warrant
which recited that the Plaintiff on a
specified date at a specified place in
Middlesex "did rob M.B. of £281 in
cash and immediately before doing
so, used force, to wit personal
violence, to the said M.B." In a
separate entry in a separate para-
graph in the warrant the offence was
said to be contrary to Section 8 of the
Theft Act, 1968.
The sole matter in issue was
whether (as required for the issue of a
direction under Section 50(2) (c) of
the Extradition Act, 1965) the offence
so specified "does not correspond
with any offence under the law of the
State which is an indictable offence
or is punishable
op
summary
conviction by imprisonment for a
maximum period of at least six
months." The fact that this test is
expressed in a negative form (both in
Sections 47(2) and 50(2) (c) of the
Act of 1965) was not indicative of
where the onus of proof lay; it merely
laid down that, for the allowance of
this exemption from extradition, the
Court had to be of the opinion that in
the circumstances of the case there
did not exist dual criminality to the
extent required for the specified
correspondence of offences. The
requirement for extradition was
satisfied when correspondence was
shown between the specified offence
and
any
offence which either was an
indictable offence or carried a punish-
ment on conviction of a maximum
term of six months imprisonment.
The District Justice had held that
the
offence
in
the
warrant
corresponded with robbery with
violence, contrary to the Larceny Act,
1916. When the Plaintiff instituted
these proceedings in the High Court
seeking a direction that he be released
under Section 50(2) (c) of the Act of
1965 the High Court (per McMahon
J.) held that the specification in the