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INFORMS Nashville – 2016

348

TD42

207D-MCC

RM in Online Markets

Sponsored: Revenue Management & Pricing

Sponsored Session

Chair: Dragos Florin Ciocan, INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France,

florin.ciocan@insead.edu

1 - Learning Demand Curves In B2b Pricing: A Case Application Of

Optimal Learning

Ilya Ryzhov, Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of

Maryland,

iryzhov@rhsmith.umd.edu,

Huashuai Qu, Michael Fu

We consider a sequence of B2B transactions involving a wide variety of buyers,

products, and other characteristics, where the seller only observes whether buyers

accept or reject the offered prices. The seller must adapt to this uncertain

environment and learn quickly from new deals as they take place. We propose a

new framework for statistical and optimal learning in this problem, based on

approximate Bayesian inference, that has the ability to measure and update the

seller’s uncertainty about the demand curve based on new deals. A case study

demonstrates the practical potential of this approach.

2 - Pricing Of Conditional Upgrades In The Presence Of Strategic

Consumers

Yao Cui, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, United States,

yao.cui@cornell.edu

, Izak Duenyas, Ozge Sahin

We study a conditional upgrade strategy that is recently used by the travel

industry. A consumer can accept an upgrade offer in advance and pay the

upgrade fee at check-in if higher-quality products are still available. Consumer

make forward-looking decisions regarding which product type to book. We

characterize the firm’s optimal upgrade pricing strategy and identify multiple

benefits of conditional upgrades. We also evaluate the revenue performance of

conditional upgrades by comparing to other policies.

3 - Revenue Management With Repeated Interactions

Dragos Florin Ciocan, INSEAD,

florin.ciocan@insead.edu,

Andre

Du Pin Calmon, Gonzalo Romero

We consider an RM problem where a seller of heterogeneous goods interacts with

a dynamically evolving population of buyers over multiple periods. The basic

trade-off we explore is between myopically optimizing the seller’s revenues over

one period versus optimizing buyer surplus in the hope of increasing buyer

participation in future periods. We exhibit a simple policy that is asymptotically

optimal.

4 - Joint Pricing And Inventory Management With Strategic

Customers

Yiwei Chen, Singapore University of Technology and Design,

stevenyiweichen@gmail.com,

Cong Shi

We consider a joint pricing and inventory management problem wherein a seller

sells a single product over an infinite horizon via dynamically determining

anonymous posted prices and inventory replenishment quantities. Customers

have a deterministic arrival rate but heterogeneous product valuations.

Customers are forward-looking, who can strategize their times of purchases. A

customer incurs waiting and monitoring cost if he delays his time of purchase.

The seller seeks a joint pricing and inventory policy that maximizes her long-run

average profit. We show that the optimal policy is cyclic. Under the optimal

policy, strategic customer equilibrium behaviors are proven to be myopic.

TD43

208A-MCC

Portfolio Decision Analysis

Sponsored: Decision Analysis

Sponsored Session

Chair: Janne Kettunen, The George Washington University, The George

Washington University, Washington, DC, 00000, United States,

jkettune@gwu.edu

1 - Systematic Bias, Selection Bias, And Post-decision

Disappointment

Eeva Vilkkumaa, Aalto University, Helsinki, Finland,

eeva.vilkkumaa@aalto.fi,

Juuso Liesiö

Based on empirical studies, the realized values of highest-ranked decision

alternatives tend to be lower than estimated. This phenomenon has been

explained by a systematic bias in the alternatives’ value estimates, or selection

bias. We develop models for estimating the relative magnitudes of these biases

using data on the estimated values of all alternatives but the realized values of

selected alternatives only. Results obtained from real data on 5,610 transportation

infrastructure projects suggest that out of the total cost overrun of $2.77 billion,

25% is due to systematic bias and 75% due to selection bias.

2 - Scheduling Public Procurement Contracting

Janne Kettunen, Assistant Professor, The George Washington

University, Washington, DC, United States,

jkettune@gwu.edu

,

Young Hoon Kwak

We show that the schedule according to which procurements are contracted can

impact the number of proposals and thereby the cost of procured services or

products. To help the owner of the procurements to schedule the contracts, we

develop an optimization framework and apply it to the Florida Department of

Transportation’s procurement contracts scheduling problem. Our results show

that the optimal schedule yields about 2% ($15 million) cost savings annually.

3 - Multi-period, Multi-objective Portfolio Optimization

Ernest H Forman, George Washington University,

forman@gwu.edu

Multi-Period, Multi-Objective and Multi-Perspective portfolio optimization

requires synthesis of hard data as well as judgment. The Analytic Hierarch Process

and extensions are increasingly being used to facilitate the portfolio optimization

process in a variety of applications, ranging from project portfolio optimization to

capital budgeting.

TD44

208B-MCC

Applications of Multiattribute Preferences

Sponsored: Decision Analysis

Sponsored Session

Chair: Jay Simon, American University, 4400 Massachusetts Ave NW,

Washington, DC, 20016, United States,

jaysimon@american.edu

1 - Preference Programming For Spatial Multiattribute Decision

Analysis

Mikko Harju, Aalto University, Espoo, Finland,

mikko.harju@aalto.fi

, Kai Virtanen, Juuso Ilari Liesio

The additive spatial value function models preferences among decision

alternatives with spatially varying multiattribute consequences. Use of this value

function can be challenging as it requires assessing a weighting function across

the (uncountably infinite) set of spatial locations. To overcome this challenge, we

develop (i) methods for capturing incomplete preference information about

relative importance of locations, and (ii) models for identifying the resulting

dominance relations among the alternatives. The use of these models is

demonstrated with a military planning application. Finally, we provide some new

insights about the axiomatic basis of spatial value functions.

2 - Multiattribute Preference Models For Computational Creativity

Debarun Bhattacharjya, IBM T. J. Watson Research Center,

Yorktown Heights, NY, United States,

debarunb@us.ibm.com

, Lav

Varshney

There is vigorous debate around definitions of creativity, yet there is general

consensus that creativity inherently involves a subjective value judgment by an

evaluator. In this talk, I will present evaluation of creative artifacts and

computational creativity systems through a multiattribute preference modeling

lens. Various implications are illustrated with the help of examples from and

inspired by the creativity literature.

3 - Multilinear Utility Functions For Multiattribute Portfolio Decision

Analysis

Juuso Ilari Liesio, Aalto University, Helsinki, Finland,

juuso.liesio@aalto.fi

, Eeva Vilkkumaa

In project portfolio selection applications, portfolio utility is often modeled as the

sum of the projects’ multi-attribute utilities. We establish the preference

assumption underlying this linear portfolio utility function. Furthermore, we

show how relaxing some of these assumption leads to a more general class of

multilinear portfolio utility functions, which can capture risk preferences on the

portfolio level. We also develop techniques to elicit these utility functions, and

optimization models to identify the project portfolio which maximizes the

expected utility subject to resource and other portfolio feasibility constraints.

4 - Multiattribute Procurement Auctions With Unknown Buyer

Preferences

Jay Simon, American University,

jaysimon@american.edu

In procurement auctions for new large-scale products or services, the length of

time between the request for bids and the selection of the winning bid can be

extremely long. During this time, the specific needs of the buyer may change.

Additionally, the new product or service being procured may involve technology

that is not fully understood. Thus, the buyer may not know what her eventual

preferences will be when the bid selection decision is made. However, the buyer

must tell the bidders how their bids will be scored at the start of the process. This

work explores optimal strategies for the buyer in the case where preferences at

the time of bid selection are uncertain when the scoring rule is chosen.

TD42