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INFORMS Nashville – 2016

410

3 - Operations Decisions With Target Based Incentives

Andrea Hupman Cadenbach, University of Missouri - St. Louis,

cadenbach@umsl.edu

Supply chains represent complex systems in which numerous performance

measures are used and in which responses to incentive structures can change

system performance. One type of incentive is a fixed target in which performance

above a threshold is rewarded. The literature shows that high targets tend to

induce risk taking while low targets tend to induce the selection of safer decision

alternatives, but this talk examines the effects of setting targets on different types

of performance measures in addition to the magnitude of the target.

4 - Team Incentives In Multi-level Principal Agent Problems

Aditya Umesh Kulkarni, PhD Candidate, Virginia Tech, 11700

Cardinal Court, Apt E, Blacksburg, VA, 24060, United States,

aditya88@vt.edu,

Christian Wernz

Existing literature on relational contracts typically does not account for the

interdependency of stochastic performance outcomes across multiple levels of

superior-subordinate interactions in organizations. We use multiscale decision

theory to derive relational, that is, trust-based, contracts for teams while

accounting for the aforementioned influences. We derive the optimal job design

for employees, which is a function of rewards and performance influence. Our

results extend agency theory by accounting for cascading and team-based

incentives in organizations.

WB44

208B-MCC

Behavioral Decision Analysis

Sponsored: Decision Analysis

Sponsored Session

Chair: Matthias Seifert, IE Business School, Maria de Molina 12, 5,

Madrid, Spain,

matthias.seifert@ie.edu

1 - Exploring The Consistency Of Higher-order Risk Preferences

Timo Heinrich, IN-EAST School, Universität Duisburg-Essen,

Duisburg, Germany,

timo.heinrich@ibes.uni-due.de

,

Alexander Haering, Thomas Mayrhofer

We measure higher-order risk preferences and explore their consistency across

orders. We analyze the role of (i) country differences between China, Germany,

and the US, (ii) differences in stake size, and (iii) differences through displaying

reduced rather than compound lotteries. We replicate the finding of mixed risk-

averse and mixed risk-loving behavior by Deck and Schlesinger (2014) in the US

and identify a similar pattern in Germany and in China. Moreover, we observe an

increase in risk aversion when stakes are increased tenfold. Finally, in reduced

lotteries there is only weak evidence for prudence and no evidence for

temperance.

2 - Regime Shift Detection In The Domain Of Losses

Matthias Seifert, Associate Professor of Decision Sciences, IE

Business School, Madrid, 28006, Spain,

matthias.seifert@ie.edu

,

Sara Farooqi

We extend Massey and Wu’s (2005) work on regime shift detection by studying

the influence of system neglect on trading behavior in experimental markets. We

show in a series of laboratory experiments how patterns of probabilistic over- and

underreaction translate into investment decisions under risk and use Prospect

Theory to explain systematic differences between buyers/sellers as well as

gains/loss domains.

4 - Risky Choice Following Near Miss Events In Sequential Tasks

Under Ambiguity

Florian Federspiel, IE Business School, Madrid, Spain,

fmfederspiel@faculty.ie.edu

, Matthias Seifert

Studies have shown that near miss events can lead to inconsistent risk

perceptions. Yet near misses are often clouded in ambiguity, allowing for hubris

and misattribution of what caused success or prevented failure. We provide an

analytical model of near misses and investigate the experience of such an event

on risk taking in a real options task. We show that increases in risk taking

following a near miss occur mainly under ambiguity. We further find that this

effect depends on the decision maker’s prior expectation. Only those with an

expectation of failure fall prey to the near miss bias.

3 - The Reasonability Of Behavioral Assumptions Made In Complex

Systems Models

Allison C Reilly, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI,

United States,

allison.reilly@gmail.com

, Seth Guikema

Improved capture of human behavior in complex systems modeling has

significantly advanced in recent decades and proffers a more cohesive approach to

understanding how these systems may operate, fail, or evolve. The behavioral

assumptions have significant implications on the insights derived from these

models, though these implications are rarely explored. In this work, we address

frequently confused decision science terminology used in systems models - from

rationality to strategy - the reasonability of the behavioral assumptions, and their

implications via case studies.

WB45

209A-MCC

Simulation for Performance of

Non-Stationary Queues

Sponsored: Simulation

Sponsored Session

Chair: John Shortle, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA,

United States,

jshortle@gmu.edu

1 - A Performance Algorithm For Periodic Queues

Ni Ma, Columbia University,

nm2692@columbia.edu

, Ward Whitt

An efficient algorithm is developed to calculate the steady-state distribution of

virtual waiting time in a general Gt/G/1 queue with a periodic arrival-rate

function. We first approximate the Gt/G/1 model by an associated GIt/GI/1 model

based on a recent heavy-traffic functional central limit theorem, and then

compute the exact tail probabilities of the virtual wait by exploiting a modification

of the classic exponential change of measure. That algorithm is then applied to

compute related performance measures, such as the mean and variance of the

virtual wait.

2 - Fourier Trajectory Analysis For Identifying System Congestion

Russell R Barton, Pennsylvania State University, 210 Business

Building, University Park, PA, 16802, United States,

rbarton@psu.edu,

Xinyi Wu

We examine the use of the Fourier transform to discriminate dynamic behavior

differences between congested and uncongested systems. Simulation continuous

time statistic ‘trajectories’ are converted to time series for Fourier analysis. We use

this knowledge to explore statistical process control methods to monitor

nonstationary systems for transition from uncongested to congested state and vice

versa.

3 - Staffing To Stabilize Blocking In Loss Models With Time-varying

Arrival Rates

Jingtong Zhao, Columbia University,

jz2477@columbia.edu

,

Ward Whitt

It is not possible to find a time-varying staffing policy to stabilize blocking

probabilities in a multiserver loss model with a time-varying arrival rate to the

same extent as in corresponding delay models, because the blocking probabilities

necessarily change dramatically after each staffing change, but nevertheless a

variant of the established modified-offered-load staffing algorithm performs well

if we randomize appropriately.

4 - Effects Of Arrival Variability on Delays at Congested Airports

John Shortle, George Mason University,

jshortle@gmu.edu

More precise spacing of flight arrivals into airports has the potential to increase

capacity and reduce delays. However, even with precise spacing, delays can also

result from the variability in the mean arrival rates throughout the day (i.e., the

non-stationary nature of the arrival process) due to banking of flights at hub

airports. This talk presents a queueing simulation of an airport and investigates

the relative impact of reducing the uncertainty in the spacing of arrivals versus

reducing the schedule variability. Under conditions of high utilization, reducing

the arrival variability has limited impact on delays unless also accompanied by

reduced schedule variability.

WB46

209B-MCC

Networks and Games in Operations

Sponsored: Revenue Management & Pricing

Sponsored Session

Chair: Kimon Drakopoulos, Marshall School of Business,

3670 Trousdale Pkwy, Los Angeles, CA, 90089, United States,

kimondr@mit.edu

1 - Information Obfuscation In Strategic Experimentation

Kimon Drakopoulos, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,

kimondr@mit.edu

In our work we model a continuous time strategic experimentation problem

against an informed opponent (incumbent) who can take actions to obfuscate

learning. We show that the unique (weak) perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this

dynamic game takes the form of the ”delayed war of attrition” where over a range

of beliefs of the experimenter, both players use mixed strategies — for the

entrant, to determine when to stop experimenting and for the incumbent, to

determine when to stop obfuscating. The uniqueness of the outcome gives rise to

many questions such as market design in order to maximize fairness for the

entrants, or consumer surplus.

WB44