Legal Europe
SUGO SEMINAR on E.E.C. LAW—OCTOBER 1974
THE E.E.C. A ND THE ORD I NARY SOLICITOR—SOME RELEVANT CASES
By JOHN F. BUCKLEY, Solicitor
Part III
Transport
The provisions of the Treaty relating to Transport
provide for the drafting of a common policy on trans-
port and also make provisions for the abolition of re-
strictions which have the effect of limiting competit-
ion. Very few cases have in fact come before the
Courts arising out of the provisions of this portion of
the Treaty but a trio of cases heard together are worthy
of note. They are the
Grad Lesage and
Haselhorst
cases being Number 9, 20 and 23 of 1970 (1971)
C.M.L.R. 1 which decided that an obligation under
Article 4 (2) of a Council decision of 13th May 1965
as completed by Article 1 of the First Directive on turn-
tax of 11th April 1967 was unconditional and suf-
ficiently clear and precise. It was consequently capable
of creating direct effects anl legal relations between the
Member States and individuals and so could be invoked
by individuals in litigation. It also provided that a tax
on freight where the criterion was the mere fact of trans-
portation and the basis of assessment was the load to
which the roads were exposed did not correspond
'o
a usual form of Turnover Tax. There is a fairly recent
transport case,
Commission
v French Republic
167/
1973, (1974) ECR 359 which held that France was
in default in not complying with Regulation No. 1612/
68 dealing with the freedom of movement for workers
by not amending a French Law which provided that
such proportion of the crew of a ship as is laid down
by order of the Minister for the Merchant Fleet must
be French Nationals. There were orders that, subject to
special exemptions, employments on the bridge, in the
engine room, and in the wireless service, on French
vessels was limited to persons of French Nationality
and general employment on ships was limited in the
ratio of three French to one non French.
Competition Policy
Article 85 and 86 of the Treaty which govern Re-
strictive Trade Practices and Monopoly situations are
among the most diligently litigated of the entire Treaty.
Article 85 provides for the prohibition of all agreements,
decisions and concerted practices which may affect
trade between Member States and which have, as their
object
or effect, prevention,
restriction
or dis-
tortion of competition. This has been implemented by
Regulation 17 of 1962 which provided for the notifi-
cation of agreements to the Commission and for block
exemptions to be given for certain categories of agree-
ments. It is unfortunate that the question of the
status of an agreement which has been notified to the
Commission but which has not been adjusted on by
the Commission, although already the subject of num-
erous cases, is still not entirely clear, particularly 4ft
relation to the new Member States but there have been
a number of cases which have had to clarify the in-
terpretation of Article 85 and Regulation 17 in general.
The
Five v Mertons
(No. 2) case, (1963) C.M.L.R.
329, was decided by the Amsterdam District Court
which held there was no breach of Article 5 of Regul-
ation 17 where (1) there was no proof that any under-
taking other than those resident in the territory of a
Member State had participated in a Restrictive Practices
Agreement; (2) the product originated from a Manu-
facturer resident within the territory of a Member State
and (3) the Restrictive Practices Agreement was wholly
domestic in character and did not regulate imports
or exports as between Member States.
A particular and familiar kind of Restrictive Prac-
tices Agreement came before the Turin Appeal Court
in the
Lagattolla
case, (1964) C.M.L.R. 84, where it
was held that an agreement entered into between a
Company and a former employee under which the
latter undertook not to compete with the Company
for a period of five years after the termination of his
employment, in a golden handshake situation, did not
contravene Article 85.
The
Cadillon
case (No. 1 of 1971) (1971) C.M.L.R.
420 gave the European Court an opportunity to con-
sider the same area as had been dealt with in the
Five
case and it held (1) that an agreement was cap-
able of affecting trade within Member States if, looked
at on the basis of a whole pattern of legal and factual
elements, it appeared with a sufficient degree of prob-
ability that it could exercise an influence direct or in-
direct, actual or potential, on the trade patterns be-
tween Member States so as to hinder the realization
of the objectives of a single market and (2) an Exclusive
Dealing Agreement could escape the prohibitions of
Article 85 if, in view of the weak position of the parties
on the market in the products and the area in question
it was not capable of hindering the realization of the
objectives of a single market even when it established
an absolute territorial protection.
The
de Haecht
case No. 23 of 1967 (1968) C.M.L.R.
26 held that an exclusive dealing agreement was not
necessarily incompatible with the Common Market
and void as such
but it could be void if it was cap-
able of affecting trade between Member States
and had as its object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition. The de
.Haecht case is of interest because it was not, as most
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