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Bill was introduced in 1974 (having originally been

mapped out by the Commission 011 the Status of

Women)' passed through both Houses before the

Christmas recess and was promulgated in the second

week of January. 1975.

The Irish Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act 1974

An examination of the provisions of the Act

reveals that it apparently complies with most of the

minimum terms of the EEC Directive (with some

notable exceptions) — and this seems to have been

the obvious intention of the Legislature. Unlike the

British Act, it does not aim to achieve equal treat-

ment in other terms and conditions of employment

such as holidays, hours, provision of clothes and

sick-pay, but only in respect of pay. It may well be

that holidays provided for under the Holidays

(Employees) Act, 1973 and hours under the Minimum

Notice and Terms of Employment Act, 1973 will

bring our law into harmony with the U.K. Act in

some of these respects. As the Opposition put it in

the Dail, "We have had to have three Bills to do the

work of one." Against this, the U.K. may have to look

again at its Equal Pay Act in the light of the EEC

Directive.

The essence of the new Irish Act is to be found in

Section 2. Where a woman is employed by the same

employer on like work with that of a man in the

same place of employment, she will be entitled to

equal pay. However, different rates of remuneration

may be paid to employees in the same place of

employment on like work on grounds other than

sex, e.g. where service pay, incremental scales and

soforth, apply.

A crucial question arises regarding the area of

comparison which a woman may draw with men's

jobs. She may only compare her job with those of

men employed in the same place and by the same

employer if both are employed on like work (section

2(1)). Suppose the employer has three establishments.

A, B and C. The same job is carried out in all three

places by men and women. The men at A and B are

employed at the same rate but the women at A, B

and C and the men at C are paid at a lower rate.

The women at A and B are entitled to equal pay

with the men at A and B; but neither the women at

C nor the men at C are entitled to be paid the same

as the men and women at A and B. (The same defect

is to be found in the British Act: Hepple & O'Higgins,

Individual Employment Law, Sweet & Maxwell, 1971,

.p.99). Likewise, an employer could maintain two

distinct places of employment, employing solely men

at one place and solely women at the other; in such

case the women would not enjoy the right to equal

pay with that of the men.

Neither does the Act entitle women to equal treat-

ment with men in respect of so-called "ex gratia"

(or "discretionary") bonuses. (Such may be legally

enforceable: Edwards v. Skyways Ltd.—(1964) 1 All

E.R. 494).

What is more serious is that an applicant for a job

can be turned down lawfully on grounds of sex, and

promotion may lawfully be refused on grounds of

sex, unless there is a contractual right to upgrading.

However, during the debates in the Dail, the Minister

for Labour indicated that he intends introducing

proposals for further legislation dealing with dis-

crim ination in the areas of access to employment,

promotion and training.

The consequences of employing men on "women's"

work, or women on "men's" work, may lead some

employers to maintain a strict segregation. For it is

only if men arc doing "like work" of a "similar

nature" that women will be able to establish a claim

to equal pay. It follows that the Act is unlikely to

expand women's job opportunities, particularly in

areas of traditional segregation such as office work.

All these criticisms may similarly be made of the

British Act.

Section 3 defines "like work". Two persons are to

be regarded as being employed on "like work" where:

(1) both perform the same work under the same

or similar conditions or where each is fully-

interchangeable with the other in relation to

the work; or

(2) the work performed by one is of a similar

nature to that performed by the other and any

differences between the work performed occur

only infrequently or are of small importance in

relation to the work as a whole; or, finally,

(3) the work performed by one is equal to that

performed by the other in terms of the

demands it makes on each person.

Under section 4, in the absence of a term of a

woman's contract of employment or otherwise

entitling her to equal pay, the terms and conditions

of her employment shall include an implied term to

that effect; and this implied statutory term is to

prevail over an express term to the contrary: there

can be no "contracting out" of the Act.

Terms of employment which include unequal pay

provisions under a collective agreement, an employ-

ment regulation order made pursuant to the Indus-

trial Relations Act, 1946, Part IV, an employment

agreement registered under Part 111 of the latter Act

and an order made by the Agricultural Wages Board

under section 17 of the Agricultural Wages Act, 1936,

shall be "null and void" if made after the commence-

ment of the Act. Those made before the operative

date of the Act are not affected for the purely prag-

matic reason that there are so many of them that

it would be unrealistic to expect them all to be re-

negotiated before the operative date. Obviously, each

wiíl eventually fall due for review and the Act will

then apply to the new agreements, regulations or

orders.

Equal Pay Officers

Then come the "teeth" of the Act — or rather, the

guardians of it, in the form of "Equal Pal Officers".

They are to be appointed by the Minister for Labour

after consultation with the Labour Court and with

the consent of the Minister for the Public Service,

who will determine the terms of employment and

remuneration of the equal pay officers.