EoW November 2011

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EuroWire – November 2011 28
Transat lant ic Cable
Boeing vs Airbus
For a pair of long-time competitors,
a pertinent question: Whose planes are
preferred by the pilots who y them?
The rivalry between Boeing Co, of the US, and Europe’s Airbus
presents a challenge to commentators. Boeing wins some
(customers, contracts, court cases, appeals to the World Trade
Organization), loses some. Airbus retreats and advances
accordingly. The pitched battle of any two behemoths is
important to the bystanders. It can also, after many decades,
become tedious. Reviewing yet another episode in the saga – an
Airbus bid to sell 260 planes to American Airlines (Fort Worth,
Texas), which currently has an all-Boeing eet – Brian Palmer
of the current a airs website Slate had a thought. Normally he
would evaluate the potential deal in terms of what American
Airlines stands to gain or lose as a corporation. But what about
the pilots at the controls of the planes? Is there a di erence,
for them, between Airbus and Boeing aircraft?
Mr Palmer sought the answer from airline industry analyst
and consultant Robert W Mann of R W Mann & Co Inc (Port
Washington, New York). While the inquiry yielded no clear
favourite overall, it did disclose that Airbus and Boeing have
very di erent control systems and that most pilots strongly
prefer one over the other. Here, abridged and lightly edited, are
Mr Palmer’s ndings as presented in the site’s “Explainer” blog.
(“Is It Purely About Money? Or Do the Pilots Care?”, 11 th July):
❈ Modern Airbus planes employ a “ y-by-wire” system. The
pilot controls the plane by manipulating a joystick next to
the main console, and a set of pedals. The movement of the
joystick and pedals is translated into electrical signals, which
switch on and o machines that move the plane’s aps, slats,
ailerons and rudder
❈ Most Boeing jets do not have a joystick but a more
traditional yoke. (The 777, introduced in 1994, is Boeing’s
rst y-by-wire plane.) In yanking back on the yoke the
pilot is actually pulling cables that move the plane’s control
surfaces with the help of some hydraulic systems
(Mr Palmer wrote: “In short, there is less electronic mediation
between the pilot and the machinery in a Boeing aircraft. Some
pilots think this gives them a better ‘feel’ in ying the plane,
while others prefer the video game-like quality of the [Airbus]
electronic interface.”)
Airbus places more restrictions than Boeing on the exercise
of pilot judgment. All aircraft must be own within certain
limits. But Airbus planes are programmed to ignore the
pilot’s instructions if the onboard computers think they
know better. The pilot may not change the default settings
of this “ ight envelope protection” by very much. The pilot
of a Boeing jet has somewhat more freedom to push the
envelope. (The term apparently originated in aviation
circles around the time of World War II.) For the most part,
the aps and rudder will obey the pilot’s commands,
even if those commands could lead to mechanical failure.
(Mr Palmer wrote: “It’s not easy to get to that point, though.
A pilot would have to pull back with signi cant force to bring
the plane into a potentially stall-inducing climb.”)
❈ Another open question is whether or not ight envelope
protection makes air travel safer. Advocates argue that
it might have prevented the November 2001 crash of an
American Airlines jet – Airbus equipment, but predating the
automatic system – in the New York City borough of Queens.
Opponents of the system point to the near-crash of China
Airlines Flight 006 in 1985, in which the pilot managed to
recover after an uncontrolled descent of nearly 30,000 feet.
Mr Palmer observed: “The problem with ight envelope
protection is that pilots occasionally have to take unorthodox
actions in desperate situations.” He also noted the possibility
that a ight protection system would have prevented the
runaway descent.
The economy
A recipe for US recovery: x the highways,
bridges, tunnels, railways, airports,
seaports, and transit and freight systems
The elected heads of the states and cities of the US are as various
as their jurisdictions, and nothing in the oath of o ce obliges
them to take counsel with their opposite numbers around the
country. Token collegiality is usually enough. Recently, however,
a prominent mayor and two former governors – free of o cial
duties after their terms in the state house – have made common
cause and begun issuing what to some ears sound remarkably
like proclamations.
Mayor Michael Bloomberg of New York City and former
governors Arnold Schwarzenegger, of California, and Ed
Rendell, of Pennsylvania, have formed the Building America’s
Future Educational Fund (BAF). The bipartisan coalition of
state and local elected o cials has an ambitious mission:
“bringing about a new era of US investment in infrastructure
that enhances our nation’s prosperity and quality of life.” With
US gross domestic product (GDP) languishing and job-creation
rates well below what is needed for a ourishing economy, BAF
asserts that recovery depends upon repair of the working parts
of the national mechanism. In an 8th August report the group
noted that, in 2005, the World Economic Forum ranked the US
number one worldwide in terms of economic competitiveness.
Today, it is at number 15. BAF sees a clear connection between
that regression and the fading health and sophistication of the
nation’s infrastructure. (“Falling Apart and Falling Behind”may be
read in full at )
BAF poured on the troubling data. The US spends only about
1.7% of GDP on transportation infrastructure, compared with
4% in Canada and 9% in China. The Port of Shanghai moves
more containers in a year than the seven largest American ports
combined. Transportation in the US is still based largely on a
highway system developed in the mid-1900s, while nations
from France to Brazil to Korea are moving ahead with ambitious
high-speed rail projects.
The explicit warning from BAF is that, if this imbalance is
not remedied promptly, the US is in imminent danger of