GAZETTE
JUNE 1991
to public services and facilities,
specifically including hotels and
many catering establishments.
2
Although there is no specific ban
in Ireland on racial and related
discrimination in entry to hotels
3
- and a case for general legislation
inthis area does exist - the
common law does contain a clear
English decision which held that a
refusal to permit a black person to
stay in a hotel was illegal.
4
Interestingly, there was an early
American decision
5
where a
refusal to admit a black person was
held to be reasonable where the
likelihood of damage to the
business could be established. It
seems very unlikely that such a
viewwould be accepted here now.
This is an area where the wider
public and constitutional policy
ideals of racial harmony and equal
opportunity would over-rule what
may have been an honest, though
self interested, motive for refusal.
Furthermore, it was very clearly the
intent of the Oireachtas when
enacting s.3(1) that it would
prohibit refusals on account of
race.
6
Itinerants
Many hotels refuse to admit
itinerants on the basis that they are
disruptive and may cause violence
or damage to property. Itinerants
can also be refused because of
local opposition to itinerants being
served and because of feared
effect on the hotel's business. It is,
however, difficult to see how any
general anti-itinerant policy
pursued by a hotel can be
reasonable.
7
Such an attitude
assumes, what is not the case, that
all itinerants are necessarily
troublesome and disorderly. This
can, effectively, amount to a form
of racism.
But, though s.3(1) may make any
general policy of refusal to serve
itinerants illegal, a hotel can still
refuse to serve particular itinerants
for the good reason - based on the
experience of the hotel itself, and
more problematically other hotels
as well - that they have unjusti-
fiably caused difficulty for the hotel
" . . . S 3(1) may make any
general policy of refusal to serve
itinerants illegal . .
in the past. Furthermore, where an
itinerant wishes to attend a dance
or a wedding function, s.3(1) does
not apply, and consequently the
hotel does not have to act
reasonably in refusing entry to the
person, subject only to the terms of
any prior contract and, possibly,
constitutional provisions.
Accent and Demeanour
It rarely happens that refusal of
admittance to a hotel is explicitly
stated to be because the person is
judged by his accent, mannerism
and general demeanour to be
undesirable, or because it is
thought he would lower the
standards of the hotel. Yet, since
many hotels, and especially higher
grade ones, seek to give the
impression of serving a select
clientele and of "maintaining
standards", there is, in fact, reason
to suspect t hat hotels do
sometimes disguise the real reason
for refusal by insisting that the
hotel is full, or that the person's
clothes do not conform to the
hotel's dress code, or that the
person is a trouble maker, drunk or
cheeky. Certainly, if the reason
given for the refusal is not the real
one, then regardless of whether the
real reason was, on its merits,
acceptable or not, the lie told will
probably render the refusal
unreasonable.
8
This point has a
special relevance where a hotel
does not wish to let it be known
that the refusal was made for what
might be called " s n o b b i s h"
reasons. Obviously, though, it is not
easy for a prospective guest to
show in court that the reason given
was not the real one.
Whether it is reasonable to
refuse to admit a person because
of his common appearance, or
because of his background,
depends on the weight to be
attached to the deliberate policy of
a hotel, based, perhaps, on good
economic grounds, that business
will be lost if it is obliged to admit
such people. It could be suggested,
for instance, that since there may
be alternative local establishments
where such a customer could be
served, that greater scope should
be allowed to modern hotels to set
standards and prices appropriate to
the socio-economic group which
the hotel wishes to serve.
9
Undoubtedly, there is merit in this
view. It is suported by the logic of
s.3(2) of the 1963 Act, which
requires a hotel to only charge
whatever prices are current at the
time in the hotel.
10
Yet, acceptance of this reasoning
could denude the basic obligation
in s.3(1) of much of its force
because the duty to admit and
serve in s.3(1) would then only
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