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based, US-based, Chinese or Japanese producer may actually
have come from a conflict zone in Africa, an indigenous re-
serve in Brazil or a UNESCO World Heritage orangutan habi-
tat in Indonesia (UNEP 2007; 2011; UNEP-INTERPOL 2009).
While there are some certification schemes available, like FSC,
the majority of these certifications are located in Canada, the
US and Europe (UNEP 2009; Schepers 2010).
Furthermore, as will be demonstrated in this report, there are
many ways wood can be laundered on its journey from the for-
est to the consumer, making certification schemes nearly im-
possible to implement effectively in many critical tropical de-
forestation locations. Hence, while consumer awareness and
demand is critical for putting pressure on manufacturers and
the processing industry, illegal logging, financing of illegal log-
ging or processing and laundering is a profitable transnational
organized crime which requires an international law enforce-
ment and investigative effort.
Like any other crime, organized illegal logging cannot be
combated merely through voluntary trade schemes or alter-
native income generation nor be prevented by short-lived
police crack-downs. It requires the full breadth of incentives,
reduced profitability and high risk. Only when the profit-risk
ratio changes dramatically, and both alternative incomes and
market incentives are in place can we expect illegal logging
and deforestation to decline.
While both trade incentives and economic support through
FLEGT and REDD+ will become increasingly available, there
must also be effective international law enforcement, train-
ing and investigative capacities to cut criminal profits and
increase the risk involved in illegal logging, wood-related tax
fraud and laundering to bring about an overall decline in il-
legal logging.