GAZETTE
SEPTEMBER 1983
If we assume that Helmut was not a "qualified
person" the generally accepted view would have been
that Helmut did not acquire a valid title to the land. The
logic is simple on the face of it; Helmut must either fit
into one of the approved categories or obtain the con-
sent of the Land Commission. Helmut has not satisfied
either of these conditions. Therefore the land is
incapable of vesting in him. Logically too, therefore,
Helmut would not have succeeded in an action for
specific performance against Benjy because Irish Courts
will not generally force a bad title on a purchaser by
granting a decree for specific performance to the
vendor.
5
Moreover, it is probable that Benjy would
have been entitled to be discharged from his contract
altogether.
By virtue of the fact that the decision was taken to
refer the State to the European Court of Justice, the
Commission was presumably dissatisfied with the
continuing existence of S.45(2)(a) of the Land Act
despite the fact that in practice a consent might be
obtained on behalf of an EEC national if a determined
approach was taken on his or her behalf. What was the
cause of this dissatisfaction?
Right of Establishment
Art.52 EEC
6
provides for what is called a "Right of
Establishment" of Nationals of one member-State in the
territory of another Member-State. Although the "right
of Establishment" is not explicitly defined in the Treaty,
it has been defined elsewhere
7
as 'the right of a natural
person or a company to settle in a Member-State and to
pursue economic activities therein".
Generally speaking, this will involve settlement in a
Member-State for economic purposes which on any
reasonable interpetation must include the management
and operation of lands for the purposes of carrying on an
agricultural or any other business.
The EEC Treaty provided for a "general programme"
for the abolition of existing restrictions on freedom of
establishment in the Community.
8
This programme
was adopted in 1961 and provided a basis for the
subsequent legislative actions of the Council of the
European Communities in this field. This legislative
scheme, consisting largely of a series of Directives, was
adopted on the basis that the prohibition on discriminat-
ion implicit in Art.52 EEC was ineffective without
implementing legislation by Member-States. It was the
purpose of the Land Act (Additional Categories of
Qualified Persons) Regulation, 1972
9
to provide that
persons and bodies specified as beneficiaries under
certain directives
10
of the Council of the EEC should be
"qualified persons" within the meaning of S.45 of Land
Act 1965. Undoubtly the 1972 Regulation would in time
have been followed by others intended to abolish dis-
crimination in regard to freedom of establishment.
However, the decision of the European Court of
Justice in
Reyners
v.
Belgium State
11
operated so as to
stem the burgeoning tide of Community and Domestic
legislation. In that case, the Court declared that the
prohibition on discrimination implicit in Art.52 EEC
was "directly applicable" as of the end of the transitional
period,
12
and this despite the wording of the text of
Art.52 which puported to make the aim of freedom of
establishment dependent upon the Council's legislative
programme and ultimately upon implementing
legislation by EEC Member-States. This decision means
that Art.52
itself
can be relied on by a Plaintiff in a
National Court who is alleging restrictions on his right to
freedom of establishment. Even more significantly,
Art. 52, like Arts.48 and 59, will be construed as prohibit-
ing discrimination by private parties as well as by public
parties.
13
It should be noted that Art.56 EEC which permits
derogation from the right of establishment in certain
specified circumstances only does so in respect of
conditions of entry and residence and not in respect of
the terms and conditions under which occupational
activities are carried on or are intended to be carried on;
this means that a State cannot impose restrictions on
EEC nationals on "public policy" grounds where the
real motive is to restrict solely or substantially on
grounds of nationality the integration of foreign
nationals into the host State's economy.
14
Art.7
15
of the EEC Treaty is also relevant since it
states in effect that all arbitrary differentiation between
persons based on factors connecting them with one
Member-State rather than another is incompatible with
one of the central aims of the Treaty, viz. the establish-
ment of a single market between Member-States. Any
such differentiation must therefore be inconsistent with
our Treaty obligations.
The obligations of membership of the European
Communities gave rise to special problems of a constitut-
ional nature. A solution was found through the medium
of the Third Amendment to the Constitution. The
operative part of sub-section 3 of section 4 of Article 29
of the Constitution provides that:
No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws en-
acted, acts done or measures adopted by the State
necessitated by the obligations of membership of the
Communities or prevents laws enacted, acts done or
measures adopted by the Communities or institutions
thereof, from having the force of law in the State.
16
The better view of Art.52 EEC is that it has, by virtue
of Art.29.4.3 of the Constitution, the force of law in the
State and more importantly that its status is superior to
that of any other provision of the Constitution which
might possible conflict with it or restrict its effect.
A
fortiori
, Art.52 EEC must take precedence over any Act
of the Oireachtas restricting or puporting to restrict its
effect. It is well settled under Community Law (as well
as under International Law) that a State cannot plead
provisions of its own domestic legislation or
Constitution as a defence to an alleged infringement of
Community Law (in this case Art.52 EEC); and any
provision of our legal system and any legislative,
administrative or judicial practice which might impair
the effectiveness of Community Law must be set aside
by our courts, n
The Land Act, 1965 (as amended) puported to render
the vesting of Land in a person who was not an Irish
Citizen but who was an f i EC national (though not a
"qualifed person") void without the consent of the Land
Commission.
Prima Facie
, this was a discriminatory
interference of an invidious nature with the right of an
EEC national to pursue an economic activity in this
country. In the case of our hypothetical example the
"economic activity" which was interfered with was the
right to enter into a contract for the purchase of land to
carry on an agricultural or any other business or to resell
193