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GAZETTE

SEPTEMBER 1983

The Rights of Children and the

Discretion of the Courts under

Section 117 of the Succession

Act, 1965

by

Anne E. Bacon, Solicitor.

(John B. Jermyn prize-winning essay, 1983)

T

HE Succession Act of 1965 was finally passed in

December of that year during Brian Lenihan's term

of office as Minister for Justice. A previous Succession

Bill had been swept aside with a dissolution of the

Oireachtas, but contributions to the drafting of the new

Bill had come from all sides, with that of Mr. John A.

Costello, in particular, being acknowledged by the

Minister. The Bill was entitled "An Act to reform the law

relating to succession to the property of deceased persons

in particular the devolution, administration, testamentary

disposition and distribution on intestacy of such property

and related matters." Until this enactment the Acts

governing this area of law were to be found scattered

through the Statute Books dating back as far as 1285 to

the Administration of Estates Act; a comprehensive

overhaul was long overdue.

As the laws of succession affect fundamental property

rights quite a number of areas affected by the new act were

controversial. The main areas of contention were in Parts

IX and X entitled "Legal Right of Testator's Spouse and

Provision for Children" and "Unworthiness to Succeed

and Disinheritance" respectively. They introduced novel

concepts into the Irish law of succession which severely

curtailed testamentary freedom. The Minister pointed out

during the debates on the second stage of the Bill (Dail

Debates Vol. 215 25/5/65) that the right to disinherit a

spouse and children was not a fundamental right inherent

in property. "In a country such as ours which recognises

the very special position of the family "as a moral institu-

tion possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights

antecedent and superior to all positive law", so-called

freedom of testation is a paradox which cannot be

defended on any ground". It was thought that the

enactment of legislation which only went as far as

providing for maintenance of a spouse and not a legal

right to a specific share irrespective of need or dependency

would fail to discharge the obligations imposed on the

state under Article 41 of the Constitution.

The intention of Part IX of the Act in giving a legal

right to a testator's spouse was to place the spouse beyond

the control from the grave by a capricious testator. Under

Section III of the Act a spouse has a legal right to one-half

of the testator's estate where there are no children and a

right to one-third of the estate where there are children.

The spouse does not have to have recourse to the Courts

to establish his or her rights to a share in the testator's

estate. The Act imposes a duty on the Personal Represen-

tative to notify the spouse in writing of the right of election

between the legal right and the rights under the Will

(Section 115). The right must be exercised within a year

from the first taking out of representation of the

deceased's estate or six months from the receipt by the

spouse of notification of the right of election, whichever is

the later. Likewise where a person dies intestate the

surviving spouse becomes entitled to a fixed portion of the

estate.

By contrast with this type of provision for spouses, the

rights of children of testators to a share in the estate is

dependant on judicial discretion. It should be noted that

the system of entitlement to a fixed portion applies to

children only when there is an intestacy.

Section 117

The provisions of Section 117 are as follows:

" 117. (1) Where, on application by or on behalf of a

child of a testator, the Court is of opinion that the

testator has failed in his moral duty to make proper

provision for the child in accordance with his

means, whether by his will or otherwise, the court

may order that such provision shall be made for the

child out of the estate as the court thinks just.

(2) The court shall consider the application

from the point of view of a prudent and just parent,

taking into account the position of each of the

children of the testator and any other circumstances

which the court may consider of assistance in

arriving at a decision that will be as fair as possible

to the child to whom the application relates and to

the other children.

(3) An order under this section shall not affect

the legal right of a surviving spouse or, if the

surviving spouse is the mother or father of the child,

any devise or bequest to the spouse or any share to

which the spouse is entitled on intestacy.

(4) Rules of court shall provide for the

conduct of proceedings under this section in a

summary manner.

(5) The costs in the proceedings shall be at )he

discretion of the court.

(6) An order under this section shall not be

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