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GAZETTE

SEPTEMBER 1983

legislature, the judiciary and the

executive. The Section accordingly

prohibits actions which prevent or

obstruct the wide range of activities

legislative, judicial or executive

which are involved in the government

or the governing of the State. Further

it applies to the prevention or

obstruction (by some violent means)

of the exercise or performence of any

individual legislator, Judge, member

of the executive or officer or

employee of the State of his

functions, powers or duties. It is not

even expressly required that such

individual should have been so

prevented or obstructed in the course

of those duties, or indeed that the

obstruction should have taken place

with that or any other particular

intent. However, the act complained

of must constitute an attack on the

State through one of its constitutional

organs. As Kehoe had attacked an

officer who was leading a substantial

force of Gardai in the clear

performance of a duty imposed by

law on the Government to protect a

foreign mission, he was guilty of an

offence under Section 7.

The

appeal

was

accordingly

dismissed.

D. P. P. -v- Patrick J. Kehoe Court of

CriminalAppeal (perMcCarthy J. Nem.

Diss.) 7 February 1983 —Unreported.

Michael Staines

CONVEYANCING

Contrast - Misdescription of Property -

EfTect of General Condition 21 of 1978

Edition of General Conditions of Sale of

the Incorporated Law Society - Vendor

could not compel Purchaser to complete

purchase until amount of compensation

was determined In accordance with

sub-section (2) of General Condition 21

of Contract.

The Plaintiffs (the Purchasers)

contracted to purchase certain land for

£306,000 from the Defendants (the

Vendors). The Plaintiffs instituted

proceedings against the Defendants

alleging that they entered into the sale

on the faith of certain representations

made to themby the Defendants or their

agents which they claimed were false

and misleading. They claimed that they

were entitled to relief under condition

21 of the Contract for Sale being a claim

for compensation for the mis-

description. They also claimed specific

performance of the contract with an

abatement of £100,000 of the purchase

price as compensation. The Defendants

denied all allegations of mis-represent-

ation and countejclaimed for specific

performance of the Contract. The

parties had agreed to go to arbitration

on the question of whether Condition 21

applied to the case and, if so, what

amount of compensation, if any, the

Plaintiffs were entitled to.

The matter before the Court was to

determine:

(a)Whether, if the Plaintiffs were

successful in making a claim for

compensation under Condition 21,

they were entitled to receive such

compensation by way of an

abatement of the purchase price.

(b)Whether, the Defendants were

entitled to insist upon the closing of

the sale before determination by

arbitration of the dispute as to

compensation and the amount of

same and

(c)Whether, if the answer to (b) was in

the negative, the Defendants were

entitled to insist upon closing the sale

prior to the arbitration, with the

Defendants agreeing to hold on joint

deposit the amount claimed by the

Plaintiffs pending the outcome of the

arbitration. On these points the

Court held:

(a) that if the Plaintiffs were entitled to

compensation at all theywere entitled to

it out of the purchase money

(b) that the Plaintiffs could not be

forced to close until such time as the

amount of compensation, if any, and

therefore the amount of the balance of

the purchase price had been ascertained

(c) while in many cases it would be

sensible for the parties to enter into a

supplementary agreement and to close

the sale retaining the amount of the

compensation on joint deposit, the

Court could not compel the Plaintiffs to

close the sale before the question of

compensation had been determined.

Valentine Keating, Arthur Molloy,

George Roe

-v-

The Governor and

Company of the Bank of Ireland Regin-

ald Brentland and Heather King - High

Court (per Barrington J.) 30 July 1982. -

Unreported.

Colin Keane

CONVEYANCING

Assignment ofFamily Home • No consent

form Spouse • entitlement of Spouse -

Rights of Purchaser.

The Plaintiff (Margaret Weir)

married Terence Weir the legal owner

of the house the subject matter of these

proceedings on 5 July, 1961. In October

1973 Mrs. Weir left the house with her

four children to reside in a Dublin Cor-

poration dwelling. All expenses

including rent were borne by MrsWeir.

On 20 November, 1974 Mr. & Mrs. Weir

entered into a Seperation Agreement

which was silent as to the Family Home.

XXX

On 2 August, 1976 Terence Weir

entered into a written agreement to sell

his leasehold interest in the premises to

the defendant, Mrs. Sandra Somers.

The sale was closed relying on a faulty

declaration under the Family Home

Protection Act prepared by the

purchaser's solicitor without any real

enquiry as to the facts or without any in-

spection of the separation agreement.

Terence Weir executed the statutory

declaration thus prepared and the sale

was closed on 17 August, 1976.

In April, 1977 Mrs. Somers agreed to

sell the premises. The Purchaser

required proof that the provisions of

Section 3 of the Family Home Protect-

ion Act, 1976 had not been breached

and

accordingly

Mrs.

Weir's

retrospective consent in writing to the

Assignment to Mrs Somers was

required. This was refused by Mrs. Weir

who claimed she was entitled to a pro-

prietary interest in the contract

premises. Mrs. Somers instituted High

Court proceedings seeking an order

under Section 4 of the 1976 Act dispens-

ing with the Defendant's consent to the

Assignment and such Order was granted

by the High Court. MrsWeir appealed

to the Supreme Court and the decision

of the High Court was reversed. The

Supreme Court declared the purported

conveyance of the Family Home to Mrs

Somers to be void. Further proceedings

were brought in the High Court byMrs.

Weir against her husband and on foot

of that claim it was declared:

(a) that the premises 111, Maryfield

Cresent, Artane, in the County of

Dublin was a Family Home as

between the Mr and Mrs Weir and

(b) that the Mrs Weir was entitled to a

half share in the leasehold interest in

the premises.

This order did not purport to vest any

legal estate in Mrs. Weir who by

ordinary civil bill initiated the present

proceedings claiming an injunction to

restrain Mrs. Somers or any other

occupiers of the relevant premises from

remaining on or continuing in

occupation of them as a dwelling. These

Proceedings came before the Circuit

Court Judge on 12 February 1982 Who

stated a case for the High Court. The

case stated was signed/Jby the Judge on

the 2nd of April, 1982 but for no app-

arent reason was not lodged .in the

Supreme Court office until 4 October,

1982. It was argued in the High Court on

21 February, 1983..

The Family Home Protection Act,

1976 was reviewed and it was noted that

the Act came into force on 12 July, 1976

five weeks before the execution of the

void Assignement on 17 of August,

1976. Sections 3,4 and 5 were quoted in

particular with reference to the present

case and related proceedings and it was

concluded that in the view of the court