192 / 324
If a tenant, who has been given notice
to quit, claims a
new
tenancy, and an application has to be made
to
the Court to fix the rent,
there should be no
costs awarded on either side.
The tenant of a studio and room, who had been
given notice to quit, claimed a new tenancy under
the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954. The landlord
agreed to grant a new lease, but the parties could
not agree on its terms, the landlord putting forward
a rent of £350 per annum and the tenant putting
forward a rent of £200 per annum and asking
that the landlord should enter into a repairing
covenant and put in new power points. On an
application to the county court under s. 24 (i) of
the Act, the court made an order for a new lease
at a rent of £300 without the landlord's entering
into a repairing covenant or providing new power
points. The landlord was ordered to pay one half
of the tenant's costs, the judge basing his order
as to costs on analogy with the consequence of a
defendant's paying into court, in an action, less
than was ultimately recovered against him.
On
appeal by the landlord,
HELD by
the Court of Appeal (Denning, Hodson
and Morris
L.JJ.) that in making the order as to
costs the court should consider the reasonableness
or unreasonableness of the offers on each side,
and there was no true analogy with the position
where a defendant paid money into court; in the
circumstances the proper order was that there should
be no costs on either side.
Per Denning, L.J. :—It seems to me that it is
wrong to draw any analogy with a payment into
court.
It would mean that the landlord, if he
wanted to save the costs of the hearing, would
have to offer the precise figure of rent which the
county court judge afterwards determined to be
the right figure, or a lesser sum. That would be
quite an unreasonable thing to ask a landlord to do.
In cases of this kind, it seems to me that the
court should consider the reasonableness or un
reasonableness of the offers on each side.
(Le Witt
v.
Cannon Brookes—(1956) 3. All E.R.
676).
Liana's Tribunal must exercise its discretion on appeal
to fix costs judicially.
The appellant owned an estate near Epsom
Downs and in 1948 he obtained planning consent
for its development as a garden city in accordance
with a plan which had been prepared for him by
an expert.
He claimed under section 58 of the
Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, the sum
of £217,517 for development value. He contended
before the Central Land Board that the development
value must be ascertained on the basis of his plan
of development. The board held that the plan was
not a factor which should be taken into account
and estimated the development value at so much
per foot frontage on the roads, assessing it at
£44,500. The appellant, pursuant to the provisions
of the Lands Tribunal Act, 1949, appealed to the
Lands Tribunal. The tribunal held that the board
was wrong on its basis of assessment and that the
appellant's contention was right.
The tribunal
assessed the development value at £102,500, holding
that the appellant in framing his claim had not
taken into account the delays and risks inherent in
putting the plan into operation.
The tribunal
made no order as to costs. The result of that order
was that the appellant had to bear the tribunal's
hearing fee of £500 which under paragraph 52 of
the Lands Tribunal Rules, 1949, was payable by
the appellant as claimant, without prejudice to his
right to recover the amount from any other party
by virtue of any order as to costs. The appellant
appealed from the decision of the tribunal with
regard to costs :—
HELD by the Court of
Appeal (Lord Evershed
M.R., Denning and Romer L.JJ.) (i) that where a
claimant disputed the development value fixed by
the Central Land Board and took the question of
the proper development value to the Lands Tribunal,
pursuant to the provisions of the Lands Tribunal
Act, 1949,
the proceedings before the tribunal
were an " appeal."
(2) That section 3
(5) of the Lands Tribunal
Act, 1949, showed that the award of costs was
in the discretion of the tribunal and that the power
of the Court of Appeal to hear an appeal as to costs
from an order of the tribunal was not limited by
the provisions of the Supreme Court of Judicature
(Consolidation) Act, 1925, and 'might be somewhat
more open than an appeal as to costs from the
High Court.
(3) That the tribunal failed judicially to exercise
the discretion vested in it, since it, in directing
itself, omitted to consider :
(a)
that the proceedings
were in the nature of an appeal and not an arbitra
tion ;
(b)
that the appellant's view of the basis
of valuation was right and that of the Central
Land Board was wrong.
(4) That, the parties consenting, the just order
was to direct the Central Land Board to pay one
half of the appellant's costs, including one half of
the hearing fee.
Per curiam. While as a matter of administrative
convenience it is sensible that one party should be